【摘要】 自我优先性及其所引发的价值虚无主义问题,一直是社群主义的自由主义批判的重点。针对这样一种批评,罗尔斯发展了另一种较为温和版本的政治自由主义。但是,无论是罗尔斯的原初版本还是金里卡等人对此问题的扩展性解释,均未能避免政治自由主义持有自我优先于目的这一本体论预设。甚至可以说,自我优先于目的是任何一种形式的自由主义所退无可退的底线。而桑德尔对自由主义自我观念的批判,绝不只是一个"语义学"问题,其关涉到主体对于"追寻美德"是否具有某种先天的义务。然而,自由主义用以对抗价值虚无主义的种种论证,要么是导向了更深的价值虚无主义,要么是其自我先于目的的本体论结构所不能容纳的。因此,自由主义在对抗价值虚无主义的问题上,陷入了一种本体论层面的悖论。更多还原

【Abstract】 Self-priority,along with its resultant value nihilism,has always been the focus in communitarian criticism of liberalism.In response,Rawls develops a more moderate version of political liberalism.However,neither Rawls’ original version nor Kymlicka and others’ expansive interpretations of this issue can avoid the ontological presupposition that political liberalism holds,namely self is prior to end.It can even be stated that self is prior to end is the irretrievable bottom line for any form of liberalism.Sandel’s criticism of libertarian self-concept is not only a "semantics",issue,but involves whether the subject has some innate obligation to "pursue virtue".However,the arguments that liberalism uses to resist value nihilism either lead to deeper value nihilism or are incompatible with its ontological structure that self is prior to end.Therefore,liberalism falls into an ontological paradox when confronting value nihilism更多还原