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基于博弈论的监理人水利工程施工阶段质量控制

Quality control of water conservancy projects by supervisors during construction stage based on game theory

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【作者】 王国强周书杰李鹏宋力

【Author】 WANG Guo-qiang, et al (Structural Research Center, Hydraulic Institute of Jiangsu Province, Yangzhou 225002, China)

【机构】 江苏省水利科学研究院材料结构研究室东台市水务工程有限公司金坛市建筑安装工程公司

【摘要】 从博弈论角度研究当前水利工程施工阶段监理人质量控制的效果,应用博弈论中的完全信息静态博弈假设,建立监理人与承包人之间的博弈模型,通过单阶段和多阶段博弈分析,得出混合战略纳什均衡解。认为监理人质量控制采用加大处罚力度、突出监控重点和减少监控成本是减少承包人施工违规行为的有效对策。

【Abstract】 The effectiveness of the quality control of the current water conservancy projects by supervisors during the construction stage was studied from the perspective of the game theory. A game model for the supervisors and contractors was established by use of the static assumption of complete information in the game theory. Based on single-stage and multi-stage game analyses, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution was derived. A conclusion is drawn that for the quality control of water conservancy projects by supervisors during the construction stage, the effective measures to reduce the contractors’ irregular construction behavior are to increase the penalty strength, to highlight the key monitoring items and to reduce the monitoring cost.

  • 【文献出处】 水利经济 ,Journal of Economics of Water Resources , 编辑部邮箱 ,2010年02期
  • 【分类号】TV523
  • 【被引频次】2
  • 【下载频次】103
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