【作者】 杨煜炫；

【导师】 于颖；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 社会学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 近几年来中国行政官员腐败案件频发,且查处的腐败行政官员人数与涉案资金数额逐年增多,虽然国家多次采取对行政官员腐败的严打行动,但收效有限。本文论题就是针对以上问题,通过社会学视角,分析当前社会盛行的潜规则与行政官员腐败的之间的联系,从中得出行政官员腐败的社会原因,以及潜规则在行政官员腐败交易中所扮演的角色与具体作用。通过本文对潜规则和行政官员腐败之间关系的深刻分析,可为政府及相关组织有效缓解行政官员腐败这一社会现象,提供一些社会学参考资料与理论依据,进而为政治体制改革和社会管理创新作出贡献。本文首先以新闻资料为背景介绍中国行政官员腐败的现状,并提出历史上每当行政官员腐败问题较严重的时期,潜规则也同时盛行,这是否是巧合,以及行政官员腐败与潜规则有什么样的关系,等问题。其后,笔者综述本文的参考文献,界定了文中使用的相关理论、概念,其中笔者借用社会学家吴思的概念,将潜规则定义为：潜规则是隐蔽的、背离正规则的、双方私下约定认可的,并给双方带来利益或减少损失的约束规则。又参考著名社会学家黎翔对潜规则的一些论证,包括潜规则在社会中的产生原因,潜规则视角下的四大社会群体等。随后简单阐述了正规则、社会交换理论、“场域—惯习”理论,以及中国行政官员的定义、内容与界定范围等相关概念。其次,本文参考潜规则的定义属性及相关理论,用社会交换理论通过二手资料分析法,分析有腐败行为的行政官员与行贿者进行潜规则腐败交易的过程比如收送红包和收送高价礼品等潜规则腐败交易案例,总结出行政官员与行贿者之所以利用潜规则达成腐败交易,是因为通过潜规则的方式,可以使行政官员与行贿者双方比在正规则交换系统中获得更多的利益或损失更少的资源,这一“理性需要”。并提出,潜规则给予行政官员进行腐败交易的利益诱惑,也赋予行政官员在与行贿者进行腐败交易的相对权威,保证了腐败行政官员在腐败交易中自身的利益获得,令潜规则交易按腐败行政官员的意志采用隐蔽性高的方式,加上信任腐败交易的“圈子”的建立及扩大,使部分行政官员在与行贿者进行腐败交易时,降低了其所承担的因违法受到惩罚和交换失败的风险成本,提高了交易双方对潜规则腐败交易的认可度,使腐败行政官员与行贿者利用潜规则进行腐败交易的行为愈加猖獗。论证了潜规则与行政官员腐败之间,相互促进、相互支持的作用关系。再次,运用法国社会学家布迪厄的“场域—惯习”理论通过二手资料分析法,分析影响腐败行政官员、行贿者、旁观者与监督者在中国社会中,面临的主客观因素,总结出潜规则视角下社会中四大群体各自面临的如逐利思想、从众心理、侥幸心理、“默认”心理与负面历史文化等主观因素,资源利益、所处环境、政治权力等客观因素,综合促使中国潜规则腐败交易的产生与盛行,正如法国社会学家布迪厄的“场域—惯习”理论所阐述的那样,由于腐败行政官员与行贿者,在这种客观“场域”中,受到不同的主观“惯习”的影响与指导,所共同作出的失范交换行为。虽然,这些主客观因素并不—定造成部分行政官员与行贿者的潜规则腐败交易,但其提高了双方对潜规则的认可度,成为影响腐败行政官员与行贿者潜规则交易的产生条件之一。最后,本文列举了行政官员权力过大,行政官员决策过程不透明,社会四大群体对正规则认同感不足,社会监督者权力较弱等特殊国情,这些为行政官员利用潜规则腐败,最终导致行政官员腐败制约失灵创造了一定的条件。并提出适当限制行政官员权力,增强行政官员决策过程透明度,加强社会四大群体对正规则的认同感,增强社会监督者的权力与独立性等具体的建议,从而促使中国社会中四大群体在社会实践中,直接或间接的抑制潜规则腐败交易的产生与盛行,以达到抑制中国行政官员腐败的目地。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the last few years China’s administrative official corruption cases have frequently occurred and the investigated corruptive officials with involved illegal funds have increased year by year. Although serious punishing movements were adopted to deal with official corruption, little effect was achieved. Consequently, I view our country’s corruption restriction system is malfunction generally.From the sociological angle of view, the thesis aims at above-mentioned questions, and analyses the relationship between the hidden rules which are in vogue in society and our country’s administrative official corruption. Meanwhile we attempt to infer the social reasons of our country’s administrative official corruption, as well as the role and concrete function of hidden rules in the transaction of administrative official corruption. The profound analysis of the relationship between the hidden rules and our country’s administrative official corruption can offer some social reference and theoretical basis for our country and related organization to effectively alleviate the executive official corruption, thus make contributions to our country’s political reform and social management.The thesis, first, based on the news data, introduces the situation of our country’s administrative official corruption. Then questions were put forward. When the problem of corruption of administrative officials was serious in history, hidden rules were on prevalence too. Was this a coincidence. What was the relationship between the administrative official corruption and the hidden rules. Then a detailed literature review defines the related theories and concepts. Based on the definition of sociologist Wu Si, hidden rules are hidden, away from rational rules, recognized in private between the two sides and beneficial or less loss to both sides. Then some citations from famous sociologist Li Xiang about hidden rules are referenced, which includes the social reasons of hidden rules and four categories of social groups from the view of hidden rules. Subsequently it simply describes rational rules, exchange theory and "Field-Habitus" theory, and the definition, content and scope of administrative officials.Secondly, with the reference of the definition of hidden rules and relevant theories and exchange theory, the thesis analyzes the trading process using hidden rules between the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber. For example, there are the cases of sending a red envelope and expensive gifts. It sums up that the reason why the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber adopt hidden rules is that through it both the administrative officials and briber can meet the so-called rational need, that is, more benefits or less loss than what they get in the open rules. Meanwhile hidden rules give the temptation of interests and relative authority in the process of corruption to the administrative officials, which also guarantee the obtaining of interests in the process of corruption. Through the hidden rules the administrative officials who are corruptive take shelter. With the establishment and expansion of corruption circles, the punishment from illegal behaviors and the risk of trading failure are less and the degrees of recognition of hidden rules are rising. Then the mutual promoting and support and mutual symbiotic relationships are demonstrated between hidden rules and administrative official corruption.Then with the "field-habitus" theory by French sociologist Bourdieu and the analysis of second-hand material, the subjective and objective factors are showed in the trading process using hidden rules between the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber. The subjective factors include the thought of pursuit of profits, following the others, luck and so on. The objective factors cover the interests of resources, the environment, and political power and so on. Just as the "field-habitus" theory by French sociologist Bourdieu, the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber are subjective to respective subjective and objective factors and commit some irregular exchange behaviors. Although the subjective and objective factors, does not necessarily result in the trading process using hidden rules between the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber, the degrees of recognition of hidden rules are rising between both sides, which will be one of the conditions of producing the trading process using hidden rules between the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber.Last but not least, the following state conditions are listed in the thesis:the over-power of the administrative officials, the opacity of the process of administrative official’s policy-making, the lack of cognition of open rules of four major social groups and the weakness of social supervision power, which provide the certain conditions that the administrative officials make the most of the hidden rules and the policy of restricting the corruption of the administrative officials is out of order. The suggestions are proper restricting of the power of the administrative officials, more transparency of the process of administrative official’s policy-making, more cognition of open rules of four major social groups and more power and independency of the social supervision power. Those can directly or indirectly prevent the corruption trading of hidden rules from occurring and prevailing so that the purpose of limiting the administrative officials’ corruption is achieved.更多还原