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基于完全信息动态博弈的国有资本收益收取研究

The Analysis of State-owned Capital Revenue Collection and Management Based on the Dynamic Game Theory of Complete Information

【作者】 张菡

【导师】 胡兴旺;

【作者基本信息】 郑州大学 , 管理科学与工程, 2012, 硕士

【摘要】 以国有资本收益收取为研究对象,通过对影响国有资本收益的各类因素进行分析,选择可以体现国有资本经营状况的指标,创造性的将完全信息动态博弈模型带入资本收益收取研究,从全新的博弈角度对国有资本收益的收取问题展开研究。回顾国有资本收益收取的演变历程,基于国内外关于国有资本收益管理研究成果,根据国内外关于国企分红的理论研究基础,本文对国有资本收益收取问题进行系统性分析,提出合理确定国有资本收益收取比例的理论方法。首先,根据国内不同行业国有资本管理现状,选择资源性行业和竞争性行业为研究范围,并根据国有资本的行业分布状况,将研究对象锁定为两类典型行业中具有代表性的国有独资企业。其次,分析国有企业现存的分红条件,不同行业中,不同的经营环境下,政府的采取分红方式不同,企业接受的分红方式不同。建立政府与国有企业之间关于国有资本收益收取的博弈格局,分析得出博弈类型为完全信息动态博弈,结合Cobb-Douglas生产函数,得出解决关于国企分红的核心问题即国有资本分红中的收益收取比例问题的模型。最后,结合模型对国有资本运营的宏观环境进行分析,并得出影响利润收取比例的两个宏观因素,分别为资本产出弹性系数和劳动力产出弹性系数。论文针对两个因素分别进行分析,并将所搜集的实际数据代入模型,结合现状分析实证结果,提出完善收益收取制度的参考建议。

【Abstract】 In order to study the collection of State-owned net capital gains, we select the economic benefit indices that could reflect the status of State-Owned capital management through the analysis of all kinds of factors that could influence the capital benefit. Now we introduce the complete information dynamic game model to the collection research on the State-Owned capital gain creatively and could do research on the collection issue from a new angle.Through the review of the history of the collection of the State-Owned capital gains, we learn the research results at home and abroad. Then according to domestic and foreign research on SOE dividend theory, we do system availability analysis of the collection of the State-Owned capital and get the theoretical method of determining the charge radio of the State-Owned capital gainsFirstly, according to present management situation of different industry State-Owned capital, we choose resource industry and competitive industry as the research objects. According to the state assets distribution in industry, we finally focus on representative of the State-Owned enterprises in the two typical industries as the objects. Secondly, through the analysis of the existing condition, we get that in some limited condition enterprises will accept the government’s dividend policy. And we want to know in which circumstances the government will take counter measures. So we could establish the game situation about to collect the State-Owned net benefit between the Government and the State-Owned enterprises and make sure that the type of game is compete information dynamic game. Combining with Cobb-Douglas production function we get the core issue that the proportion of the State-Owned enterprise dividend policy.Lastly, combined with the model we do analysis about the operation macro environment of the State-Owned capital. There are two macro factors that affect the charge radio which are capital output elastic coefficient and labor output elastic coefficient respectively. According to the two factors that are analyzed and put actual data into the model, we get the empirical results and put forward recommendations to improve revenue collection system

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 郑州大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2012年 09期
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