双渠道环境下制造商产品定价与服务决策

【作者】 胡伟超；

【导师】 田厚平；

【作者基本信息】 南京理工大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 随着互联网的普及和电子商务的迅猛发展,许多传统制造企业增设了网络直销渠道,希望企业能在未来的市场竞争中占得先机。但是,对于这些传统企业而言,开设网络渠道会面临着诸多困难。一方面,实证研究表明服务质量逐渐成为影响消费者网购的重要因素,而在服务方面,网络渠道与传统渠道有着很大的不同,企业为提供优质的服务,可能会付出高昂的成本,如何平衡服务与成本的关系也是其着重考虑的问题。另一方面,制造企业引入网络直销渠道,会与零售商的传统渠道形成竞争,引发渠道冲突。因此,如何通过合理的定价策略,协调好渠道利益,也是传统制造企业增设网络直销渠道时亟待解决的问题。针对上述两个问题,本文主要以博弈论中的相关理论为研究工具,建立定量模型,并结合算例分析,深入研究了双渠道供应链环境下制造商的定价与服务策略,并得到了一些有价值的结论。首先,本文重点考虑了制造商的服务决策。通过引入“不适成本”来衡量网络渠道服务质量,并建立了斯坦克尔伯格博弈和纳什博弈模型,研究了集中式和分散式双渠道供应链下最优的价格和服务决策,分析了网络渠道的不适成本对制造商和零售商最优价格决策的影响,以及消费者的网络渠道偏好对制造商的服务策略、制造商和零售商的定价策略及利润状况的影响。研究表明,网络渠道的服务质量(不适成本)的确对制造商和零售商的定价策略有着重要影响。算例分析发现,消费者对网络渠道价格和服务的敏感性、网络渠道偏好对制造商和零售商的服务和价格决策以及双方的利润有着重要影响。其次,为了缓解渠道冲突,本文引入了一致定价策略,分析了一致定价策略下,制造商和零售商的最优决策和利润状况。并通过算例分析将一致定价策略与区别定价策略进行对比研究,分析了网络渠道偏好和批发价对定价策略选择的影响,找出有利于缓解渠道冲突的定价策略。研究发现,只有当消费者对网络渠道偏好不是很大时,一致定价策略对零售商有利。而对于制造商和供应链整体而言,大多数情况下区别定价策略要优于一致定价策略,当消费者对网络渠道偏好适中时,制造商选择一致定价策略可以使制造商和供应链整体损失的利润较少。另外,当制造商定价权力较小时,其更愿意选择一致定价策略。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the popularity of the Internet and the rapid development of e-commerce, more and more manufacturers are introducing online channel to sell their products directly, so that enterprises can seize the opportunities in the future market competition. However, the traditional enterprises which have focused on offline business will face many difficulties when they introduce online channel. On the one hand, empirical studies have shown that service quality has become an important factor influencing consumer acceptance of the online shopping. However, there are some differences between online channel and traditional channel. The manufacturers may pay a high cost in order to provide high quality service. How to balance the relationship between service and cost is a stressed problem need to be considered. On the other hand, the online direct channel which be introduced by manufacturer will compete with the traditional channel, leading to channel conflict. Therefore, how to coordinate online channel and traditional through reasonable pricing strategy has become an important problem of manufacturers when they open up online channel.In response to these two questions, we build a dual-channel pricing model based on game theory and combine of numerical analysis of our model, to study manufacturer’s pricing and service strategy in dual-channel supply chain. We get some valuable conclusions eventually.First, we consider manufacturer’s service decisions emphatically. We introduce "inconvenient cost "measuring service quality of online channel, and examine the optimal decisions of inconvenient cost and prices in a centralized and a decentralized dual-channel supply chain using the two-stage optimization technique based on Stackelberg Game and Nash Game. We analyze the impacts of inconvenient cost and consumer preference of online channel on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing behaviors, and the impacts of consumer preference of the online channel on inconvenient cost, pricing decisions and profits. We analytically show that inconvenient cost strongly influences the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s pricing strategies. Numerical studies reveal that the difference between the price and service sensitivity of consumers, and consumer preference of the online channel have great effects on the service, pricing decisions and profits.Second, we introduce equal-pricing strategy in order to mitigate channel conflict. We examine the optimal decisions and profits of manufacturer and retailer. We compare the equal-pricing strategy with unequal-pricing strategy through numerical analysis of our model, and analyze the impacts of consumer preference of online channel and wholesale price on the choice between the two pricing strategies of manufacturer. Numerical studies reveal that the equal-pricing is beneficial to retailers when consumer preference of the online channel is not high. The unequal-pricing strategy is better than equal-pricing for manufacturer and supply chain in most cases, while the equal-pricing strategy makes manufacturer and supply chain loss less profits when consumer preference of the online channel is moderate. The manufacturer prefers to choose equal-pricing strategy when its pricing power is small.更多还原