【作者】 袁明宝；

【导师】 贺雪峰；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 社会学， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 税费改革以及配套的乡镇体制改革虽然暂时缓解了国家与农民之间的紧张关系,但很快又带来了新一轮的治理困境,本文的核心立意乃是从接点治理的角度去解释税费改革后困境出现的原因。接点治理指的是国家政权利用乡村组织和乡村社会中的体制外精英实现治理的方式。本文主要论述接点治理的型成、表达、变迁与式微的纵向过程,并阐释接点治理的变化过程与基层治理绩效的相关性。接点治理型成于乡村社会中的基本人情单位中,人情单位的强制性与可选择性将村庄权威结构中“有行势的人”凸显出来,并成为乡村政权可以借用的治理主体。接点治理能够达到良好绩效的主要原因是“接点”同时具备了认同感与合法性这一两重性,就在治理过程中与混混、乡村干部区分开来。并且,接点治理经历了集体时期、税费时期和后税费时期三个阶段,进而形塑了三种治理模式,分别是吸纳模式、授权模式和结合模式。在这三种模式中,接点都很好地实现了认同感与合法性的结合,从而可以达到良好的治理秩序。本文认为在集体时期和税费时期,国家政权都充分利用了基本人情单位中的接点来实现汲取资源和对村庄的治理,但在税改后国家改变了乡村社会的治理策略,由接点治理转变为直接治理,就是通过加强国家在乡村社会的职能部门建设和基础设施建设来代替乡村组织等接点。这实质上是国家权力以“条状”结构的职能部门权力渗透到乡村社会,在本文中就是国家基础权力的增强。乡村社会中以职能部门为载体的基础权力建设,本是国家权力实现与农民直接对接的途径,是国家政权建设的应有之义,但在加强基础权力的同时却弱化了接点治理的权力。而国家基础权力具有科层化、专业化的特点,无法与乡村社会的综合性、全面性和乡土性的特点相符合,进而不能解决乡村社会内生出来的复杂问题。在本文看来,国家权力绕开接点使得乡村组织无法对混混等势力进行对抗,导致混混对乡村集体资源和财产的掠夺。而乡村组织囿于自利性倾向的凸显,便容易与混混结成合谋关系共同侵占乡村利益。最终使得国家输入到乡村社会的资源大部分被乡村利益集团和混混势力所截留,导致农民对政权合法性的质疑,带来了基层治理的内卷化。更多还原

【Abstract】 Although tax reform, with village-township management regime reformation did help relieve severe tensions between state and farmers, the village governance afterwards fell in another dilemma. This article tries to find out how the new dilemma came out from interface governance perspective.Junctional Governance,, refers that the state utilizes village organization and village elites who originally is not in the system to assist its governance. We will depict interface governance in time sequence, and find out its correlation with grass-root governance’s performances.Junctional Governance, is embedded in basic social relationship in rural China. Its character with mandatory and selection is integrated on Strongmen in villages, who are the candidates to assist village governance. From our observation, Junctional Governance, always can result in good performance, for it is accepted and admitted by ordinary farmers. During its development, it went through three kinds of modes accompany with macro-environment changes. They are absorption mode, empowerment mode, and syncretism mode.However, things changed after tax reform. Tax reform actually diverts governance strategy above village society, from Junctional Governance, to direct governance. Although this new strategy brings about good results at some aspect, whether it is in accordance with local village society’s complexity and comprehensiveness is questioned by the author. In reality, we observe that plenty of collective assets or government invest have been intercepted by local elites or strongmen. In this way, direct governance not only undermines the legitimacy base of local authority, and also improves its involution.更多还原