机构投资者持股影响因素的实证研究

【作者】 周瑀；

【导师】 李定清；

【作者基本信息】 重庆工商大学 ， 会计学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 随着市场经济的不断发展,我国的投资机构迎来了跨越式的发展,已经成为资金雄厚、拥有巨大市场影响力的主体。越来越多人的经济状况与社会保障基金、证券投资基金等机构投资者在资本市场中的投资经营有关。很多学者的研究认为机构投资者的壮大彻底改变了公司的股权结构,改善了传统的公司治理,成为多数发达资本市场建设过程和上市公司治理进程中不可或缺的重要力量。但是在研究中,他们通常没有对机构投资者的身份进行区分,与个人投资者相比,机构投资者是用别人的资金进行投资,在信息不对称的固有矛盾下具有双重的委托代理的身份,这对机构投资者的投资产生影响。本文通过对影响机构投资者持股因素的分析,力图研究出它们在资本市场上的表现和参与公司治理的程度。首先,在理论上,本文结合委托代理、信息不对称等基础理论,分析机构投资者特殊的双重身份。从上市公司的治理结构上看,机构投资者是它的股东之一,是委托方;而对投资者而言,投资机构主要由融资构成,本身的所有权与经营权也是相分离的,机构投资者的管理层与资金委托人之间也具有委托代理关系,充当代理人的角色。本文在此基础上,对机构投资者的持股决策进行分析,分别从机构投资者的经纪人本质、风险控制、持股特性以及决策选择四个方面进行论述。其次,本文在实证研究中,选取了2007—2009年度在沪、深两市公开发行A、B、H股的上市公司共2856个作为样本。并对这些样本公司的财务信息、市场表现信息以及公司治理信息与机构投资者持股的比率的相关性进行了实证检验,验证了本文提出的假设,即机构投资者持股与上市公司的财务信息、市场表现信息以及公司治理信息存在着显著的相关关系。最后,根据研究结论提出建议,我国在大力发展机构投资者的同时,应该不断完善机构投资者管理、监督制度,加强对机构投资者的教育,从而抑制机构投资者在资本市场中的投机行为,提高自身对公司治理的参与程度,发挥其在资本市场中的积极作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the development of market economy , China’s institutional investors welcomed the development by leaps and bounds. They have developed into the main financial strength which has a huge influence on the capital market. More and more people’s economic situation has relationship with institutional investors’investments in the capital market,such as social security funds,securities investment funds. Many scholars believe that the growth of institutional investors completely changed the ownership structure and improved the traditional corporate governance. Institutional investors have become the most important force in developing capital markets and corporate governance process. But in the study,they usually did not distinguish the identity of institutional investors. Compared with individual investors,institutional investors use other people’s money to invest,and they have a double identity of agent under the contradictions of the information asymmetry. This is all impact of institutional investors. On this basis, this paper analyzes the factors of institutional investors holding to try to work out their performance in the capital markets and the degree of participation in corporate governance.First of all, in theory,this paper refers to the basic theory such as agency theory and asymmetric information theory, and analyzes the special dual role of institutional investors. In the governance structure of listed companies, institutional investors are one of its shareholders and the Principal. For investors, investment institutions are constituted mainly by the financing,and their own ownership and management is also a separation. The management of institutional investors and the client is also a principal-agentrelationship. From this perspective, they are agents. On this basis,the paper analyzes the institutional investors holding decision-making from four aspects as the nature of institutional investors,risk control,ownership characteristics and decision-making choices.Secondly,in the empirical study, this paper selects total of 2856 listed companies as samples who offering A,B,H shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock in 2007-2009. Then,it examines the correlation ratio about the information of these sample companies and institutional investors holding,including financial information,market information and corporate governance performance information. These verify the hypothesis proposed in this paper. Between institutional investors holding and information of listed companies like financial information,market information and corporate governance information is a significant relationship.Finally,according to research findings to make recommendations, institutional investors should continue to improve the management and supervision system,while our country is to develop institutional investors,enhance the education of institutional investors. Its purpose is to inhibit institutional investors’speculations in the capital market,improve their level of participation in corporate governance,and play their positive roles in the capital market.更多还原