【摘要】 研究了完全信息和不完全信息条件下,污染者存在合作共谋可能性时,环境税规制农业面源污染问题的机制和效应.研究表明,在不完全信息条件下,当污染者之间的合作共谋程度不明确或不能被环境监管者有效观测时,利用环境税规制农业面源污染将受到极大的限制;如果监管机构能够投入很高的成本用于监测农业面源污染排放,从而解决不对称信息问题,那么最优的监管政策对于合作共谋的污染者集体有利,会向合作共谋的集体征收税率较低的环境税,但对不合作共谋的集体中的面源污染个体,则会征收最优但税率很高的环境税.同时,如果引入风险偏好因素,当农业面源污染者厌恶风险时,社会整体福利水平会随着污染者合作共谋指数的提高而提升.更多还原

【Abstract】 The mechanism and effect of environmental tax on agricultural non-point source pollution are studied under the condition of complete information and incomplete information.The results show that under incomplete information,when the degree of cooperation and collusion between polluters is not clear or can not be effectively observed by environmental regulators,the regulation of agricultural non-point source pollution by environmental tax will be greatly restricted.If regulators can invest a high cost in monitoring agricultural non-point source pollution emissions to solve the problem of asymmetric information,then the optimal regulatory policy will be beneficial to the co-conspirators collectively,and will levy a lower environmental tax on the co-conspirators collectively,but will levy an optimal but high tax rate on non-point source pollution individuals in the non-cooperative conspirators collectively.At the same time,if risk preference factor is introduced,when agricultural non-point source polluters are risk averse,the overall social welfare level will increase with the increase of the polluter’s cooperative conspiracy index.更多还原