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财政分权、地方政府行为与环境污染

Fiscal Decentralization, Local Government and Environmental Pollution

【作者】 杨蔚

【导师】 耿强;

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 , 数量经济学, 2012, 硕士

【摘要】 财政分权和政治集中的体制设计,带来了经济的快速增长,但为增长而竞争的地方政府,往往放松环境管制标准,引起环境污染的加剧。本文通过理论模型分解了影响环境污染的规模、技术和结构效应,并将财政分权因素加入其中,探讨财政分权对环境质量的影响,进而通过简单的参数设定将理论模型与计量模型联结起来,应用中国的省级面板数据对模型进行检验,考察了财政分权对环境污染的实际影响。实证研究发现,规模效应显著提高排污量,结构效应影响并不显著,而技术效应能够显著降低排污量,目前我国确实存在污染避难所现象,而工业比重较高的地区污染明显较大。财政分权对环境的影响与地区特性紧密相关,在经济发展滞后的地区,财政分权水平的提高带来了更大的污染,但在相对收入较高的地区,随着财政自由度的提升,环境质量得到了改善。财政分权的总体效应还要考虑分权对经济增长的促进作用,经济活动增加带来的规模效应可能加重污染,从而使得财政分权对环境的总体影响不利。此外,在地方政府财政压力更大的中西部地区,财政分权对环境污染的影响更为显著,而在酸雨和二氧化硫污染两控区,更加严厉的环境规制有效约束了地方政府行为,减少了财政激励的不利影响。要在关注经济增长的同时兼顾环境质量,走可持续发展道路,重点不在于抛弃分权体制,而是要改变对地方政府的导向和激励机制,政绩考核应更多关注民生和环境保护方面的因素,引导政府回归公共品供给角色,改革财政体制,减小地区间财政能力差距,尽可能减小地方政府竞争的不利影响。

【Abstract】 China’s fiscal decentralization and political centralization system has brought this country remarkable growth in the past decades. However, the competing local governments tend to relax the environmental standards and thus generate more pollution. This paper studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution by developing a theoretical model to divide the impacts on pollution into scale, technology and structure effects, and adding the fiscal decentralization into this model. Then we test the theory using provincial panel data from China. The empirical results show that the scale effect increases pollution while the technology effect reduces pollution, and the structure effect is not significant in our sample. We also find that pollution haven phenomenon does exist in China and the pollution rises with higher ratio of industrial product in GDP. Fiscal decentralization’s impact on pollution is closely related to local characteristics, in provinces with lower relative income level, higher fiscal decentralization level brings more pollution, while in areas with high income it improves environmental quality. The gross effect of decentralization depends on its effect on economic growth because the scale effect may worsen the situation. Moreover, in middle and western China where local governments face more fiscal pressure, the effect of decentralization is more significant. Also, in the acid rain and SO2pollution control area, more stringent laws and controls effectively regulate the action of local governments and reduce the negative effect of decentralization. In order to take the way of sustainable development and value the environment as well as economic growth, we should change the incentives of local governments and attach more importance on residents’welfare and environmental quality when evaluate their performances. For reducing the negative effect of interregional competition, fiscal system should be reformed to balance the financial capacity among different regions.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 南京大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2012年 10期
  • 【分类号】F224;F812;F205
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】526
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