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政府委托人视角下的全过程代建项目投资控制研究

Research on the Investment Control of the Whole Process Agent Construction from the Viewpoints of Government Client

【作者】 孟繁丽

【导师】 严玲;

【作者基本信息】 天津理工大学 , 技术经济及管理, 2010, 硕士

【摘要】 我国政府投资项目管理模式改革过程中,全过程代建成为政府投资项目建设实施的主导模式,在全国范围内大面积推行。代建制的实施使政府对代建项目的投资控制转移到通过委托代建合同对代建人的控制上,此时代建人必须实现投资硬约束。本文将代建项目的投资控制分为三个层次,政府与政府有关部门(委托人)的行政代理层、政府委托人与代建人之间的项目治理层,以及代建人与各专业承包商之间的项目管理层。在此基础上,论文将研究对象界定在政府委托人与代建人之间项目治理层的投资控制问题上。全过程代建模式下,代建合同总价的确定成为政府业主建立的有效控制投资的对代建人的约束激励机制。文章认为代建合同总价可以分为两个部分进行讨论,一是投资包干总价的确定,二是可调总价的规定和计价方法。论文的主要内容如下:1.风险分担理论基础的研究代建合同总价实质体现了一种合同双方的风险分担关系。文本在风险分担的理论指导下,探讨了政府全过程委托人与全过程代建人分别应当承担的风险,作为投资包干总价确定和调整的基础。2.以设计概算为基础的投资包干总价的确定全过程代建模式下,投资包干总价的确定是在初步设计阶段,针对全国各地投资包干总价是在设计概算基础上确定的,因此本文首先分析了投资包干总价与设计概算的关系,认为设计概算中的预备费不应全部归入代建人的投资包干总价中,并且由于定额水平等原因,应对设计概算进行下浮,为科学确定投资包干总价提供了新的方法。3.投资包干总价的修改和调整投资包干总价要求在既定风险范围内代建合同价格不得调整。在全过程代建项目的实际操作中,为了对代建人进行有效的激励和约束,代建合同往往会规定哪些风险因素的发生可调整投资包干总价。但各地的规定较不统一,代建人和政府业主之间也容易产生分歧。本文对可以调整的风险进行分析,并在此基础上探讨投资包干总价的调整方法。

【Abstract】 In the reform of public project management model,agent construction has become the dominant mode in the entire process and the implementation is being carried out on a large scale throughout the country. Under agent system,the government has transferred the control object from agent construction investment to the agent through the commission contract.The condition is that the agent must have achieved the hard investment constraints.This paper divides the investment control on agent construction project into three levels: the administrative agency level between government and relevant government departments (client), the project management level between the client and agent, as well as the project management level between the agent and the specialist contractor. On this basis, the paper will focus the study object on the project management level between the government client and the construction agent in the course of investment control. In the entire process of the agent construction mode, the commission contract lump sum has become an incentive and restraint mechanism for government owners to execute control on the agent effectively. The thesis research is divided into two parts, the main contents are as follows:1. Research on the basis of risk-sharing theoryLump-sum investment reflects a risk-sharing relationship between the contracting parties in essence. Under the guidance of risk-sharing theory, this paper discusses the risks assumed respectively by the client and the agent in the whole process, which forms the basis of the determination and adjustment of total investment lump sum.2. Determination of the total investment lump sum on the basis of design estimateIn the entire process of agent construction mode, the determination of total investment lump sum is in the preliminary design stage, the total lump sum investment is determined on the basis of the design budget throughout the country, so this paper first analyzes the relationship between total investment lump sum and design budget, thinking that the budgetary reserve of design estimate should not be entirely put into the total lump sum of investment.the paper takes the rating bias into consideration.It should be to decrease of design estimate. The paper providing a new approach to determine the total investment lump sum scientifically.3.Change and adjustment of the investment lump sumAccording to the requirements of total investment lump sum, the price of agent contract shall not be adjusted within the framework of given risks.In the actual operation of the agent construction project, the contract will specify the occurrence of some risks to adjust total investment lump sum in order to give the agent effective incentive and restraint. However, the agent and the government owner may grow different opinions easily since the provisions of different places are not unified.This paper analyzes the adjustable risks, and explore the adjustment methods of total investment lump sum accordingly.

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