【作者】 陈琴琴；

【导师】 赵万一；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 民商法学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 证券投资基金在现代资本市场上是一种很受追捧的投资工具。我国的证券投资基金经过十几年的发展已初具规模,它不但拓宽了投资者的投资渠道,为投资者提供专业化、高质量的投资服务,而且给证券市场注入新鲜的血液,进一步促进了证券市场的可持续发展。在契约型证券投资基金组织体系中,基金管理人(受托人)应当为基金持有人(委托人)的利益勤勉尽责地管理和运作基金资产,基金管理人的行为直接影响着基金持有人的投资收益,换句话说,基金管理人在基金运作中处于核心地位。因此,要想保证基金规范运作,首先需要对基金管理公司进行治理。基金管理公司治理与一般公司治理的主要差别在于治理目标的不同,即基金管理公司不仅要保护股东的利益,更应把基金持有人的利益摆在优先位置。但是,由于基金管理人与基金持有人的利益存在冲突,导致在现实中经常出现基金管理公司在利益的驱动下利用信息优势、专业优势从事损害基金持有人利益的行为。基金管理公司在运作中产生的问题成为制约我国基金业发展的“瓶颈”,因此,有必要设计一套制度来规范和约束基金管理公司的行为,从而保护基金持有人的利益。本文主要从基金管理公司的股东会、董事会、监事会、督察长和经理层的角度进行研究,揭示这些组织机构存在的一些弊端,并在深入分析的基础上提出一些完善对策。本文分为引言和正文,正文由五个部分组成:引言主要介绍证券投资基金的概念、发展历程和发展现状,并指出证券投资基金发展的困境主要在于基金管理公司的内部治理缺陷。第一部分先简单介绍公司治理和基金管理公司治理,并将两者进行比较,指出基金管理公司在机构设置、受股东制约程度和治理目标上与一般公司存在差异。第二部分主要是理论阐述,首先对委托代理理论进行简要介绍,分析基金管理中委托代理关系的特殊性。然后介绍了利益相关者理论,并提出基金持有人是基金管理公司的利益相关者。第三部分主要介绍了我国基金管理公司运作过程中出现的主要问题,如基金管理人的道德风险,基金经理的频繁跳槽,股东的“积极管理”和封闭式基金的“边缘化”。第四部分指出基金管理公司运作过程中出现的问题主要是由基金管理公司内部治理不完善引起的,即股权结构不合理,独立董事作用有限,监事会形同虚设,督察长制度效果不佳以及基金经理的激励约束机制不健全。第五部分对完善我国基金管理公司治理提出了一些对策,包括股权结构、独立董事制度、监事会、督察长制度和经理层的改进。更多还原

【Abstract】 The securities investment fund has become a very popular investment tool in modern capital market.Chinese securities investment fund has begun to take shape after ten years of development,it not only widens investment channels of investors, provides professional and high-quality investment services for investors,but also brings fresh blood into the stock market,and further promotes its sustainable development. In the system of contractual type fund,fund managers(fund trustee) manage and operate the fund assets with diligence and conscience in behalf of fund holders(client),whose behaviour have a direct impact on investment income of fund holders.That is to say,the fund managers play a key role in the fund.Therefore,for guaranteeing fund to operate normatively,first of all,fund managenent companies should be governed. Comparing with the normal corporate governance,the major difference of fund management company governance is the management objective.Fund management companies not just protect interests of shareholders,but give priority to interests of fund holders.However,owing to the interests of fund managers and fund holders are in conflict,there is a situation in reality that fund managenent companies always take advantage of information and profession to do something which harm the interests of fund holders driven by the interests.Because the problems caused by operation of fund managenent companies will be obstacles which restrict funds industry’s development of our country, so it is necessary to design a system to regulate and bound the behaviour of fund managenent companies in order to protect interests of fund holders.This thesis makes research mainly from the angle of shareholders’ conference、board of directors、supervisory board、inspectors and managerial level,then reveal the shortcomings of these departments.Finally,it puts forward some improving strategies on the basis of deep analysis.This full thesis is divided into a preliminary and a text including five parts :The preliminary mainly introduces the conception、history and development status of securities investment fund,and points out that the development dilemma of securities investment fund depends on the internal governance defects of fund managenent companies.In the first part,it begins with governance of corporations and fund management companies,and indicates the difference between the both companies about institution、the degree of constraints from shareholders and governance goal. In the second part,it is about theoretical elaboration.Firstly,it briefly introduces the Principal-Agent Theory,and analyses the particularity of principal-agent relation in fund management companies.Then it presents Stakeholders Theory which considers that fund holders are belong to stakeholders of fund management companies.In the third part,it illustrates several major problems appeared during the process of fund management company governance,such as moral risk、frequent job-hopping of fund managers、"active management" of shareholders and "marginality" of close-ended funds.In the fourth part,it discusses that the above problems are caused by the internal governance defects of fund management companies.The defects contains the unreasonable ownership structure、limitation of independent directors、the lack of supervision from the supervisory board、ineffective inspectors and unsound incentive and restraining mechanism of fund managers.In the fifth part, it advances some strategy to perfect Chinese fund management company governance,which include the improvement of ownership structure、independent directors、supervisory board、inspectors and fund managers.更多还原