【作者】 张樱姝；

【导师】 孙乃纪；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 自我国实行经济体制改革以来,收入分配制度经历了一系列的改革,从传统经济体制下的单一的分配制度造成的平均主义模式,到不断地探索寻求适合发展中社会主义市场经济条件下新的分配制度。因此,如何制定一套有效的适应我国经济转型机制的激励契约已经成为公司治理研究中的一个重要议题。随着我国资本市场的快速发展,上市公司数量和规模的扩大,上市公司高管薪酬也在快速增长,而且高管薪酬的差距在加大,同时还出现了很多令人费解的现象:某些上市公司当年发生巨额亏损,但公司高管却依然可以拿到丰厚的薪酬;某些公司业绩名列前茅,高管薪酬却在薪酬排名榜上默默无闻;某些上市公司高管年薪的增长远高于公司业绩增长。那么薪酬制定的依据到底是什么呢?委托代理理论认为,高管的报酬具有激励作用。在委托代理关系中,委托人与代理人的效用函数不一样,委托人追求的是股东财富最大化,而代理人追求自己的工资津贴收入、奢侈消费和闲暇时间最大化等等,这必然导致两者的利益冲突。为了避免两者的冲突,委托人必须设计最优契约来激励代理人。研究表明,出于保护股东和投资者利益的目的,把高管薪酬与公司绩效有效地结合起来的激励契约是有效的。高管薪酬激励契约的制定依据的原则纷繁复杂,而且不具有透明性。虽然激励的最终目的是提高企业价值、提升公司业绩,但是高管薪酬激励契约的制定还会受到很多公司内在或外在因素的影响,这些影响有可能是可以提高激励有效性的正面影响,也有可能会对激励有效性产生负面的影响。以往文献先后考察了公司规模、风险、成长性、行业和地区,以及公司治理结构方面的很多因素。但是很少有文献研究政府对高管薪酬激励契约的影响。本文从政府通过制定政策法规的政府管制角度和政府作为公司实际控制人的微观管理角度对上市公司高管薪酬契约的激励有效性的影响进行分析,可以对高管薪酬领域的研究增添一个崭新的视角,同时对于完善我国上市公司的激励机制有一些现实意义,也可以帮助我国各级政府更好地发挥政府职能。本文将主要研究以下几个问题:第一,考察高管薪酬契约是否有效地激励了公司管理者,进而达到提高公司业绩的目的,即高管薪酬激励契约是否有效?第二,中央政府和地方政府作为市场化改革的推动者,在我国的不同地区产生的影响也不同,进而各个地区的市场化进展程度也各不相同。在部分省份,尤其是东部沿海地区,市场化改革已经取得了决定性的进展;而在另外一些省份,非市场因素还占有重要地位。那么在不同地区的上市公司高管薪酬水平是否有差距?不同地区的上市公司的高管薪酬契约的激励有效性是否有差别?即市场化改革进程的不同是否对高管薪酬契约的激励有效性存在影响?第三,以往研究表明,政府干预会对公司治理产生影响,那么政府作为公司实际控制人对公司经营管理活动进行的干预是否会对高管薪酬水平产生影响?政府作为公司实际控制人对公司经营管理活动进行的干预是否会影响公司高管薪酬契约的激励有效性?中央政府控制企业与地方政府控制企业的高管薪酬水平是否有差别?中央政府作为公司实际控制人与地方政府作为公司实际控制人对高管薪酬契约的激励有效性的影响是否有差别?第四,不同地区的市场化改革进程对政府控制公司高管薪酬契约的有效性的影响,与对非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约的有效性的影响是否有差别?针对以上问题,本文构建了回归模型,并利用2001-2005年上市公司的数据进行了实证研究分析,得出如下结论:首先,在总体上得到了我国上市公司的高管薪酬契约具有激励有效性的证据,这个结果同以往的研究结论是一致的。其次,数据结果没有发现我国的市场化改革进展程度对上市公司高管薪酬契约的有效性产生影响,即检验结果没有支持“市场化改革进程会提高高管薪酬对业绩的敏感性”的假设。对此,本文把样本按照公司实际控制人性质分为政府控制公司和非政府控制公司两个分样本,进行了进一步的研究分析,结果显示:对于政府控制公司的数据样本,数据结果同前面的结论一样,没有发现市场化程度的提高影响到高管薪酬对于业绩的敏感性;对于非政府控制公司的数据样本,数据结果出现了相反的结论,市场化改革提高了高管薪酬对于业绩的敏感性。即相对于政府控制上市公司,市场化改革进程对非政府控制上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响更显著。本文认为由于在全样本数据中非政府控制公司的样本数量只有880个,占全样本数据量(4728个)的比例不到20%,比例较小,而占全样本比例较大的政府控制公司,由于受到政策性负担以及公司的社会目标等因素的影响,致使高管薪酬契约难以真正地与公司业绩挂钩,进而使薪酬契约的激励效果难以发挥。由于受占全样本数量80%以上的政府控制公司的样本数据的影响,本文分析的全样本数据的回归结果才没有支持“市场化改革进程会提高高管薪酬对业绩的敏感性”的假设。最后,本文关于公司实际控制人性质对于高管薪酬契约有效性的影响的研究结果显示,非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约对于业绩的敏感性要高于政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约对于业绩的敏感性,即非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约的激励有效性要好于政府控制公司;对于中央政府控制公司和地方政府控制公司高管薪酬契约有效性的检验结果则是:两类公司的高管薪酬契约的激励效果有差异,相对于地方政府作为实际控制人,中央政府作为实际控制人对于上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响更显著。本文通过考察市场化改革和公司实际控制人性质对公司高管薪酬的影响,从外部环境因素和内部机制因素两个方面研究了高管薪酬契约的影响因素;同时,也从政府作为政策监管制定者和公司实际控制人两个角度说明了政府行为对公司治理结构的干预和影响。最后,本文给出如下建议:公司治理结构要依据制度环境进行动态调整,只有适应制度环境的要求才能发挥作用;进一步改变政府经济职能,减少政府对于市场和企业的过多干预、更好地发挥市场的资源配置作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the restructuring of economic system in China, income distribution system has undergone series of reforms, from the egalitarianism resulting from the single distribution system under the traditional economy to the striving for exploring the new distribution system in keeping with the development of social market economy, therefore, It has been one of the important topics relating to the study of corporate governance how to establish an efficient incentive contract system suitable for the transformation of the national economy.With the rapid development of china capital market, more and more companies are listed and increased in scale. The executive pay of listed companies also increased rapidly and the gap between executive`s pay have been widened. At the same time, people are puzzling by such facts as some companies made huge losses, but the management got well-paid, some companies performance ranked former position, but the executive pay don’t rank the compensation scorecard.(without attracting public attention);For some companies, the annual increase rate of compensation for the executive is far higher than the increase rate of its performance.Therefore what is the benchmark for the determination of the executive pay? The principal-agent theory assumes that the executive pay has incentive function. In the principal-agent relationship, the utility function of principal and agent are different, the principal pursues for the maximization of shareholder wealth, the agent strives for the maximum of personal salary and bonus, position-related consumption, leisure time and so on. The difference will necessarily result in the conflict between them. In order to compromise the conflict, the principal must design an optimum contract to make incentive to the agent. The studies indicate that the incentive contract is efficient from the viewpoint of protecting the interest of shareholders and investors, linking between the executive pay and corporate performance.Owing to the complexity and lack of transparency of the principles underlying the determination of the pay-performance incentive contracts, many factors, inside and outside the company will have influence, of which probably having positive effect on increasing the effectiveness, otherwise negative effect on decreasing the effectiveness, on the establishment of the pay-performance incentive contracts for the executives of which the final purpose is to increase corporate value, promote corporate performance.The former essay studied respectively the influences of corporate scale, risk, growth, industry and region, and corporate governance on the executive pay incentive contracts in sequence, but made less study of the effect of the government. This paper analyzed the effects on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contracts of the government from the macro viewpoint of regulating the law and legislations and from the micro viewpoint of real controller of company. This paper will not only add a new viewpoint to the study of the executive pay incentive, but also have some significance in perfecting incentive mechanism of listed company. This paper will also be helpful to better perform their role for the government at all level. This paper mainly study some questions as follows:First, to study the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by analyzing whether pay incentive contract stimulate the executive to achieving the purpose of improving corporate performance.In China, the central and local government are acting as the advocator of the market-oriented reform. Owing to the influence from the governments above varied from different regions, thereby the progressiveness in market reform varies. In some provinces, in particular, east coastal regions, market reform has achieved decisive progress, but in other regions, non market factors still play an important parts. Therefore, this paper secondly study the effect of the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by examining whether there are differences in the executive pay level and in the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of listed companies in different regions.Thirdly, the former studies indicated that government intervention has effect on the corporate governance. Therefore, whether there are influences on the executive pay level and on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by the government intervening the corporate management acting as the real controller of the company? whether there are differences in the executive pay level and in the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract between the listed companies controlled by central government and local government?Fourthly, whether the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions influence the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of private companies? whether the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions influence the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of the companies controlled by the government?After analyzing empirically by establishing a regression model the data on the listed companies over 2001-2005 relating to the questions mentioned above, this paper drew the following conclusions that the executive pay contracts of listed companies have incentive effectiveness as a whole firstly, consistent with the previous research findings; Secondly, the data analysis indicated that the degree of progress in market-oriented reform has no influence on the effectiveness of the executive pay contract of listed companies, i.e. data analysis don’t support the hypothesis that the process of market-oriented reform improve the sensitivity of executive pay to corporate performance.In order to make further analysis, this paper classified the segment data according to the real controller of the companies into two sections: data of government-controlled listed companies and data of non-government-controlled listed companies. The further analysis indicated that for the government-controlled companies, a higher level of marketization don’t improve the sensitivity of the executive pay to corporate performance consistent with the conclusions mentioned above, but for the non-government-controlled companies, the process of market-oriented reform improve the sensitivity of the executive pay to corporate performance. i.e. relative to the government-controlled listed companies, market-oriented reform process of the non-government-controlled listed companies influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts more significantly.In this paper, the sample size of non-government-controlled companies only amounted to 880, less than 20%of the full sample data companies(amounting to 4728), government-controlled companies accounted for a larger proportion of the total sample. For the government-controlled companies, as a result of the policy burden, and the company’s social goals and other factors, executive compensation contracts can hardly be linked with corporate performance effectively, thereby enabling the incentive effects of compensation contracts is difficult to play. Resulting from the impact of government-controlled companies which accounted for more than 80% of the total number of samples, the regression results of the full sample of data in this paper do not support the "market-oriented affect the sensitivity of executive pay for corporate performance" hypothesis.Finally, the study of the influence of the nature of real controller of companies on the effectiveness of the executive pay contract indicated that the sensitivity degree of the executive pay to corporate performance for the non-government-controlled companies is higher than that for the government-controlled companies, i.e. for the non-government controlled company, the effectiveness of the executive incentive compensation contract is better than the that of government-controlled companies. The test results of the incentive effects of executive compensation contracts for the companies controlled by the central government and local government are different , the central government acting as real controller influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts more significantly than that by local government.This paper investigated the factors which affect the executive pay contract of listed companies from the external environment and internal mechanism respectively by examining the effect of market-oriented reform and the nature of real controller on the executive pay. At the same time, this paper analyzed the effect of government behavior and its intervention on the corporate governance structure acting as legislation regulator and real controller of the company respectively.Finally, several suggestions were given base on the former analysis in the end of this paper. On one hand, in order to play the role, the structure of corporate governance should adjusted dynamically to meet the requirements of the environment; On the other hand, we should further change the role of the government, lessen government intervention to market and company, let the market play an increasingly important role in resource allocation.更多还原