【作者】 尹洁；

【导师】 陈收；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 工商管理， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 我国开放式基金自2001年9月成立以来,始终按照基金净值固定比例提取管理报酬。2008年股市大跌,基金投资者亏损巨大,但是基金管理者的管理报酬总额不降反增,引发了基金持有者的强烈不满,基金管理报酬的问题受到基金业界和学术界的广泛关注。“旱涝保收”的基金管理报酬模式实质上反映了我国基金管理报酬激励约束机制有效性不足。本文对我国现行报酬模式的激励现状进行了描述,发现基金管理报酬主要随基金规模大小而变,与基金收益关系不明确,随后从经济学和管理学的激励理论出发,分析了不同管理报酬模式下基金管理者可能采取的各种不同行为;本文还以2006年以前上市的股票型开放式基金为例,对我国基金管理报酬激励约束现状进行实证研究,结果发现基金管理者所获得的报酬与其所管理的基金业绩不存在统计上的相关性,进一步证实了现行管理报酬模式所导致的基金管理者激励约束不足问题。对此,本文运用委托代理分析框架,设计了一种混合管理报酬模式,通过将基金管理报酬与基金业绩联动起来,实现了基金管理者与基金持有者利益的捆绑。并通过与现行管理报酬模式进行比较研究,在理论上证明了相同管理报酬成本下,混合管理报酬模式下基金管理者将会付出比现行报酬模式下更大的努力水平。不同于传统提取业绩报酬的方式,本文区分了基金业绩的来源,仅仅针对基金业绩中与基金管理者努力水平相关的那部分业绩进行奖惩,以保证基金管理报酬的获取与基金管理者的付出的一致。更多还原

【Abstract】 The open-end funds in China have been charged management compensation by the fixed proportion of NAV since the foundation in Sept. 2001. Although fund investors suffering serious losses from the stock market crash in 2008, the total amount of management compensation charged by fund managers increases instead of decrease, which makes fund holders strongly dissatisfied. Then, the management compensation arouses wide attention of the people from fund industry and academia. The management compensation contract which is“ensure stable yields despite drought or excessive rain”essentially reflects the lack of effectiveness of the funds management compensation incentive and restraint mechanism in China.This paper describes the current situation of the compensation incentive, and finds that management compensation vary with the size of the fund while its relationship with fund performance is uncertain. Then, based on the incentive theory of economic and management, the paper analyses probable behaviors that fund managers may adopt in different compensation contracts. It conducts an empirical study on the current fund management compensation incentive and restraint mechanism in China by taking equity open-end funds issued before 2006 as sample, and the results show that the fund management compensation are statistically irrelevant to the fund performance, which further confirms the problem of incentive and restraint for fund manager that caused by current compensation contract.This paper designs a new mixed management compensation contract based on principal-agent analysis framework, which combines the interests of managers and holders by enhancing an interactive development between fund management compensation and fund performance. Making comparative study of the new mixed management compensation contract and current contract, it theoretically proves that the new mixed management compensation contract can make fund managers work harder than the fixed one under the same management compensation Meanwhile, it classifies the sources of fund performance and award and punishment will be adopted to managers only on the performance section linked to fund managers’effort level, in order to keep management compensation consistent with managers’efforts.更多还原