【摘要】 在消费者低碳偏好的背景下,利用演化博弈模型分析了制造商碳减排决策的动态演化过程。研究结果表明:系统的演化均衡结果受单位碳减排成本和消费者碳排放敏感系数的影响;碳限额额度存在边界条件,政府设定碳限额额度小于该边界条件时,碳限额交易政策才能有效地激励企业进行碳减排。为促使系统演化成企业均选择碳减排的均衡,政府应降低企业的碳减排成本及提高消费者节能环保意识。同时,政府设定碳限额额度还应要小于一定的边界条件。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the context of consumers’ low carbon preference, the evolutionary game model was used to analyze the dynamic evolution process of manufacturers’ emission reduction decisions in this paper. Results show that the evolutionary equilibrium results of the system are affected by the unit carbon emission abatement cost and the consumer’s low carbon preference. The carbon limit quota has boundary conditions. When the government sets the carbon limit amount to be less than the boundary condition, the carbon limit trading policy can effectively encourage enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. In order to promote the evolution of the system into a balance of carbon emission reduction, the government should reduce the cost of enterprises about carbon emission reduction and raise consumers’ awareness of energy conservation and environmental protection. Moreover, the government should set the carbon limit to be less than certain boundary conditions.更多还原