【作者】 陶前锋；

【导师】 赵苑达；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 保险学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 我国作为一个传统的农业大国,农业抗风险能力却非常脆弱。在积极构建社会主义和谐社会和实现共同富裕的今天,如果农业不发展、农民收入不增加、农村不稳定,那么构建社会主义和谐社会与实现共同富裕将会是一句空口号。我国保险业发展较快,但农业保险发展缓慢。农业保险发展缓慢是由多方面原因造成的,首先源于农业自身面临的巨大风险,包括自然风险和市场风险等；其次农业保险面临着由信息不对称引起的逆向选择和道德风险问题。本文将运用保险学、经济学等方面的知识,对农业保险的逆向选择和道德风险问题进行分析,并提出相关对策以解决我国农业保险发展缓慢的问题,从而达到转移农业风险、改善农村环境、增加农民收入的目的,最终为构建社会主义和谐社会与实现共同富裕提供强劲动力。一、国内研究情况及趋势在对农业保险中逆向选择和道德风险问题的研究上,国内学者祁贵义在《防范逆向选择和道德风险之对策》一文中,提出了建立风险评估机制的观点。俞雅乖在《有效需求、道德风险：农业产业化和政策性农业保险》一文中提出了农业产业化经营的理念。吕秀萍(2006年)从保险合同主体角度分析了保险市场的信息不对称风险；从投保方和保险方分别处于信息优劣地位的情形,分析了保险合同主体的信息不对称风险,目的在于分析保险合同主体信息不对称风险的防范对策。二、国外研究情况及趋势乔治·阿克洛夫(George Akerlof,1970年)对旧车市场模型(lemons model)的分析开创了逆向选择理论的先河。在旧车市场上,逆向选择问题来自买者和卖者有关车的质量信息不对称。卖者知道车的真实质量,而买者不知道,只知道车的平均质量,因而只愿意根据平均质量支付价格。这样一来,质量高于平均水平的卖者就会退出交易,质量低的卖者进入市场,结果是市场上出售的旧车质量下降,买者愿意支付的价格进一步下降,更多较高质量的车退出市场。在均衡的情况下,只有低质量的车成交。在极端情况下,市场可能根本不存在，交易的帕累托改进不能实现。1986年,Luz Maria Bassoco等人对墨西哥农业保险补贴问题进行研究,认为政府的保费补贴低于2/3时,就不能有效的吸引农业生产者。1997年,Knight and Coble对美国农业保险进行了调查,详细讨论了信息不对称而引起的逆向选择和道德风险。本文的创新之处：针对农业保险的逆向选择和道德风险问题,提出建立最优奖惩系统；分别从政府、保险公司和农户等方面考虑,较为全面的提出了切实可行的举措。另外,提出了大力发展农产品企业等,对农业产业进行规模化经营的思路,以达到降低逆向选择和道德风险的目的。本文的不足之处：农业保险不是主要保险公司的主要业务,因而获取数据的途径较少,定量分析有所欠缺；另外,在参考文献方面,所获得的文章有限,在一定程度上会影响研究。基于本人所选的论文题目、掌握的保险知识以及阅读的相关书籍文章,本文大致分为六部分：第一部分为绪论部分,阐述本文选题背景、问题的提出以及研究的目的与意义；国内外文献综述、研究方法、结构安排。第二部分以农业保险的概念为起点,逐步陈述了农业保险与农业风险的相关问题。第三部分着重分析了我国农业保险发展过程中遇到的瓶颈问题——逆向选择与道德风险问题。农业保险发展缓慢,原因主要在于以下两方面：一方面是农业保险自身的特点,高风险性、高赔付率、高亏损率的特性。另一方面则是逆向选择与道德风险问题,后者则是本文分析的重点。第四部分,主要介绍了在逆向选择与道德风险问题上,我国农业保险的现状,经历的六个阶段。第五部分比较了国外农业保险在处理逆向选择与道德风险问题上的差异,重点介绍了美国、日本、法国与菲律宾的农业保险制度,总结了国外农业保险在此问题上的经验教训。第六部分作为本文的结论部分,分别从政府、农户及农业保险公司的角度出发,提出了解决农业保险中的逆向选择与道德风险问题的思路。更多还原

【Abstract】 Our country as a traditional agricultural country, but agricultural ability to resist risk is very fragile. In actively constructing socialist harmonious society and realizing common prosperity today, if agriculture don’t develop, rural is not stable, farmers’income is not increasing, so the construction of socialist harmonious society and realizing common prosperity will be an empty slogan.The insurance industry develops fast, but the development of agricultural insurance is slow. The development of agricultural insurance is slow by various reasons, first from the huge risk facing agriculture itself, including natural risk and market risk, etc.; second, agricultural insurance confronted by information asymmetry adverse selection and moral hazard problem. This article will use the insurance study, economics, and so the knowledge of the respect, to the agricultural insurance of adverse selection and moral hazard were analyzed, and puts forward relevant strategies to solve the slow development of agricultural insurance, so as to achieve the transfer of rural risk, improving the environment and increasing the farmers’ income purpose, in order to construct a socialist harmonious society and realizing common prosperity provide strong power.First, the domestic research situation and trendsIn the agricultural insurance of adverse selection and moral hazard on, Chinese scholars Qiguiyi in "the guard against the risk of adverse selection and moral countermeasures", proposes that risk evaluation mechanism point of view. Yuyaguai in "the effective demand, moral risk:the industrialization of agriculture and the policy-based agriculture insurance."in the article puts forward the concept of the industrialized operation of agriculture. Lvxiuping (2006) from the insurance contract subject to analyze the information asymmetry of the insurance market risk; from the insured and the insurer in the information quality of position respectively situation, analyzes the insurance contract subject information asymmetry risk, the purpose to analyze insurance contract subject information asymmetry of risk prevention countermeasures. Second, research abroad and trendsGeorge Akerlof (George Akerlof,1970) on the old car market model (lemons model) analysis started adverse selection theory precedent. In the old car market, adverse selection problem from buyers and sellers about the quality of the cars information asymmetry. Know the true quality whose car, and buyers don’t know, just know car average quality, and therefore only willing to pay the price according to the average quality. This way, the quality is higher than the average level of the sellers will get out of the trade, low quality of the sellers to enter the market, the result is sold on the market of the old car quality drop, buyers willing to pay the price drops further, more higher quality car to withdraw from the market. In a balanced cases, only low quality car clinch a deal. In extreme cases, the market may not exist, trade pareto improvement can’t come true. In 1986, Luz Maria Bassoco to Mexico to agricultural insurance subsidies, think the government’s premium subsidies less than two-thirds, can effective attract agricultural producers. In 1997, the Knight and Coble agricultural insurance to the United States on the investigation, and discusses the information asymmetry and cause adverse selection and moral hazard.The innovation of this paper place:according to agricultural insurance of adverse selection and moral hazard problem, and puts forward to building the best rewards and punishment system; separately from the government, insurance companies and households taken into account, comprehensive, and puts forward practical measures. In addition, puts forward the developing agricultural enterprise, etc., to the agricultural industry scale management ideas, in order to decrease the risk of adverse selection and moral purpose.This deficiency:the agricultural insurance is not main insurance company’s main business, so get the data way less, quantitative analysis is in;in addition, in reference to the literature, obtained by the article limited, in the certain extent impact study.Based on my personal choice, and grasp the thesis topic of insurance knowledge and reading books related articles, this paper roughly divided into six parts:The first part is the introduction section, this paper expounds the problem put forward to choose a background, and the purpose of the research and meaning; domestic and foreign literature review, research methods, the structure arrangement.The second part to the concept of agricultural insurance as the starting point, and gradually stated the agricultural insurance and agricultural risks related problems.The third part focuses on analyzing the development of agricultural insurance encountered in the process of the bottleneck problem-adverse selection and moral hazard problem. The development of agricultural insurance is slow, reason lies mainly in the following two aspects:one is the characteristics of agricultural insurance, high risk, high through the characteristics of high rate, losses. On the other hand is adverse selection and moral hazard problem, while the latter is the focus of analysis in this paper.The fourth part, mainly introduced in adverse selection and moral hazard problem, the present situation of China’s agricultural insurance, experience of six stages.The fifth part compared the foreign agricultural insurance in the treatment of adverse selection and moral hazard problem differences, the paper focuses on the United States, Japan, France, and the Philippines agricultural insurance system, and to sum up the foreign agricultural insurance in the lessons.The sixth part as a part of the conclusion of this paper respectively from the government, farmers and agriculture insurance company angle, and puts forward some solutions to the agricultural insurance adverse selection and moral hazard problem of thought.更多还原