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上市公司重整程序中大股东占款问题研究

Research on Issues of Occupying by Major Shareholders during Reorganization Program of Listed Corporations

【作者】 席小婷

【导师】 于莹;

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 , 法学, 2011, 硕士

【摘要】 自第十届全国人大常委会第二十三次会议表决通过《中华人民共和国企业破产法》(以下简称新《破产法》)以来,重整制度已走过了近四年的风雨历程。随着实践中各种问题的接踵出现到有效应对再到以规范性文件予以切实规范,重整制度正愈加完善,而这一制度也越来越受到那些陷入困境但仍具有潜在生命力的上市公司的青睐。从已进行重整的27家上市公司来看,大股东占款是上市公司经营困难、债台高筑的重要成因,而重整程序中如何处理大股东占款留下的后患便成为重整能否成功的关键环节。笔者将理论与实务相结合,首先介绍大股东占款相关概念、大股东取得控制权的方式及具体的占款行为,并简要归纳了我国相关法律法规对这一问题的规制措施;在对大股东占款问题有所认识的基础上,进一步阐述大股东占款与上市公司重整的关系:大股东占款不仅是上市公司重整的主要祸源,而且对重整程序各个环节的顺利进行都产生了极大的阻力,从正相关的角度来看,上市公司重整对与大股东占款问题的彻底解决乃至公司治理机制的完善起着至关重要的作用;随后,根据不同的占款行为模式在上市公司重整过程中所带来的不同问题归类设计出上市公司重整程序中切实解决大股东占款问题的方案,并相应的进行风险性分析;最后,通过对我国上市公司治理机制进行研究后发现,上市公司内部及外部治理机制存在的连环性问题正是导致大股东占款频发且难以整治的关键。由此笔者根据我国目前上市公司治理现状提出一系列完善性措施,以求从公司治理的角度对大股东占款问题进行有效抑制。综合全文来看,本文主要研究结论如下:一、广义的上市公司大股东占款既包括对上市公司资金的侵占也包括对其资产的变相掏空;其行为模式通常是以IPO、国企拆分及重组借壳的方式上市,取得控制性地位后再通过各种直接占资、关联交易、违规担保及其他方式为掏空行为,侵占上市公司利益。二、从起因上看,大股东的占款行为对上市公司各方面利益都造成了极大地损害,使得上市公司越发的“体弱多病”,长此以往,影响公司偿债能力的各方面积极因素逐步丧失,破产原因产生并逐渐积少至巨,最终使上市公司步入破产的境地,由此可以说,大股东占款是上市公司破产重整的主要祸源。三、从影响角度来看,对于已进入重整程序的上市公司,大股东占款对重整程序的各个环节都产生了极大地阻碍作用,如债权清偿比例降低、审计评估难度加大、债权审查任务艰巨、诉讼风险较难控制、重整计划顺利通过受阻、优质重组方望而却步、报审程序复杂繁琐;从正相关的层面上看,大股东占款越是严重,上市公司偿债能力越弱,破产重整的可能性越大,对重整进度及质量的负面效应越是强烈;从负相关层面上看,上市公司重整进度越快、重整质量越高,则重整后的公司整体价值越高、公司治理结构越完善,对大股东占款的抑制越有效。四、从目前上市公司解决大股东占款的案例来看,主要包括占款股东或其关联公司直接清偿、地方国资委代偿以及其他创新方式,如债权转让、计提坏账并予以核销、合并范围调整等,都是实务案例中出现的解决大股东占款问题有效且创新的路径设计。上述解决大股东占款问题上所采用的具体方式在实务当中都取得了很好的效果,对之后进行重整的上市公司也起到了有益的借鉴作用,但这些路径在仍然存在较大的隐患,如现金清偿的执行力较弱、以资抵债易造成另一种非公允价格的关联交易、以股抵债对于已担保、冻结的股权鞭长莫及、债权传让有可能遭到法院撤销、违规担保的处理又易引发金融债权人的诉讼风险,这些问题在实务操作过程中应予以全面考虑。五、上市公司内部与外部治理机制的不完善是导致大股东占款的重要原因。股权结构的失衡、组织机构应有功能的丧失、市场机制不成熟及立法不善、执法不严都为大股东占款行为的发生提供了条件。因此要有效的抑制占款行为则应从公司治理的角度出发,通过优化股权结构、改革监管体制、培育良好的市场机制、完善相关法律法规、加强执法力度等措施对大股东占款进行内外兼治。

【Abstract】 The reorganization has been existing more than four years since the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (" bankruptcy law " for sort) was voted through by the 23rd meeting of the National People’s Congress. Along with the issues arised and resolved constantly by a series of normalizative documents, the reorganization system which is under the favour by companies that are in trouble but still have potential vitality is becoming more perfect. The occupying by major shareholders is a part of factors that lead to operation problems and debts according to the practical situation of the 27 listed corporations that have been reorganizing or reorganized, as a result, how to dealing with the troubles caused by the occupying becomes a crucial link during the program of reorganization and depends the program’s success to some extent.Combing the theories and practices, this paper firstly describes relevant concepts, ways of getting control power, behaviors of occupying and regulations as well; further elaborates the relationship between issues of occupying and the reorganization program based on comprehending to aforementioned items:the occupying by major shareholders not only is a crucial part of factors that lead to reorganization, but also brings about obstructions on each link of the program, form the positive correlation, the reorganization of listed corporations plays a vital role in solving issues of occupying and perfecting the mechanism of corporate governance; at last, this paper proposes a series of measure from the aspect of corporate governance to effectively restrain the issues of occupying.This paper gets the following conclusions:Firstly, occupying by major shareholders in a broad sense includes the action of misappropriation on funds and assets. Some shareholders usually resort to IPO (Initial Public Offering), spliting state-owned enterprises and BDL (Back Door Listing), and then profit from misappropriation on funds, connected transaction, illegal guarantee and any other ways.Secondly, the occupying by major shareholders makes a great damage to listed corporations. Constantly in this way, solvabilit lost and reasons of bankrupt emerged, that make the occupying by major shareholders becoming the major cause of getting reorganization.Thirdly, the issues of occupying by major shareholders block the reorganization program of listed corporations. On the view of positive correlation, the more serious issues of occupying are, the poorer and slower of solvabilit and reorganization program is; On the view of negative correlation, the sooner and better the reorganization program gets, the more valuable and perfect the listed corporation is.Fourthly, from the aspect of cases at the present time, solutions of occupying by major shareholders include directly satisfying by responsible shareholders, substituted paying off by local SASAC and some other new payment methods, such as assignment of the obligee’s right, provision for bad debt and consolidation adjustment. These methods above have gained a good result in practice and palyed a role of example to succedent reorganized corporations. However, these methods above get risks on many aspects:execution of paying off by funds is difficult, debt program is easy to cause unfair connected transaction and can not solve the issues of illegal guarantee, assignment of the obligee’s right may be revoked by court and give rise to new lawsuits.Fifthly, the imperfection of corporate governance mechanism is the main reason of occupying by major shareholders. The unbalance of ownership structure, function deficiency of organizations, immature of market mechanism and legislation mismanagement, all those factors together provide the conditions for the behaviours of occupying. Therefore, only if optimizing ownership structure, reforming oversight mechanisms, breeding nicer market mechanism, perfecting relevant regulations and enhancing the law enforcement, the issues of occupying by major shareholders could be restricted effectivlv.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 吉林大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2011年 09期
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