节点文献
环境治理悖论中的地方政府与公民社会:一个智猪博弈的模型
Local Government and Civil Society in the Paradox of Environmental Governance: A Model of Boxed Pigs Game
【摘要】 智猪博弈模型提供了一个地方政府与公民社会协同治理环境的行动逻辑。以"智猪博弈"模型讨论作为博弈参与人的地方政府和公民社会的环境治理偏好,可以清晰地描述地方政府与公民社会的环保行动逻辑,解释政治晋升锦标赛制度语境下的环境治理悖论。依据博弈"规则制导"的核心启示,破解环境治理悖论需要以"放权"和"赋权"的两手,以位移制度开关设置和扩大预期制度红利增量的协同性制度变迁,督促地方政府和公民社会从"等待"走向环境治理的"行动"。
【Abstract】 Environmental governance is essential to sustainable development. Starting from the environmental governance paradox, the paper presents a visual clustering map of the literature with Cite Space. It discusses the environmental governance preferences of local governments and civil society as participants of the game by using the Boxed Pigs Game, describes the logic of environmental action between government and civil society, and explains the paradox of environmental governance in the context of political promotion championship system. According to the "rule guidance" of the game, it requires both "decentralization" and "empowerment" to resolve the environmental governance paradox. Institutional changes, such as increasing expected institutional dividend and setting shift switch, must be made to urge local government and civil society participation from "waiting" to "taking action".
【Key words】 environmental governance; civil society; civic participation; local government; Boxed Pigs Game;
- 【文献出处】 四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ,Journal of Sichuan University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2019年02期
- 【分类号】D621.5;X32
- 【被引频次】13
- 【下载频次】1811