【作者】 苗露；

【导师】 罗宏；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 会计学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 投资是企业最重要的战略决策,其效率高低直接决定了公司价值的大小。企业投资行为是否有效率,对企业价值最大化的财务目标能否顺利实现具有重要影响。然而,控制权和所有权相分离是现代企业的典型特征,即企业的资源配置权是由较少持有或不持有公司股份的管理者来控制的。在企业管理者进行投资决策时,由于道德风险和信息不对称的存在,他们很可能首先从自身利益出发来选择投资项目和发动公司并购,而这些决策可能只对其自身有利而非有益于股东,因此造成了偏离企业最大化目标且无效率的投资行为。通常表现为经营者为了获得更多的私人利益将企业的现金流投资于净现值为负的项目,造成了企业过度投资的问题。过度投资使得企业资本大量沉淀在生产能力过剩的领域,造成资源浪费和公司价值下降,影响资本市场有效配置资源功能的实现。企业的高层管理者(以下简称高管)是以经营和管理企业为职业,在企业内作为战略决策者,掌握企业的最终决策权,在企业的生存和发展中,他们有至关重要的作用。他们致力于人力资本与其他资本的结合,协调与维持企业的各种经营活动,同时不断创新,最终达成其个人和企业的目标。人力资本理论将人力资本看作经济发展中最大的推动力,而企业中的高层管理者由于其拥有强大的知识和能力积淀,成为人力资本的较高形态,对经济的增长起着强大的推动作用,在企业中是具根植性的资源。本文以2005-2007年中国沪、深两市上市公司为研究对象,研究管理层背景特征对过度投资的影响。通过本文的研究发现,管理者的学历水平、教育背景和管理层的规模与企业过度投资呈显著负相关关系,管理者的性别比例和任期年限与过度投资呈正相关关系。在区分了企业性质后的样本分组研究中,在国有控股的样本数据中,管理层的专业背景和管理者的年龄通过了模型的检验,在非国有控股企业的数据中,管理层的学历、性别比例、管理层的规模都通过了检验。本文的贡献：①系统论证了中国上市公司过度投资行为存在的可能性和形成机理,有利于揭示中国上市公司投资效率低下的真实原因。②在公司治理的框架中探讨企业投资行为尤其是管理层对过度投资这种非效率投资行为的影响,有利于深化和完善公司治理问题的研究领域和理论体系。③针对中国资本市场存在着两类性质截然不同的控股股东,本文区分了上市公司的性质,对国有控股和非国有控股上市公司的管理者特征与企业过度投资之间的关系进行了实证检验,推动中国企业投资行为的深入研究。本文的局限：①本文选用了管理层背景特征中几个代表参数,忽略了一些非关键性因素,导致回归结果与实际情况略有偏差。②在样本选取过程中,数据不够完整全面,造成回归结果未能完全反应真实情况。更多还原

【Abstract】 Investment is the most important strategic decision, and its efficiency will directly determine the value of the company’s size. Corporate Investment is efficient, maximizing the value of the enterprise can successfully achieve the financial targets has an important influence. However, separation of control and ownership is typical of the modern enterprise, that enterprise is the right allocation of resources does not hold fewer shares of the Company held or controlled managers. Investment decisions in the corporate managers, because of moral hazard and asymmetric information exists, they are likely to first choose their own interests to launch investment projects and mergers and acquisitions, and these decisions may not only benefit the shareholders for their own benefit, and therefore the deviation from the goal of maximizing corporate investment behavior and inefficient. Usually presents the operators of private interests in order to get more cash flow to invest in companies with negative net present value of the project, resulting in the problem of excessive investment. Corporate capital investment made over a large number of precipitation in the areas of excess capacity, resulting in waste of resources and decline in value of the company, affecting the capital market to achieve efficient allocation of resources function.The enterprise’s senior management (hereinafter referred to as the executive) is a professional operation and management of enterprises, as a strategic decision-makers within the enterprise, the ultimate decision-making power of enterprises as the enterprise’s survival and development, they have a crucial role. Their commitment to human capital and other capital integration, coordination and maintain a variety of business activities, innovation, and finally reach their personal and business goals. Human capital theory of human capital as the biggest driver of economic development, while the enterprise has a strong senior management because of its accumulation of knowledge and ability to become the highest form of human capital on economic growth plays a strong role in promoting, is the most rooted in the enterprise of resources.In this paper, from 2005 to 2007 China Shanghai and Shenzhen listed company as the research object, research management background characteristics of over-investment. Results:The regression test for the full sample, managers, academic level, educational background and management of excessive investment scale and significant negative correlation between the sex ratio of managers and term life and a positive correlation between over-investment. Distinction between the nature of the enterprise in the sample group study, the state holding the sample data, the management of the professional background and managers by the age of the model tested in the data of non-state-controlled enterprises, the management of education, sex ratio, the management of scale are passed the test.The contribution of this:①The system demonstrates the behavior of listed companies in China there is the possibility of over-investment and the formation mechanism is conducive to investment in Chinese listed companies reveal the true reason for low efficiency.②In the framework of corporate governance, corporate investment behavior, especially over-investment in such non-management behavior of the efficiency of investment is conducive to deepening and improvement of corporate governance areas of research and theoretical system.③there for the Chinese capital market, the controlling shareholder of two very different nature, this distinction between the nature of listed companies on the state-controlled and non-state holding listed companies and business managers of over-investment characteristics of the relationship between the empirical test, promote Chinese enterprises to invest in-depth study of behavior.The limitations of this article:①This paper selected background characteristics of several representatives of the management parameters, ignoring the non-critical factors that lead to the regression results with a slight deviation of the actual situation, inevitable.②In the sample selection process, not a complete and comprehensive data, resulting in the regression results failed to fully reflect the true situation.更多还原