【作者】 刘丽；

【导师】 辛清泉；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， MPAcc， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 在我国目前的转型经济体制下,由于支撑市场经济的基础制度设施尚不发达,国有企业在我国的经济和社会发展中还扮演中重要作用。国有企业一方面依然面临着巨大的市场竞争压力,同时还要扮演着社会稳定(如增加就业、化解金融危机、价格控制等)的角色。另外,国有企业还存在着严重的因控制权和现金流权不匹配所导致的代理问题。因此,多年来,如何对国有企业经理进行激励和监督,始终是国有企业改革所面临的一个基本问题。本文以国有上市公司古井贡酒股份有限公司事件为例,系统分析国有企业的激励不足和监督乏力如何导致了经理层腐败。本文的主要观点是,内生于国有企业的多任务特征,完全采取市场取向的国有企业薪酬激励并不可行,其结果是,显性的薪酬激励之于国有企业经理存在不足。为弥补这一激励不足问题,国有企业可能发展出其他的替代性激励机制,如国有企业在职消费,或国有企业经理的政治晋升等。问题是,对某些国有企业经理而言,当这些替代性的激励机制失灵,并且相应的监督机制也乏力时,国有企业经理便可能铤而走险,导致经济腐败问题。通过细致的资料收集,本文认为,古井集团前董事长王效金便可能是这一逻辑下的一个典型标本。多年来,王效金带领古井集团走出了一条高速发展之路,并开创了中国白酒业的高峰。但是,受制于国有企业显性激励的制度约束,其名义的薪酬收入相当有限。从相关报道看,王效金的志向并不满足于只是一个企业家,政治仕途构成了其自身的一个重要激励来源。他曾一度谋求安徽省毫州市副市长一职,但始终未能如愿。当名义薪酬这一显性激励措施相当不足,且政治晋升这一替代性激励措施失效时,加之监督机制的缺位,王效金转而通过收受贿赂等腐败手段谋求经济利益,最终受到法律制裁。在理论分析和案例检验的基础上,本文在最后还从激励与监督约束两个方面提出了相应的改进建议及对策,即:通过引入职业经理人市场,减少国企的政策性负担,使经理层的名义货币薪酬真正地与企业绩效挂钩,同时,加大对股权激励等长期激励措施的实施力度,双管齐下,使显性激励措施发挥更大的激励作用;不断加强对政治晋升、在职消费以及声誉激励等隐性激励措施的构建,使其能够在显性激励措施失效时发挥足够的替代激励效用;通过建立现代企业法人制度以及政策约束制度,建立健全对国企经理层的内外监督约束机制。在此基础上,探索建立一套有效的国企经理层激励与监督机制,从而防止腐败行为的发生,促进国企的健康发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 Nowadays, China’s economic structure is under transformation, and because the infrastructure facilities supportting the market economy system are still underdeveloped, state-owned enterprises are playing an important role in the development of China’s economic and society. State-owned enterprises, on one hand, are still facing great market competitive pressures, also playing a stabilizing society (for example, increasing employment , overcoming financial crisis, controlling price and so on)role. In addition, state-owned enterprises still have the existence of serious problems of agency caused by the mismatchness between the control power and the right of cash flow. So, over many years, how to motivate and supervise the managers of the state-owned enterprises is always a basic problem in the reform of state-owned enterprises.This article taking the event of state listed company-Anhui gujing wine corperation as an example, systematically analysed state-owned enterprises how to cause the corruption of management because of the lack of incentives and supervision. The main point is that, thanks to a multitasking feature born in the state-owned enterprises, adoptting the pay motivation mechanism entirely market orientated is not feasible in the state-owned enterprises, as a result, the dominant pay motivation mechanism is insufficient for the managers in the state-owned enterprises. For the morale of the problem of inadequate, there may develop other alternative motivation mechanisms in the state-owned enterprises, such as on-the-job consumption, political advancement for state-owned enterprises managers. The problem is that, as far as some managers of state-owned enterprises are concerned, When the replacement of the mechanisms and appropriate monitoring mechanism are also weak, the managers in the state-owned enterprises may be desperate, and finally cause economic corruption.By a series of collection for detailed information, the paper think, gujing group ancient chairman wang xiaojin may be a fine specimen in this logic. For many years, the group led by wang xiaojin walked out of a high speed development, and created the rush hour in the chinese wine industry. However, under the system constraints of dominant motivation in state-owned enterprises, the nominal salary income is quite limited. According to the relevant reports, Wang xiaojin’s ambition is not satisfied with only an entrepreneur, political career makes himself an important motivation. He was once to a state of the deputy mayor of haozhou city in anhui province, but remained unsatisfied. As political promotion, the replacement of the motivation measure, is out of effect and the nominal salary income is quite limited, Wang xiaojin turned to gain the economic interests by corruption means, such as accepting bribery, and was punished by law at last.On the basis of the theoretical analysis and the case test, the paper finally the motivation and constraints in both aspects, presents the corresponding improvement suggestions and countermeasures, incluing: By introducing the professional managers market, we can reduce the polical burden of state-owned enterprises to link the manager’s nominal salary income with the performance of business effectively, at the same time, increase the implementation of long-term motivational measures, work along both lines to make the dominant motivational initiatives playing a greater motivation; Continue to strengthen the building of the recessive measures, for example, political promotion, on-the-job consumption, reputation motivation and so on, to make it be the alternative of the dominant motivational initiatives; By establishing the modern corporate system and policy control system, to establish a sound of supervision and restraining mechanism of state-owned enterprises managers. On this basis, we try to establish an efficient motivation and supervision mechanisms of state-owned enterprises managers, and prevent corruption to promote the healthy development of state-owned enterprises.更多还原