【摘要】 为探讨矿山废弃地治理PPP模式地方政府与社会资本的合作机制,本文构建了演化博弈稳定均衡模型。结果表明:当社会资本机会成本小于机会主义收益时,若地方政府在矿山废弃地治理PPP项目中获得额外收益增加,或社会资本在声誉、物资和其他方面的奖励增加,双赢合作成为稳定均衡策略;当政府加大对社会资本机会行为惩罚,并使得社会资本机会成本大于机会主义收益时,系统演化博弈由地方政府来主导。政府在演化过程中给予外部影响,如降低监管成本、提升社会资本积极合作的口碑效应和声誉收益,可改变演化结果,实现稳定策略均衡。最后提出降低地方政府监管成本、构建社会资本激励机制以及建立反向约束和公众监督机制三个措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 In order to explore the PPP cooperation mechanism between local government capital and social capital in mining wasteland,this paper constructs a stable equilibrium model of evolutionary game.The results show that when the opportunity cost is less than the opportunistic income,if the local government gains additional income in abandoned mine governance PPP projects,or social capital rewards in reputation,material and other aspects increase,win-win cooperation becomes stable equilibrium strategy;when the government increases the penalties for social capital opportunity behavior and makes the social capital opportunity cost greater than the opportunistic income,the system evolutionary game is dominated by local governments.The government gives external influence in the process of evolution,such as reducing the supervision cost,enhancing the word-of-mouth effect of active cooperation of social capital,reputation gain,and changing the evolutionary result to achieve stable strategic balance.Finally,according to the actual situation of the management of abandoned mines in PPP mode,the article puts forward three measures to reduce the supervision cost of local government,construct the incentive mechanism of social capital and establish the mechanism of reverse restraint and public supervision.更多还原