【作者】 张金易；

【导师】 严玲；

【作者基本信息】 天津理工大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 竣工结算直接关系到建设单位的投资效益和施工单位的经济效益,尤其是在DBB模式中,业主、监理工程师和承包商形成“三角形式”的施工合同管理关系,业主只能通过监理工程师间接管理施工合同,而业主是项目的拥有者,承包商是项目的建设者,两者对于项目的利益需求不同,导致双方既存在利益的冲突,又存在合作的关系,这体现在施工合同形成及履行的各个阶段。论文以业主预期与承包商的利益追求为分析的出发点,探讨双方在招标阶段、合同签订阶段、施工阶段及竣工阶段的行为与关系,分析各阶段影响竣工结算争议的风险因素,以风险分担为核心思想,设置预防和控制竣工结算争议的管理措施。文章的主要研究内容如下：1.界定研究问题。通过文献研究的方法,分析在项目各阶段存在的竣工结算争议风险因素,将各种风险因素的责任归属和解决难度进行比较,确定不平衡报价风险、共同延误、合同风险分担和结算审核方法为文章的研究问题。2.竣工结算争议的产生机理。招标阶段承包商与业主的非合作博弈,给业主带来了逆向选择风险,最大的风险是不平衡报价；在合同签订阶段,合同条款的不完备及风险分担的不合理,对双方在施工阶段的合同关系产生消极的影响,风险事件发生后双方缺乏有力的合同依据进行责任归属,直接引起竣工结算的争议；在施工阶段,发、承包双方是一种合作博弈的关系,同时业主面临承包商的道德风险,承包商的不平衡报价策略在此阶段的价款调整中体现了提高收益的作用,业主的违约、延迟履行义务等事件也给承包商带来了索赔的机会,在处理共同的责任造成的项目工期及费用损失时,承包商会降低或隐瞒自己的责任,而业主为了保护自己的利益,会做出不利于承包商的决定,这些事件导致发、承包商双方确定结算价款时产生争议；竣工阶段业主面临承包商的道德风险带来的竣工结算欺骗行为。3.研究设计。分析国内外常用的单价合同文本的风险分担特点,依据风险分配理论,设置在07版《标准施工招标文件》的通用合同条款下,业主与承包商在专用合同条款中的风险分担原则及业主的主动控制策略。4.研究内容。依据招标阶段、合同签订阶段、施工阶段及竣工阶段主要的结算争议风险因素,设置预防与控制措施,包括通过强化设计阶段和招标阶段的工作质量控制不平衡报价风险；在合同签订阶段将专用合同条款清晰化,详细分配业主与承包商的风险,并制定限制承包商使用不平衡报价风险的条款；在施工阶段通过原因比例分摊法处理共同延误事件造成的工期延误和费用损失的风险分担；在竣工阶段,使用全面审核法审查竣工结算。更多还原

【Abstract】 Final payment is directly related to the construction unit of investment efficiency and economic benefits of contraction units, especially in the DBB model, the owner, supervision engineer and contractor form a "triangular form" of construction contract management relations, every side has different needs for the project, which resulting to the relations of co-operation and the conflict of interest simultaneously exist between the owner and the contraction, which is reflected in the construction contract formation and performance at all stages. The paper starts with the different interesting of demand between owner and the contractor as the research starting point, analyzing the completion settlement risk factors on the every stage of the project, taking the risk-sharing as the core ideology to set up the management measures of prevention and controlling the final payment dispute.1. Define the research questions. Through literature research method to analyze the final payment risk factors at various stages of the project, Comparison of the attribution of responsibility and resolve the difficulty of every risk factor, determine the unbalance bidding、concurrent delay、risk-sharing and settlement examination as the paper research points.2. The generation mechanism of final payment dispute. At the tender stage, the non-cooperative between the owner and the contractor brought adverse selection to the owner, the largest risk is unbalance bidding. At the contract signing stage, the incompleteness of contractual terms and risk-sharing unreasonable, causing a negative impact on the relationship between the owner and the contractor, and is not conducive to completion of settlement of the dispute settlement. During the construction phase, the owner faces cooperative game and moral hazard from contractor, the contractor’s unbalanced bidding strategy reflects the role of raising revenue at this stage, the owner’s failure、delay in fulfilling its obligations and so on,bring a claim opportunity to the contractor, in particular, the concurrent delay events are most difficult to deal with the settlement dispute. At completion stage, the owner faces the moral hazard of the contractor which will fraud the true final payment.3. Research design. Analyzing the risk-sharing features of Unit Price Contract text commonly used in home and abroad, and based on risk-sharing theory, setting the principle of risk-sharing of the《The standard of construction tender documents》4. Research content. Including the controlling of unbalanced pricing, risk-sharing at the contract signing stage, how to deal with the concurrent delay, and the prevention of contractor fraud at the completion stage.更多还原