【摘要】 在竞合联盟中,成员专有知识共享和保护是理论界研究的热点问题,中国宽松的产权制度背景可能使得这一问题变得既复杂又具有特殊性。以可占有能力这一隐性传输壁垒为出发点,构建龙头企业和追随企业的异质性决策演化博弈模型,探寻可占有能力如何影响不同成员的知识演化策略。研究发现:①领导企业和追随企业的知识策略表现出一定差异,当可占有能力达到阈值后,领导企业一定会选择知识共享策略,而追随企业的知识策略并没有出现均衡状态,其中,成果可占有能力对策略演化的作用效果比知识可占有能力强;②当联盟成员均采取知识共享策略时,无论是知识可占有能力还是成果可占有能力,均与联盟研发投入正相关。当联盟成员均采取知识保护策略时,无论是领导企业还是追随企业,研发投入仅与知识可占有能力正相关,而与成果可占有能力不存在任何关系;③不论采取何种知识策略,联盟成员的期望收益始终与成果可占有能力正相关,而与知识可占有能力负相关,且当可占有能力达到阈值时,成果可占有能力对企业期望收益的作用效果显著强于知识可占有能力。因此,在当前产权制度背景下,可以从提高自身可占有能力这一途径维护竞合联盟稳定性,以此作为宽松产权制度下的一个有效补充。更多还原

【Abstract】 This article takes the appropriability, an implicit transmission barrier as a starting point to construct a heterogenous enterprise evolutionary decision-making game model of leading enterprises and followers to explore how the appropriability affects members′ knowledge development strategies.The findings of this study are that first, there is a distinct difference between the knowledge strategy of leaders and followers.Leading enterprises are bound to share knowledge while the strategies of other enterprises do not achieve equilibrium after the effectiveness reaches a threshold.Furthermore, the achievement appropriability has a better effect on strategy evolution than the knowledge appropriability.Also, when alliance members adopt a knowledge-sharing strategy, both knowledge appropriability and achievement appropriability are positively correlated with the alliance′s R&D investment.It follows that when an intellectual protection strategy is adopted, R&D investment only has a positive relation with knowledge appropriability while nothing to do with achievement appropriability for both leaders and followers.Third, no matter what kind of knowledge strategy is adopted, the expected return of alliance members is always positively correlated with achievement appropriability, while negatively correlated with knowledge appropriability, and the effect of achievement appropriability on the enterprise’s expected return is stronger than that of knowledge appropriability.Considering the context of the current property rights system, the Chinese government’s industrial policy should guide enterprises to improve their own appropriability as an effective supplement to the lenient property right system.更多还原