【作者】 张凯；

【导师】 李向阳；

【作者基本信息】 哈尔滨工业大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 双边市场中的平台企业(Two-sided Platforms,简称双边平台企业)作为一类特殊的企业模式在现实中广泛存在,诸如银行卡、电信产业、B2B/B2C、媒体产业、中介企业以及各类应用软件等许多行业都是典型的双边市场产业。尽管这类企业早已有之,但与之相应理论——双边市场理论,是在进入21世纪后才引起学术界和产业界重视,目前业已成为产业经济学的前沿理论之一。选择合适的竞争策略,包括定价策略和非价格策略,将两类性质截然不同且具有交叉网络外部性的最终用户吸引到平台中交易,是该理论研究的主要内容。目前,国内外学者集中于研究价格竞争策略对双边市场的影响,主要围绕定价方式、价格结构、影响进入价格制定的因素等方面展开,对非价格竞争策略涉猎甚少,如日常生活中常见的技术创新策略、重叠业务策略、搭售策略、广告策略等,基本都属于空白阶段。因而,选择双边平台企业的非价格竞争策略作为研究对象,具有十分重要的理论意义和现实意义。本文在对国内外研究成果梳理、总结的基础上,延续并采用了目前通用的双边市场的概念及分析框架,运用博弈论、演化理论和决策科学的方法,对现实生活中经常观察到的价格歧视策略、重叠业务策略、搭售策略和广告策略进行了深入仔细地研究。首先,给出了按价格竞争策略和非价格竞争策略分类的依据,并对每类策略的内涵进行了拓展和延伸;在现有一般定价模型基础上,构建了以加入双边平台企业交易次数为歧视标准的价格歧视竞争模型。尽管该策略属于价格竞争策略范畴,但它是现实中比较常见的一种竞争策略。围绕平台企业追求长期利益最大化和短期利润最大化两种不同动机,对采取该策略均衡时,最终用户的均衡进入价格、平台企业利润及社会福利水平进行了比较分析。其次,阐述了重叠业务策略的内涵,辨析了多归属、产品差异化等与之相近的概念;构建了一次性静态博弈模型,对两种情形下,即一边用户是单归属另一边用户是部分多归属和两边最终用户都是部分多归属,重叠业务策略对最终用户均衡进入价格和社会福利水平产生的影响展开了分析。在此基础上,将静态模型扩展为动态微分博弈模型,从长期角度研究重叠业务策略在双边平台企业竞争中的运作机理。最终,通过中国七大银行信用卡主卡(普通卡)年费标准及其所经营币种的实例对文中内容进行了验证。接着,从经济学角度界定了合法搭售的概念,阐明了双边平台企业搭售行为的特征;基于一次博弈利润矩阵构建了动态演化博弈模型,分析了长期范围内,搭售策略对双边平台企业竞争产生的影响,并对影响演化路径和演化结果的因素进行了敏感性分析。之后,放松动态模型中一致性偏好搭售策略的假设,研究当双边平台企业采取搭售策略时,具有不同搭售偏好的买方最终用户对最优均衡解产生变化,并对社会福利水平进行相应分析。运用Dangdang和Amazon对“免运费”策略不断调整的案例对本部分内容进行了验证。再次,遵循经济学对广告策略的分析框架,构建了消息性广告模型和劝购性广告模型,分析了广告作为一种非价格竞争策略对双边平台企业竞争所产生的作用,并通过数值仿真对两种广告模式进行了比较分析。其中,消息性广告并不直接影响最终用户的需求曲线,而是通过影响期望需求曲线来影响最大化利润;劝购性广告直接影响最终用户的偏好,进而影响最终用户的需求曲线,导致平台企业利润发生改变。最后,从双边产业系统论角度出发,围绕双边产业层、最终用户层和外部环境层三个层面,给出了双边平台企业关于竞争策略选择方面的建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Bandcard, telecom industries, B2B/B2C, media industries, intermediary industries and other forms of industries are typical two-sided markets, which are quite common and important in our modern life, have recently received significant attention and becoming a hot in industry economy. In such markets, two or more groups of agents interact with each other via common platforms, which called two-sided (or multi-sided) platforms, and the value of participating in platform for agents in one group depends on the number of agents in another group who participant in the same platform. The theory of two-sided market did not come out until 21st century; through they have been existed for a long time. The fundamental problem in two-sided markets is how to get different groups around a platform on board in large number by setting-up a pricing model to maximize the platform’s profit. Recently burgeoning literatures have come to front investigating price competitive strategies in two-sided markets, such as the impact of competition on price level and price structure. As far as we known, fewer literatures focused on non-price strategies, such common strategies as technology innovation strategy, overlapping operation strategy, tie-in sale strategy, advertising strategy and so on. As shown above, studying on non-pricing competitive strategies is very important in both real life and theory area.Based on present study, we pursued in-depth research on price discrimination strategy, overlapping operation strategy, tie-in sale strategy, advertising strategy by using game theory, principal-agent theory, operational research and cryptology theory synthetically.Firstly, reasons that the classification of price competitive strategies and non-pirce competitive strategies were given, and relative contents in each classification had been analyzed. Based on the normarl pricing model, we build price discrimination model, which the discriminatory criteria was transaction times in platform. Price discrimination strategy as one of price competitive strategies is quite common in our life. We analyzed equilibrium price, equilibrium profit and market shares in two different case that platform pursues long term maximum profit or short term maximum profit. And lastly, we compared them, and also the social welfare.Secondly, we distinguished the conception of overlapping operation, multi-homing and product difference. And then, a static model about overlapping operation strategy was build and the impact of overlapping operation strategy in equilirbrium prices were analyzed from two different cases, one was one side of agent is single-homing and the other is partial multi-homing, the other was both sides of agents are partial multi-homing. And then, the static model was extended to dynamic differential game for the long term perspective of overlapping operation strategy. We verified what we got in the two models based on the real case that yearly fees and currency in seven banks of China.Thirdly, legal tie-in sale was defined from economic point of view, and characteristics of tie-in sale in two-sided platforms were described. Based on the profit matrix of one-shot game, we build the dynamic evolutionary game to analyze the effect of tie-in sale in a long term, and still did sensitive analysis for some factors which had impact on the evolutionaly results and evolutionary paths. And then, we released the assumption all buyer agents like tie-in sale, and analyzed the the impact that buyer agents were with imperfect preference. We verified the results by the case Dangdang and Amazon.Fourthly, following the framework of advertising in economy, we build informative advertising model and persuasive advertising model, analyzed the effect of advertising, and simulated the results. Informative advertising will not affect the demand function directly, but the persuasive advertising will.Lastly, we gave some suggestions for the choice of competitive strategies from two-sided industry system views.更多还原