【作者】 杨世勇；

【导师】 王化成；

【作者基本信息】 中国矿业大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 改革开放三十多年来,我国经济得到了持续的发展,人民生活水平、经济发展水平、资本市场及公司治理水平都有很大的提高,但三十多年的发展过程中,由于新的利益群体不断产生,各群体之间的利益冲突越来越明显,成为影响社会经济发展的重要问题。我国资本市场自二十世纪末成立以来,经过近二十年的发展,已经成为国民经济发展的重要力量,特别是机构投资者的介入,使得资本市场得以更加快速地发展,也使得我国资本市场更加成熟和完善,同时也为上市公司治理和完善增加了新生力量。然而,由于我国资本市场尚处于发展阶段,市场机制不完善,上市公司股东的利益冲突非常严重,大股东对其他股东的侵害行为非常普遍,相比西方国家而言,由于以国有股为重要特征的大股东持股(非流通股)而导致的股权分置,使股东之间的代理冲突(二类代理)尤为明显,传统上大股东与中小股东的利益冲突主要反映为大股东侵害中小股东利益时,被侵害者由于股小权微而只能选择忍气吞声或“用脚投票”,但机构投资者的发展和壮大使这一问题出现了重要变化,在同样面对大股东利益侵害时,机构投资者由于其强大的资本实力和较多的股权份额,可以从日常决策和市场操作等方面对大股东侵害行为进行制约和监督,从而完善上市公司治理结构,促进我国资本市场更加健康、快速的发展。基于此,本文更加注重从历史的角度探寻我国上市公司股东之间利益格局形成的制度路径,从我国特有的制度背景下分析大股东和其他股东的利益获取行为,以获得各类股东在上市公司中生存和发展的历史与现实依据。由于机构投资者在上市公司中的地位尚未有确切的定位,而在其持股力量日益强大的情况下,原有的制度环境和大股东代理条件是否符合机构投资者生存与发展的利益要求?面对大股东代理和股权分置改革,机构投资者如何做出持股选择?机构投资者会在我国特有的上市公司利益格局中发挥何种作用?机构投资者的持股选择对大股东主导的公司决策、信息披露、股利分配会产生何种影响等等,都是迫切需要学术分析与研究的现实课题。带着这些疑问,本文在对我国上市公司大股东和机构投资者两类股东产生与发展进行理论研究的基础上,对制度约束和大股东代理环境进行了定性与定量相结合的分析,最后对上市公司中机构投资者持股选择及其影响进行了理论与实证相结合的研究,得出如下研究发现:(1)通过结合制度和历史路径分析,发现了两类股东发展的制约因素,即大股东的股权流通性制约、机构投资者的金融管制和投资约束,找到了造成我国上市公司大股东与机构投资者股权竞争失衡的外部原因。通过大股东代理与与机构投资者利益困境分析,发现大股东代理行为产生的动机,找到引起大股东与机构投资者利益冲突产生的内部原因,即控制权与所有权分离、控制权与剩余索取权分离、信息不对称。(2)通过对在中国平安再融资案例的分析,发现我国以证券投资基金为主的机构投资者在自身利益和大股东利益出现分歧时,他们首先试图直接通过股东大会决议表决的方式来表达自己的意愿;当行动失败后,转而依靠股票市场,采用间接地“用脚投票”来迫使大股东改变公司决策。(3)通过两类大样本(所有机构投资者持股深交所上市公司、所有机构投资者持股A股上市公司)实证检验,发现2003-2007年(2005年被剔除),上市公司中机构投资者持股比例和持股家数都与大股代理变量第一大股东持股比例和前五大股东显著正相关,表明机构投资者持股是考虑了大股东代理水平而做出的选择,同时反映出大股东代理行为并没有随着非流通股的解禁而发生方向性变化。(4)通过两类大样本(所有机构投资者持股深交所上市公司、所有机构投资者持股A股上市公司)的一般性统计描述,我们发现了机构持股公司无论是信息披露水平还是股利支付水平,都明显高于上市公司总体数据,说明机构持股对公司信息披露水平和股利支付水平的提高均有显著作用。同时,发现2006-2007年,也就是非流通股解禁后,公司信息披露水平和公司股利支付水平比2003-2004年均明显降低,这反映出股权分置改革后,公司大股东持股水平持续降低,大股东代理行为开始向获得控制权私人收益(少分红、操纵利润、隐瞒内幕消息等)方面转变。(5)通过以每股现金分红作为被解释变量,用上市公司中机构投资者持股比例和持股家数作为解释变量进行了OLS回归分析发现,机构投资者持股水平与公司现金股利水平呈显著正相关关系,由于机构持股明显在公司分红之前,因此,可以明确判断是机构投资者持股水平会造成公司每股现金分红的提高。(6)通过对三类机构投资者,即激进型(证券投资基金)、稳健型(社保基金)、中间型(QFII)的比例研究,发现三类机构投资者对大股东代理水平的选择和非流通股解禁比例的选择基本一致。在三类机构投资者对公司股利水平的影响方面,通过对2003-2004年三类机构投资者持股公司的股利水平数据比例分析,发现社保基金对公司股利水平的影响力最强、QFII次之、证券投资基金的影响最弱。不过在进一步分析2006-2007年的数据后,我们发现三类机构投资者对上市公司的股利水平影响差异并不明显,这可能与证券投资基金的高速发展,对上市公司大股东主导的股利政策的影响力增强有关。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the reform and opening up of China for 30 years, its economy has undergone a sustained development, the living standards of people, economic development level, capital markets and corporate governance standards have greatly improved, but during 30 years of development process, interest conflict between various groups become increasingly evident because of continuous production of the new interest groups, and it becomes the important issues that influences the socio-economic development of China. The capital market of China came into existence in the end of twentieth century, it has become an important force in economic development after nearly two decades of development, especially with the involvement of institutional investors, making the capital markets to a more rapid development of capital market of China, also made a more mature and improve, and a new forces for the improvement of corporate governance of listed companies. However, due to the capital market of China is still in development stage, and the market mechanism is imperfect, the interest conflict of shareholders of listed companies is very serious, the violations of the major shareholder to the other shareholders is very common, compared to western countries, due to the important characteristics of state-owned shares major shareholder holding (non-tradable shares) which led to the split share structure, so that a agency conflict between the shareholders (Type II agents) is particularly clear. The main conflict of interests between the traditional large shareholders and small shareholders is reflected as a major shareholder against the interests of small shareholders, when he suffered from the aggressor and had to swallow their anger because of only a small proportion of stock or“vote with their feet”. But the problem changed a lot with the development and growth of institutional investors, when they were in the face of the same violation, they could restraint and supervision the majority shareholder in terms of violations from day to day decision-making and market operations because of its strong capital strength and more of the equity share, to improve the governance structure of listed companies and promote the development of China’s capital market more healthy and fast.Based on this, this paper gave more emphasis on exploring the form of the institution path of the interests pattern between shareholders of listed companies from a historical perspective, and analysis behavior to obtain interests of major shareholders and other shareholders from our unique background, in order to obtain the history and reality of various types of shareholders and how to survive and develop in listed companies. The status of the institutional investors don’t have the exact location in listed companies yet, but its force in its holdings of stock increasingly powerful, and whether the former institution conditions and shareholder agency conditions in line with the interests and demands of development and survival of institutional investors? How do the institutional investors make choices when facing of shareholder proxies and split share structure reform? What kind of roles would the institutional investors play in the unique pattern of interests in listed companies of China? What impact would holdings choose of institutional investors on major shareholders of companies dominated the decision-making, information disclosure, dividend distribution, etc. This is the urgent need for the reality of academic analysis and research topics. With these questions, and based on the theoretical study of large shareholders and institutional investors’ creation and development,this paper had qualitative and quantitative analysed the environments of institution restriction and large shareholders agency, finally this paper had theory and empirical researched on institutional investors’ ownership choices of institutional investors and its impact on listed companies.更多还原