【摘要】 本文从投资效率的角度,研究内部人减持对上市公司投资效率的影响。实证研究发现:(1)对于投资过度的企业来说,内部人减持抑制投资;对于投资不足的企业来说,内部人减持加剧投资不足;(2)融资约束削弱内部人减持对投资过度(不足)的抑制(加剧)作用,即融资约束越高的企业,内部人减持对投资过度的抑制作用越弱,对投资不足的加剧作用越弱。这种影响不论是在大股东减持抑或是董监高减持中均能够体现出来。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of investment efficiency, this paper presents an analysis of the impact of the internal reduction of shares on the investment efficiency of listed companies. The empirical analysis shows that:(1) for the excessiveinvestment enterprises, the internal reduction inhibits investment; for the insufficient-investment enterprises, the internal reduction intensify investment shortage;(2) the financing constraints could weaken the inhibition effect of internal reduction on excessive investment, which means that, higher financing constraints, weaker inhibition effect, more excessive investment;also the financing constraints could weaken the intensification effect on insufficient investment, which means that, higher financing constraints, weaker intensification effect, less insufficient investment. The above results of share reduction could be found in both the majority shareholders and the supervisory board.更多还原