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我国大米纵向市场价格传导机制研究

The Research About Rice Vertical Market’s Transmission Mechanism in China

【作者】 陈鹏

【导师】 杨万江;

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 , 产业经济学, 2012, 硕士

【摘要】 进入21世纪以来,我国的粮食储备已达到2亿吨,粮食自给率常年保持在95%以上。可以说,短期内粮食供给已不存在问题。但是长期来看,依然存在隐患。由于历史原因,我国的粮食价格一直保持在较低水平,在此背景下,经济迅速发展以及劳动力跨区域流动成本降低所形成的经济冲击必然导致粮食生产的机会成本上升,农户供给函数改变,进而引起粮食价格的变化,最终影响到整个粮食产业的发展。大米作为我国最重要的粮食品种,在这一过程中必然首当其冲。因此本文以大米纵向市场为研究对象,对经济冲击下该市场内各类价格的变化规律,即价格的传导机制,进行考察。本文将大米纵向市场抽象为由农户、收购商、零售商和消费者四个主体所组成的,包含收购、批发以及零售三个市场的有机系统。基于中国现实,提出合理假设,并以此为基础推导出不存在经济冲击与政府干预的条件下纵向市场的静态均衡条件。在此基础上,引入经济冲击因素,对市场均衡进行比较静态分析,推导出无政府干预条件下由经济冲击所造成的价格波动在大米纵向市场系统中的传导机制。结果表明系统均衡点的移动必然导致大米纵向市场向完全垄断的方向演化。无论是从经济实力,还是国家安全的角度考虑,只有政府可以充当最终垄断者的角色。由此可以得出结论,政府短期内的不干预政策必然导致长期内最严厉的干预政策——国家垄断——的出现。这一结论为国家调控粮食市场提供了理论依据。在以上研究的基础上,本文分别将农户补贴政策、收购商补贴政策、库存政策与保护价政策引入均衡移动模型,推导出不同政策下价格传导机制的特点,进而对不同的政策作出评价:农户补贴政策最适于中国目前国情;收购商补贴政策若能消除其制度性障碍即可有力推动大米产业的发展;库存政策具有放大性与不可持续性,可以作为应对突发事件的应急性政策工具,长期使用不利于大米生产且容易产生价格的剧烈波动;保护价政策短期内可以维护农户的经济利益,长期内却会导致大米市场向完全垄断的方向演化,对包括农户在内的全社会产生不良影响,因此可以作为权宜性政策,而不可持久本文最后利用现有的大米价格数据,构建VAR模型对所做出的理论推导进行实证检验并以此为依据提出政策建议,并对本研究做出展望。

【Abstract】 Since the beginning of 21th century, our grain reserves has been 200 million tons and the degree of self-efficiency keeps above 95%. We can see that food supply in the short term is on problem any more; however, there is hidden trouble in the long term. Because of historical reasons, the food price of our country has been at a relevantly low level. Under such circumstances, the economic impact generated by the rapid growth of economy and a reduction of the cost of interregional labor mobility will certainly lead to the increase of the opportunity cost of food production and changes of farmers’supply function which will further result in changes of food prices and influence the development of the whole food industry. Rice, as the most important grain variety of our country will definitely bear the brunt of it. This article takes the vertical market of rice as an example, researches into the change law of all kinds of prices in the market under economic impact, the transmission mechanism of prices.This article abstracts the vertical market of rice into four subjects, farmers, buyers, wholesalers and consumers which consist of three organic systems of the market, buying, wholesaling and retailing. Based in the reality of China, we put forward a rational hypothesis and based on the hypothesis we deduce the equalizing conditions of the vertical market which is free of economic impact and government’s intervention. Based on this, we introduce economic impact factors, conduct comparative static analysis of market equaling and deduce the transmission mechanism of economic impacts in the vertical market without government’s intervention; the result of this tells us that the mobility of the system balanced point will definitely lead to the total monopolization of the rice vertical market. Whether we take economic strength or national security into consideration, only the government can play the role of the final monopolist. We can deduce from this that the government’s nonintervention in a short term will definitely result in the toughest intervention, state intervention. This conclusion provides the theoretical basis for the government’s regulation of food market.Based on the research above, this article respectively introduce farmers’ subsidy policies, buyers’subsidy, inventory policies and protective price policies into the equaling mobility model, deduce the different features of price transmission mechanism under different policies and make comments about the policies:farmers’ subsidy policies are most suitable for the current conditions of China; buyers’subsidy policies, if without its systematic barriers, can forcefully promote the development of rice industry; inventory policies have amplification and are unsustainable which enables it to be the stop gap policy tool against emergencies, but using it in a long term will do harm to rice production and will lead to severe fluctuation of prices; protective price policies can protect farmers’economic benefit in a short term, but it will cause the rice market to evolve to total monopolization and do harm to the whole society including farmers; thus it can only serve as an expedient policy and can’t be used in a long term.Using current data of rice prices, this article builds a VAR model to conduct empirical test of the theoretical deduction; and based on this it put forward policy suggestions and make prospect of this research.

【关键词】 大米纵向市场价格传导均衡移动VAR模型
【Key words】 RiceVertical MarketTransmission MechanismEDMVAR
  • 【网络出版投稿人】 浙江大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2012年 09期
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