【摘要】 在中国水权市场建立的探索时期,市场竞争机制作用发挥不充分,运用市场机制配置水资源程度仍偏低,而国内学界对于水权市场运行效率及其影响因素的研究却尤为匮乏。考虑到当前收集、使用实际运行数据分析水权市场有效性存在难度的事实,以及水权市场环境条件和相关人行为具有复杂性的现实状况,本文应用实验经济学方法建立虚拟水权交易市场,比较不同交易制度下水权市场效率,以及水权成交数量和成交价格的差异,并考察交易成本、市场势力因素及其交互组合对水权市场运行效果的影响。研究结果表明:①无论水权市场交易成本存在与否、水权初始分配为竞争还是垄断,双向拍卖、分散交易、明码标价三种交易制度下的水权交易均存在一定的社会福利损失;双向拍卖制度下的水权市场效率相对最优,成交价格、交易数量最接近于完全竞争市场的理论均衡值,而明码标价制度下的水权市场表现最不理想。②较之无交易成本的水权市场,考虑交易成本因素后三种交易制度下的水权市场效率均有下降;成交价格更趋向于竞争市场的理论均衡价格,尤以分散交易制度下的价格变动为最显著;与双向拍卖、分散交易制度形成对比的是,在明码标价制度下,交易成本的存在加剧了交易量对均衡成交数量的负向偏离。③较之仅考虑交易成本的水权市场,结合市场势力因素后,三种交易制度下水权市场效率明显降低,且双向拍卖制度下的效率变动为最小;由于市场势力的影响,三种交易制度下的平均价格偏离、平均交易数量偏离表现出显著增大的特征。基于实验结果,本文侧重于政府在水权市场建设中的作用,从加强水权市场制度建设、创新水权初始分配决策机制、重视水权交易配套设施建设等方面提出政策建议,以推进中国水权市场的健康、有效运行。更多还原

【Abstract】 During the exploratory period pertaining to the establishment of water rights market in China,the role of the market competition mechanism was not fully employed. Furthermore,ever since,the degree to which the allocation of water resources is accomplished by using market mechanisms is still low. Congruently,domestic academic studies regarding the operating efficiency of the water rights market and its influencing factors are particularly scarce. Considering that it is difficult to collect actual operational data and analyze it in relation to the effectiveness of the water rights market and that the environmental conditions for the water rights market and related human behavior are complex topics,this paper applied experimental economics to establish a virtual water rights trading market that compares efficiency,trading volume,and price,for different trading institutions. It also investigated the influence of transaction costs and market power and their interaction in water rights markets. The results showed: ①A social welfare loss existed in water rights markets under three trading institutions: double auction,decentralized trading,and posted offer. Efficiency of a water rights market in a double auction was optimal,and trading prices and volumes were close to the theoretical equilibrium value of a perfectly competitive market. The market performance was worst when using the posted-offer method. ② Compared to a water rights market without transaction costs,the market efficiency and transaction costs under these three trading institutions declined when transaction costs were considered. Trading prices approximated the theoretical equilibrium price of a competitive market,and price variations were the most significant with decentralized trading. In contrast to a double auction and decentralized trading,transaction costs under a posted-offer method intensified the negative deviation of trading volume to the theoretical equilibrium. ③Compared to a water rights market that only considers transaction costs,the market efficiency under these three trading institutions was significantly reduced when market power was also considered. Because of market power,deviations to average prices and trading volumes under the three trading institutions increased significantly. Based on the experimental results,the government’s role in building a water rights market becomes the focal point. To promote healthy and effective operation of water rights in China,this paper put forward policy recommendations such as strengthening the construction of water rights market system,innovatively taking initial allocation of water rights and attaching importance to the construction of supporting facilities for water rights trading.更多还原