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美国“多层次”证券法公共执法制度的实证分析

An Empirical Analysis of the “Multi-enforcer” Public Enforcement Regime in the U.S.

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【作者】 徐文鸣

【Author】 XU Wenming;

【机构】 中国政法大学法与经济学研究院

【摘要】 本文聚焦于美国"多层次"的证券法公共执行制度,即公共机构通过发起执法程序使得违法行为人承担法律责任的机制。美国证券交易委员会、金融业监管局和各州证券监管机构都可以独立执行证券法,多层次的公共执法制度保证证券法得到有效执行。对上述机构执法活动投入和产出数据的分析显示,美国证券交易委员会的执法投入和产出水平都较高,并且保持较为稳定的增长率。它还通过设立公平基金,承担着赔偿投资者的职责。而美国金融业监管局作为自律监管机构,负责对经纪—自营商进行一线监管和自律处罚。美国各州的证券监管机构则有权起诉证券市场的欺诈行为人。多层次执法制度最小化"监管失灵"对证券执法的负面影响,保障了对证券市场违法犯罪行为的威慑力。

【Abstract】 This paper focuses on the "multi-enforcer" public enforcement regime of securities law in the United States, which mainly concerns the proceedings that public agencies initiate to make violators legally liable. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and state securities regulators can enforce securities laws independently, which ensures that securities laws are effectively enforced. An analysis of the enforcement input and output of these agencies shows that the SEC has a high level of enforcement inputs and outputs and maintains a relatively stable growth rate. It also has the responsibility of compensating investors through the establishment of fair funds. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, as a self-regulatory body, is responsible for regulating broker-dealers. Securities regulators in U.S. states could prosecute fraudsters in the securities market. The "multi-enforcer" public enforcement regime minimizes the negative impact of "regulatory failure" on securities market and guarantees the deterrent effect against illegal activities.

【基金】 国家社科基金后期项目(18FFX042);北京市社科基金青年项目(17FXC017)
  • 【文献出处】 经贸法律评论 ,Business and Economic Law Review , 编辑部邮箱 ,2019年05期
  • 【分类号】D971.2;DD912.28
  • 【被引频次】4
  • 【下载频次】292
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