【作者】 王立东；

【导师】 徐卫东；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 民商法学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 董事责任保险对于我国而言,是一个兼具熟悉感与陌生感的“舶来品”:说它熟悉,因为它在我国正式出现已经快十年的时间了;说它陌生,因为至今为止,它仍未被大多数人所了解、熟悉、掌握和运用。本文以董事责任保险制度与实践最为发达的美国为参照标的,采取一个更为广阔的视角,更加全面、深入地研究了董事责任保险在美国拥有强大生命力和极高适用性的原因;同时,基于董事责任保险在我国的发展现状,全面、深度剖析其在我国面临的法律困境,并提出若干改进建议,以期为我国董事责任保险制度的发展与健全提供智力支持,并期望能有抛砖引玉的效果。第一章绪论中主要介绍了论文的选题背景、现实意义、写作目的、研究价值、研究现状、理论创新、研究方法、写作思路、研究局限及前景展望。新《公司法》的颁布并没有为董事责任保险在我国的业务拓展打开多大的局面。以保监会为代表的官方机构、紧随其后摩拳擦掌的各大保险公司、其他方面的有识之士仍在为董事责任保险的进一步拓展而不懈努力。为什么董事责任保险在我国自其诞生至今十年时间仍无法彻底打开局面?这个问题促使我们不得不认真、深刻地思考董事责任保险在我国的法律困境与突破策略。“他山之石,可以攻玉”,我们可以摸索着美国董事责任保险发展经验这块石头试探着“过河”。董事责任保险在美国发展得最好,因此,不妨把视角聚焦在美国实践上,因为欧洲、日本等其他国家也是以美国制度为标杆的。董事责任保险的良性发展需要具备很多方面的必备要件,涉及到多学科的共同研究,如果仅把它限定在某一个特定的专业领域似乎免不了失之偏颇。坊间已不乏此类作品,但专门探究董事责任保险法律困境与出路的专题研究却不多见。在全球经济一体化程度不断加深、我国融入世界经济大环境程度日渐深入的情境下,董事责任保险也已被引进、移植进我国的体制之内,但若想使它真正发挥其应有的作用还需要理论方面、制度方面、体制方面的全面配合,本文深入剖析了董事责任保险的法律困境并对此提出了改进策略,应该能为董事责任保险在我国全面开展提供一定的帮助。第二章专门研究董事责任保险在美国的适用性。董事责任保险是责任保险的一个子项目,它并不诞生于美国,却在美国找到的最好的归宿,究其原因,即在于美国董事责任保险制度与美国经济发展要求的吻合程度极高。与之相对的是,在其他不具备美国经济发展风格与程度的发达国家,董事责任保险就不是很发达。美国拥有极发达的法律制度和司法体系,民众的权利意识也极其强烈,这才使得美国的公司诉讼极为发达,这些诉讼之中很多是针对公司董事及其他高级管理人员的,但美国需要这些高级人才为它创造财富,公司需要这些人替它管理、经营业务,这些高级管理人员也需要避免官司缠身甚至“因公”破产,所以,董事责任保险在美国应运而生,并红火发展。从董事责任保险在美国的产生与发展历程来看,不难发现,美国董事责任保险虽然适用面积很广、参保客户很多、保险标的额也极大,但是客户群体和保险责任是比较单一的,那就是针对上市公司董事及高级管理人员的公司诉讼中涉及的相关费用与责任承担问题。美国现有的董事责任保险有明确、详细的制度支持,各州公司法都有相关规定,其他各职能部门和专业机构也有配套规定。但要注意的是,美国董事责任保险的双方当事人都是各自领域的专家人才,除具有专业知识外还具有很强的谈判能力,因此美国董事责任保险的保单内容并不是格式化的,每份保单并不一样,也没有统一格式,这从一个侧面也反映了董事责任保险在美国的灵活性,也正因此它才能在美国经济的起伏波动中随时调整自己以适应公司与董事的不同要求,进而拥有极强的生命力。董事责任保险在美国的发展并不是一帆风顺的,就近年来看,它也经历了20世纪70、80年代的危机,2001-2002年前后的低谷以及2008年登峰造极的金融危机的冲击。在美国政府的调控下,美国经济界、法律界、保险实务界人士多方努力,成功地化解了前两次重大危机,虽然目前仍处于第三次重大危机之中,但相信美国一定会采取措施力克困境。第三章在比较了中美董事责任保险实务中的效果差异之后,整理了国内对于董事责任保险的正反两方面看法。从最明显的指标即参保率来看,美国居首位,英国次之,欧洲国家和日本随后,我国香港地区参保率大约在60-70%,台湾地区大约在30-40%,大陆地区还不到10%。针对大陆地区董事责任保险的惨淡经营现状,有学者从正面提出了继续推行董事责任保险的必要性和意义,还有人进一步探讨了完善大陆地区董事责任保险的若干措施。有的学者则认为董事责任保险在大陆地区不具备推行的条件,甚至会有负面效应。应该说,持有这两种方向看法的人都有比较充分的理由坚持自己的看法。董事责任保险是以美国风格为主的一种普通法系精神的产物,与我国总体上呈现为大陆法系风格的法律制度和司法体系确实存在着很大的差异,再加上国情、民风的不同,董事责任保险在我国自然会存在一个水土不服的问题。相信如果我国有关权力部门坚持进一步推广董事责任保险的话,将要在两个选项之间做出一个抉择,要不就是改进或变革现有体制与制度,适应美式风格的董事责任保险产品,要不就是开发出中国特色的董事责任保险产品,以符合中国国情和经济发展需要;但现在的问题是,我国理论界、实务界尚未对董事责任保险的准确内涵有一个统一的共识,大多照搬、复制美式风格董事责任保险的条款与内容,这就造成董事责任保险合同产品本身设计缺乏现实针对性,而现实的客观经济环境和法律体系又不支持纯粹美式风格的董事责任保险产品。但只要找到董事责任保险在我国面临的各种困境并有针对性地改进和提高,一定会使董事责任保险制度发挥出其应有的价值和作用。第四章论述了我国董事责任保险制度发展所欠缺的基础条件,这些因素虽然并不完全直接体现为现成的法律条文,但它们也与董事责任法律制度的立法宗旨、功能定位以及董事责任保险制度的发展息息相关,互为表里,这些问题的有效解决也是中国董事责任保险制度能够突破现有障碍、寻求更大发展空间所必须的。主要包括三方面的问题:第一,现代公司两权分离机制在我国并没有完全形成,中国董事的实际地位和作用不能与美国董事相提并论,董事定位模糊,在缺乏积极作为动力的前提下对董事责任保险的需求性很小。我国经济发展的路径与美国不同,美国历来以私有经济为主体,我国则长期处于国家主导经济的模式下,暂且不论近年来“国退民进”的影响和国家调控经济的优劣,单就公司的权利(力)结构而言,尽管部分程度上实现了所有权与管理权的分离,但是上市公司中国有股“一股独大”、“一股专断”的情况仍普遍存在。董事仍是由大股东委任的、是听命于大股东的代言人,他的行为基本上由股东指挥,这一方面致使董事缺乏经营管理的积极性。另一方面,即便董事和高级管理人员因其职务行为造成损害、受到追究,也因该行为系股东授权、认可而被免责;第二,法律文化迥异致使美式董事责任保险难以在中国适用。中国的立法风格是“宜粗不宜细”,再加上法律本身固有的滞后性,使得我国法律在应对社会生活的复杂性与多样性面前捉襟见肘。大陆法系的法律风格是立法至上,法官要严格遵照法律规定按律审判,公司诉讼中的很多问题法律条文上都语焉不详或者付之阙如,这也降低了法官的司法能动性以及参与公司事务的积极性。董事责任保险的最终实现往往有赖于法院做出的权威判定,我国法官不愿介入公司事务的审判,必然影响董事违反义务与否的判定,这也使得董事责任保险的实现变得难以预期。另外,中国没有普通法院和衡平法院之分,更关键的是没有普通法和衡平法之别,所以,衡平法下的受托义务及相关制度难以原样复制,我国法院在审理时很难有准确的法律依据和翔实的司法判例可资借鉴;第三,我国现有的董事责任保险产品在条款设计上的缺陷也影响了它被接受的程度。首先,现有的董事责任保险产品的被保险人范围有限,主要针对上市公司的董事长和独立董事,我国推广董事责任保险的功能定位也主要是为了配合独立董事制度的实施与完善,因此其在条款设置上没能照顾到更多的拥有管理职权的有资格的管理者。我国董事责任保险的主体范围的有限性限制了上市公司其他董事和高级职员享受该制度的保护,影响了该险种的发展壮大。其次,董事责任保险的除外规定使其承保责任范围极为有限,根据相关法律规定设计的现有董事责任保险合同中的除外条款使得董事的大部分因违法行为造成的损失不在保险覆盖范围之内。一定程度上使董事责任保险的实用性大为降低。再次,董事责任保险在购买上的程序性约束制约其发展。我国的有关法律文件规定上市公司为董事和高级管理人员购买董事责任保险需要经股东大会批准,而由于股东大会召开的难度以及大股东的主导地位,实际上是把购买董事责任保险与否的决定权交给了大股东。购买董事责任保险与否全凭大股东的意愿,这实际上也降低了董事责任保险的购买率。复次,董事责任保险的购买方式及保费承担比例缺乏明确法律依据。我国法律没规定董事责任保险必须是强制性保险,也没有说明董事责任保险费的负担比例,这在很大程度上降低了董事责任保险的购买率。最后,公司补偿保险形同虚设也降低了董事责任保险的吸引力。我国公司法上没有规定公司补偿制度,即便在董事责任保险中含括了公司补偿保险的条款,也会因实际上缺乏法律依据和可操作性而使其形同虚设,大大降低了公司为其董事购买董事责任保险的意愿,因为通常公司要承担大部分保险费,也要为董事的过错行为买单,而公司补偿保险的虚置自然使上市公司购买董事责任保险的意愿大打折扣。第五章在第四章的基础上深入、全面地挖掘了董事责任保险在我国面临的具体法律困境。这里也暗含这样一种前提假设,即虽然理论上讲,如果中国要引进和移植董事责任保险的话,可以有两种途径,即或者改进我国经济体制和法律环境或者创造出有中国特色的本土化董事责任保险产品。但是实际上只有前者是可行的,因为风格上和产品设计上的微小差异并不会使董事责任保险完全匹配和适应中国的公司立法、公司治理和公司诉讼;当然,这并不是说要中国变革体制单纯去迎合董事责任保险的发展,因为体制变革是我国的全局性战略,大到经济体制和法律环境的变革,小到董事责任保险的中国发展,都应是这一历史进程中的应有之义。无论对董事责任保险做出何种局部调整,但其核心的、特有的理念、精神、目标和价值不会改变,要不然就面目全非了。所以只有改进董事责任保险的生存环境才是真正的可行之路。基于此作者以中美比较的视角总结出目前阶段董事责任保险在中国面临的若干法律困境:第一,中美公司法的性格差异阻碍美式董事责任保险在中国的发展。美国是移民国家,移民在长期独立生存发展之后,根据客观环境需要组建了联合政府,但各州在很大程度上享有立法权和司法权,美国每个州都拥有一个公司法就是一个明显的例子。由于公司法的竞争,使得美国公司法呈现出极强的赋权性格,允许、支持、尊重、鼓励公司自治和董事积极创富。我国长期处于统一中央政府的领导下,出于管理的需要,立法权自然也集中在中央,这在客观上也使得中国的公司立法呈现出很强的管制性特征,进而在一定程度上限制了公司的自由发展及管理人员的积极作为;第二,董事义务模糊、责任虚化造成董事责任难以确认,公司诉讼难有定论。我国公司法对于董事义务和责任的规定很不健全,即便是《公司法》在2005年全面修订之后,这个问题也没有得到彻底的解决。我国的司法制度要求法官据法断案,法无规定不为罪,法无规定不处罚,公司诉讼的高度复杂性与技术性使得法官很难有依法断案的可能,这种情况下,董事的义务语焉不详,董事的责任难以确定,公司诉讼久拖不决,私下和解屡有发生,这一切都意味着很难进入到董事责任保险的理赔和最终赔偿阶段;第三,董事责任保险制度与民商法理念、价值之间仍存在冲突,这在一定程度上阻碍了董事责任保险的发展。民商法中的过错责任和侵权理论有督促行为人提高注意行事、抑制违法行为的功能,这一点在中美的法律体系中都无异议。但是董事责任保险的诞生,在一定程度上不可避免地会造成对民商法上述功能某种程度的背离与冲击。董事责任保险在美国诞生之时,也曾因此而备受争议、广受批评,进而致使其发展比较缓慢,但最终它还是获得了公众的支持,这才有了董事责任保险在美国的辉煌篇章。而其他发达国家、地区却在很大程度上不愿接受这一矛盾的调和,因此董事责任保险在这些国家、地区中的发展就要比美国滞后和逊色很多。我国对此问题的长期争论也影响了董事责任保险的正常发展;第四,厌讼情结极大地降低了董事责任保险的适用机率。我国传统上对于诉讼的回避心理很大程度上降低了董事和高级管理人员被起诉的机率,而不经司法判决,公司董事及高级职员往往不会承认其违反了其应尽的义务,保险公司自然也会拒赔。我国公司诉讼的相关制度不健全、缺乏可操作性,程序法上的不成熟导致董事责任很难真正得到落实,无法落实董事责任实际上就使得董事责任保险丧失了存在的意义。第六章探讨了董事责任保险在我国突破各种法律苦境、发展壮大的若干建议:首先,基于对现实情况的理性分析,不难总结出我国现阶段不适宜推行强制性董事责任保险,否则将会导致利益格局的失衡以及董事责任保险市场的畸形发展;其次,我国推行董事责任保险是为了配合完善独立董事制度,但如果独立董事因无所事事而无险可言的话,董事责任保险也将无用武之地,所以要想发挥董事责任保险的功效,必须真正地激活独立董事积极任事、保护中小股东权益的勇气、热情和责任感;再次;各国董事责任保险的实践证明,董事责任保险合同的当事人在董事行为的法律定性上往往不能达成统一,致使董事责任保险的功用无法快速、有效实现。判断董事行为的性质及责任的划分的终极权威定论必须通过司法途径获得,这就是说,必须提高公司法的可诉性、便利股东诉讼,才能促使董事责任保险尽快发挥损害填补的功能;最后,我国的法律文化和司法传统造成我国公司法上商业判断规则制度的欠缺,只有充分利用这一规则制度才能帮助法院尽快做出合理判断,只有健全商业判断规则才能保证董事责任保险合同纠纷解决所依赖的权威判断的快速形成。更多还原

【Abstract】 Directors’and officers’liability insurance is familiar to the Chinese because it has formally come into being for nearly ten years; it is also strange for us because only very few people and companies use it, most people and companies couldn’t understand and use it well. So, the key problem, the necessity to analyze the applicability/feasibility of directors’and officers’liability insurance comes out, which also is a fundamental preparation to construct the directors’and officers’liability insurance institutions in China. The paper stretches out the study making the practice of American directors’and officers’liability insurance as a reference to probe the applicability/feasibility of directors’and officers’liability insurance in U.S.A. Meanwhile, the paper also deeply explore the true and critical reasons why the directors’and officers’liability insurance doesn’t have a good performance in nowadays China according to its present situation with the purpose to inspire more people to pay attention to the development of directors’and officers’liability insurance in China.Chapter one introduces the background of the paper’s creation, the realistic value of the paper, purpose of writing, the current situation of the project, theoretical innovation comparing to exist documents, the ways of probing and writing, the limitations and perspective of the project. The newly promulgated Company Law of the People’s Republic of China doesn’t provide a new wonderful prospect to the development of the application of the directors’and officers’liability insurance in China. China Insurance Regulatory Commission as a typical representative of the official body, big insurance companies, people of vision still try their best to defend and advocate the directors’and officers’liability insurance. Giving that we really need the directors’and officers’liability insurance, then when it can formally develop and be widely accepted? Why the directors’and officers’liability insurance couldn’t be welcomed and accepted in China since its birth nearly ten years ago? All the questions press us hardly to deeply and thoroughly think about the applicability/feasibility of the directors’and officers’liability insurance in China. Comparing other countries’practice could give us many valuable hints, so it is helpful for us to draw lessons form the experience of American practice where the directors’and officers’liability insurance is best used. Other European countries and Japan also regard America as an example to improve the practice of the directors’and officers’liability insurance in their own territories. The well development of the directors’and officers’liability insurance needs many other conditions to support, which also needs a multidisciplinary study. It will be partial if we just take the directors’and officers’liability insurance as a single-subject question. Although there are many creatures concerning the study to the directors’and officers’liability insurance, the case study is rare. The directors’and officers’liability insurance has been transplanted into Chinese economic system according to the background that China is infuse into global economics day by day. The disadvantages to the transplantation of the directors’and officers’liability insurance for China listed in the paper just with the purpose to give some hints for people to break out the barricades for the directors’and officers’liability insurance’s application in China.Chapter two focuses on the research of the applicability/feasibility of American directors’and officers’liability insurance. The directors’and officers’liability insurance is a subproject of liability insurance. Why it has a best situation in America other than its birthplace? The most important reason is it suits the needs of development of American economics. Comparing with other countries, America has a highly developed legal and judiciary system, besides, Americans have a strong aware of struggling for rights, all of which make company litigation extremely well-developed in America. The targets of company litigation commonly focus on the directors and officers in public companies. But America needs these people to create fortune, public companies need these people to manage the companies, and themselves need to avoid being rapped by company litigation, all of which needs make the directors’and officers’liability insurance emerge and has a best development. It is not hard to find out from the development of the directors’and officers’liability insurance in America that the insured and insured liabilities keep fixed and stable although this kind of insurance is widely used. The directors’and officers’liability insurance is well supported by clear and exact institutions. All states have their company law, and all laws support the directors’and officers’liability insurance. What needs to be specially mentioned is that all the parties of the insurance policies are highly sophisticated and have strong capacities to negotiate, so the format and contents of policies are different to each other. It also indicates the flexibility of American directors’and officers’liability insurance, which makes it suit various demands from different companies and directors and keeps a strong life force. American directors’and officers’liability insurance has a tough development progress. These years, it has been influenced by the crisis of 70-80s, the trough of 2001-2002 and the impact of financial crisis in 2008. American directors’and officers’liability insurance has overcome the first two crises through the efforts of government, layers and understandings. It is likely for it to get through the nowadays crisis, too.Chapter three collects both affirmative and negative opinions to the directors’and officers’liability insurance in China after comparing the different effect of this insurance in Chinese and American practice. As the insurance rates as concerned, America ranks first, nearly all public companies buy the directors’and officers’liability insurance, Britain followed, and then the other European countries and Japan, about 60-70 percent companies in Hong Kong district buy this insurance, 30-40 percent of companies in Taiwan district buy the insurance, and less than 10 percent of companies in the mainland district buy the insurance. In connection with dismally status of the directors’and officers’liability insurance in the mainland district, some scholars suggest that keeping on selling the directors’and officers’liability insurance is necessary and meaningful, other scholars go further and present some advice to improve the insurance in China’s mainland. There are still some scholar don’t believe China’s mainland possesses the conditions to spread the directors’and officers’liability insurance, and if insist on spreading the insurance, maybe there will be some negative effect. It should be said that both sides have enough reasons to persevere their claims. The directors’and officers’liability insurance derives from the spirits of the common law, there are many differences between the common law and the civil law, addition to the differences on the aspects of national conditions and folklore between China and America, the American style insurance inevitably acclimatized to China. It is investable to make a choose from two choices to spread the directors’and officers’liability insurance, changing the present system in order to suit the American style insurance or creating a Chinese style insurance to suit present Chinese situation. But the key problem is there isn’t one uniform standard to define the directors’and officers’liability insurance. Most existing insurance policies are copying the American style insurance’s format and contents, which make the Chinese insurance lacks of realistic accordance; meanwhile, the present Chinese conditions don’t support the application of American style insurance.Chapter four deeply probes the key elements for the healthy development of the directors’and officers’liability insurance which we don’t possess: Firstly, the pattern of separation of ownership and management hasn’t completely shaped up. Chinese directors’actual position and functions couldn’t be comparable to American directors’. The ambiguity of directors’position let down Chinese directors’willingness to buy the insurance. Chinese economic developing path is different from American path. Private economy is the main stream of American economy; Chinese economic development model is national control, even though the model is gradually changed to certain extent and the Chinese corporation structure of powers demonstrates the tendency of separation of ownership and management formally. As a matter of fact, the situation of state owned shares oriented is still popular. In Chinese public companies, directors and other officers always are appointed by the controlling shareholders and their representatives, which make the directors lack of initiative to behave. Directors could exempt from the liability resulting from their wrongful duty behavior because they are conducting according to the directions of the controlling shareholders;Secondly, the differences between Chinese and American legal cultures make it difficult to spread the directors’and officers’liability insurance in China. The Chinese style legislation and the lag of laws make Chinese laws could not satisfy various needs for social life. Justices in civil law countries have to strictly abide by the laws, but the laws are always ambiguous, which let down justices’willingness to be involved into company affairs. A key prerequisite to apply the directors’and officers’liability insurance is the confirmation of the directors do violate their fiduciary duty which only could be confirmed by the courts. Chinese justices are reluctant to get involved into company litigation, the situation also makes the directors’and officers’liability insurance seems doom and gloom. Besides, China doesn’t possess the tradition of the division of law court and equity court, consequently, the fiduciary duty under the ideal of equity law couldn’t be completely duplicated in China, and what’s more, Chinese justices have no accurate rules to abide by and cases to compare. Thirdly, existing Chinese directors’and officers’liability insurance policies haven’t been rationally designed makes it difficult to be accepted. (1) The scope of the insured is so limited, just concerning on chairman of the board of directors and independent directors, which leads to the insurance lost many potential and qualified insurant. (2) The exceptions of the policy designed according to laws makes the scope of the insured liabilities very limited. Many risks in reality to directors and officers are not covered, which decrease the insurance’s attraction. (3) Chinese laws formulate that the directors’and officers’liability insurance only could be bought by the agreement of shareholders meeting. The difficulty to start a shareholders meeting and controlling shareholders’dominant role make controlling shareholders actually have the power to decide whether to buy the insurance or not. The procedural limitations to buy the directors’and officers’liability insurance prevents minority shareholders to purchase the insurance. (4) Chinese laws don’t provide the way of purchasing the directors’and officers’liability insurance, in other words, the Chinese directors’and officers’liability insurance is not a compulsory insurance. Besides, the laws don’t provide the proportion of the premium. Therefore, the Chinese directors’and officers’liability insurance is slow in sale. (5) Chinese company law doesn’t possess provisions about company compensation, so even if the insurance policy contains the articles concerning company compensation insurance, it won’t work in reality. Generally, the company will afford most premiums, the directors’and officers’liability will lost attraction if the compensation insurance doesn’t work.Chapter five argues the legal dilemma for Chinese directors’and officers’liability insurance. Theoretically speaking, there are two choices for China to develop the directors’and officers’liability insurance, one is to improve the Chinese system to spread the insurance, and the other is to create a Chinese style insurance. But virtually, only the former one is operational. Tiny differences on the style and product design couldn’t make the insurance suit for Chinese company legislation, corporate governance and company litigation. No matter how much we change the directors’and officers’liability insurance, its core spirit and special ideal, aims and values won’t change, otherwise, the insurance is no longer to be called as directors’and officers’liability insurance. So changing the environmental conditions of the directors’and officers’liability insurance is the only real way. The paper summarizes several disadvantages to spread the directors’and officers’liability insurance in China: Firstly, the basic nature of Chinese and American company law is very different, which hinders the development of American style directors’and officers’liability insurance in China. Americans set up union government according to their needs after they live separately for a long time. But any state keeps a lot of powers of legislation and jurisdiction, for example, every state has a unique company law. Every state makes their company law more suitable for people to use, so their company laws demonstrate a tendency granting rights and freedom for the users. But Chinese company law is made by the central government to fit the need of governing and regulating, so Chinese company law keeps many restrictions to the users, which limits the free development of company and persons recharge for management. Secondly, the laws about directors’and officers’liabilities are very ambiguous, which leads to the dilemma of company litigation. The institutions concerning directors’duties and liabilities are still not clear, even after the amendment to the company law in 2005. Chinese judicial system restrains justices strictly abide by the articles and couldn’t make any change. Besides, company litigation is very complicated and technological. All the above conditions result in delay of the final judgment, so private settlement is an acceptable alternative choice. And then, it is hard to start the directors’and officers’liability insurance; Thirdly, the fundamental ideal and basic value of directors’and officers’liability insurance and tort law are not completely compatible, which hinder the development of the directors’and officers’liability insurance. It is widely accepted that tort law and its theory of fault liability have the function to remind people to keep attention and restraint illegal act. But the birth of the directors’and officers’liability insurance violates and breaks the functions mentioned above. The conflict has been paid high attention to since the insurance’s birth even in America, but it was accepted at last and made a nice performance. Many European countries are reluctant to accept it until today, so the insurance is not developed as good as its achievement in America; Fourthly, Chinese reluctance to get involved into litigation decreases the application rate of the directors’and officers’liability insurance. Traditionally, Chinese are reluctant to get involved let alone to start a lawsuit, so the company litigation generally could not occur. And the existing procedural laws about company litigation are also not convenient for minority shareholders or investors to start a company lawsuit. The situation makes the directors’and officers’liability insurance lost relevance because directors’and officers’liabilities couldn’t be determined only if the courts make a decision out from company litigation.Chapter six presents several reasonable suggestions for the development of directors’and officers’liability insurance in China. First of all, it is clear that the directors’and officers’liability insurance shouldn’t be compulsory, or else, it would lead to an imbalance situation both for parties of directors’and officers’liability insurance and insurance market; and then, it is necessary to make sure independent directors to act dutifully, which will make the directors’and officers’liability insurance useful; thirdly, the dispute concerning the directors’and officers’liability insurance always be the judgment to the nature of directors’behavior will be finally determined by judicial judgment, on which the directors’and officers’liability insurance’s operation rely. So making company law and company litigation convenient is important for the directors’and officers’liability insurance; lastly, the directors’and officers’liability insurance’s operation need the judicial judgment, but courts need the business judgment rules to help them to make out the judicial judgment, so introduce and make good use of the business judgment rules is useful for the directors’and officers’liability insurance’s operation, too.更多还原