【作者】 唐曼萍；

【导师】 郭复初；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 经过30多年的改革开放,国有企业逐步建立了现代企业制度,基本确立了我国社会主义市场经济的主体地位,成为多种所有制经济中的主要经济成分,为中国经济的蓬勃发展奠定了坚实的重要微观经济基础。作为国有企业核心人力资本的高管人员是国有企业本金营运实现保值增值的关键要素,是企业形成持久的竞争优势并实现长远目标的重要因素,国有企业不断改革和发展的实践已经证明高管人员的企业家才能对企业运营的重要作用。但是,在现实世界中我们经常可以观察到国有企业高管人员基于代理动机和“经济人”特性而做出损害企业价值和利益相关者利益的自利性机会主义行为,这种财务行为影响了高管人员企业家才能(或精神)的充分发挥。同时,我们还可以观察到高管人员不惜牺牲个人利益而维护企业利益,实现股东、债权入、企业员工、消费者等利益相关者财务目标的负责任财务行为。这两种不同的财务行为基于不同的动机对企业价值和利益相关者利益分别产生了不同的影响,也构成了现实研究中一个有趣的话题。但从国内外现有对高管人员财务行为研究的文献看,学者们多从委托代理理论的视角研究高管人员基于代理动机的财务行为,并且国内的这方面研究都还不够系统和完善；而缺乏对现实经济中普遍存在且为主流方向的社会责任动机下高管人员社会责任财务观行为的研究。因此,本文在委托代理理论、马克思的人性理论、马斯洛的需求层次理论以及经营者财务理论等理论基础上,选择两个对立而又统一的主题——高管人员代理动机的财务行为和高管人员社会责任动机下的社会责任财务观行为进行比较分析和实证研究。本文的研究不论是在理论上还是在实践中都具有比较重要的意义。从理论意义上看,本文结合中国转型经济改革的背景,利用国有上市公司的数据对代理动机下的高管人员过度投资行为和在职消费行为进行了实证检验,从而丰富了这方面的理论文献；本文还结合我国国有企业的特殊情况,立足国有企业经营的实践,创新的提出了高管人员侵占国有资产行为的理论框架；并结合实践对国有经济中普遍存在的高管人员社会责任财务观行为进行了理论分析和案例研究,从而弥补了这方面研究的不足。而从实践的角度看,通过本文的研究,我们可以发现一些对治理国有企业高管人员代理性财务行为有用的制约因素,从而为高管人员财务行为的公司治理提供思路；另一方面,我们的研究还为国有企业社会责任财务观行为的激励提供了理论基础和比较现实的激励措施。本文主要研究了以下内容：(1)财务行为分析的理论基础与高管人员财务行为研究概述。我们阐述了研究的理论基础,并从高管人员财务行为的内涵、行为特征、表现方式、与国有企业价值的关系等方面探讨了高管人员财务行为的研究概述。(2)代理动机下高管人员过度投资行为的理论与实证分析。从过度投资行为的概念、特点、后果、动因及其度量等方面对国有企业高管人员的过度投资行为进行了系统的理论分析,并在此基础上结合高管人员的背景特征分析过度投资行为对公司业绩的影响。(3)代理动机下高管人员在职消费行为的理论与实证分析。首先从理论上对高管人员的在职消费行为作了多维度的系统分析,并进一步构建经济模型对是否存在自由现金流量的在职消费行为进行了检验,实证分析了各制约机制对高管人员在职消费行为的影响。(4)代理动机下国有企业高管人员侵占国有资产行为的分析。在对侵占国有资产行为的概念简析基础上,分析了国有企业高管人员侵占国有资产行为的实质是管理层权力私人收益的获取。其侵占国有资产行为的具体方式有贪污挪用、用企业资产资金行贿、变相管理层收购、贱卖国有资产、利用国有资产私营、异质性激励、侵占无形资产和吃回扣等八大常见的侵占方式。侵占行为有经济效应、社会效应和法律效应；而影响高管人员侵占行为的因素,既有高管人员自身个性特征和诚信度的影响,又有公司内部产权制度、高管人员任命机制和薪酬契约的影响,还有外部宏观环境中资本市场、职业经理人市场、产权市场和外部审计监管力量的影响。(5)社会责任动机下高管人员社会责任财务观行为的分析。首先讨论了社会责任的内涵,阐述了社会责任财务观提出的时代背景、人性基础和社会背景以及社会责任财务观对高管人员理财行为的要求；从对股东和对其他利益相关者的社会责任财务观行为两个维度分析了高管人员社会责任财务观行为的表现；并从高管人员的心理因素和制度环境因素两个维度分析高管人员社会责任财务观行为选择的影响因素。从内在的心理因素影响看,高管人员社会责任财务观行为主要受高管人员“社会人”的人性特征和其较高层次的需求影响；而从外在的制度环境因素影响看,又主要受我国集体主义的社会氛围、国有企业文化的感召和社会对高管人员价值评价体系等几方面的影响。最后,我们结合“5.12”汶川大地震,从震中抢险救灾和震后恢复重建两个维度具体分析了“东汽”高管人员在灾难面前的社会责任财务观行为。(6)对国有企业高管人员不同动机下的财务行为治理规范进行了设计。从约束高管人员代理动机的财务行为规范设计和激励高管人员社会责任动机的财务行为规范设计两个方面,从企业内部治理制度设计和企业外部宏观必要环境构建两个维度探索了国有企业高管人员财务行为治理和规范的思路。本文的主要创新点包括：(1)本文以唯物辩证法理论为指导,提出了高管人员财务行为的“二元特征”,克服了传统“一元化”理论的片面性。现有中西方研究高管人员财务行为的文献主要基于代理动机来分析高管人员降低企业价值的财务行为,而本文突破这一传统的“一元化”理论,还提出了高管人员基于社会责任动机而提升企业价值和实现利益相关者财务目标的财务行为,从正反两个方面完善了高管人员财务行为研究,使高管人员财务行为研究进入了一个新的视野。(2)本文从高管人员的个性特征分析过度投资行为,并进行了实证检验,为抑制过度投资行为指明了方向。现有对高管人员过度投资行为的研究主要侧重于公司股权结构制衡机制和宏观投融资体系与制度层面的解释,本文突破宏观研究的层面,而从微观层面探讨了高管人员个性特征对过度投资行为的影响,以及过度投资行为对公司业绩的影响。(3)本文探讨了公司治理机制对高管人员在职消费行为的影响,并进行了实证检验,为抑制过度在职消费行为指明了方向。在理论分析的基础上,本文从自由现金流量的视角检验了高管人员在职消费行为的存在,并发现公司制约机制对高管人员在职消费行为有制约作用,从而为过度在职消费行为的治理找到了理论支撑。(4)本文构建了国有企业高管人员侵占国有资产行为的理论分析框架,为高管人员侵占行为的治理找到了理论依据。通过研究,我们阐述了高管人员侵占国有资产行为的内涵和特征,概括了高管人员侵占国有资产行为的主要方式,分析了高管人员侵占国有资产行为的实质和效应,探讨了侵占行为的影响因素,从而为高管人员侵占行为的治理提供了理论依据和有益的思路。(5)本文突破现有研究,提出了国有企业高管人员社会责任财务观行为,并在系统的理论分析基础上,运用案例研究方法对其进行了实证检验,为弘扬正气、科学理财提出了政策建议。现有研究主要关注企业法人社会责任的履行,而对高管人员社会责任及其社会责任动机下的财务行为研究不足。本文基于这一研究现状,根据高管人员履行社会责任的理财行为实践,提出了国有企业高管人员社会责任财务观行为。高管人员社会责任财务观行为主要通过高管人员提升企业价值和实现利益相关者财务目标的理财行为体现出来,这与现有中西方普遍的高管人员基于代理动机而降低企业价值和制约利益相关者财务目标实现的财务行为研究形成了鲜明的对比。同时,本文对“5.12”汶川大地震中“东汽”高管人员的社会责任财务观行为进行了深入的案例分析,研究发现在危机状况下国有企业高管人员会基于社会责任动机而做出提升企业价值和实现利益相关者财务目标的社会责任财务观行为,这对弘扬正气、科学理财提供了有力的例证,这对我国国资管理工作中如何做好国有企业高管人员社会责任财务观行为的科学引导是一个有益的启示。(6)本文提出了约束高管人员代理动机的财务行为规范设计和激励高管人员社会责任财务观行为的行为规范设计,为我国国有企业的公司治理提供了理论基础和有益的思路。在对高管人员财务行为治理规范方面,本文突破现有的公司治理思路中仅对高管人员代理动机下的财务行为进行规范、且侧重于物质激励的方式,而补充还应对高管人员社会责任动机下的社会责任财务观行为进行合理的引导和重点加强精神激励,并结合企业微观层面和国家宏观政策环境的层面探讨了高管人员财务行为规范化的设计。更多还原

【Abstract】 State-owned enterprise is an important micro-structure driving Chinese economic development. But its survival and growth needs the executives ability and the executives spirit, especially, under the condition that China’s market system has become more perfect and the market competion has become more severe. But in the realistic world, we can find some executives of state-owned enterprise harm to enterprise’s value because of their selfish which means that entrepreneur is an economic man. Entrepreneur’s selfish financial behavior prevent him from behaving on the behalf of stockholders. At the same time, we also can observe some responsible financial behavior of executives which can maintain the interests of the enterprise and the stakeholders, such as the shareholders, the employees, creditors, consumers and so on. But from the existing literature, we can’t find much of the research literature about executives’s financial behavior which based on the social duty motivation. Therefore, based on the different theories such as the principal-agent theory, Marx’s theory of human nature, maslow’s hierarchy theory of needs and the financial theory about operators etc, this paper chooses to study the executives’s financial behavior which based on the motives of the agent and also study the executives’s financial behavior which based on the motives of the social responsibility.This study whether in theory or in practice are quite important significance. From the view of theory, based on the background of Chinese economic transformation reform and using the data of state-owned listed companies,this paper verifies executives’s over-investment behavior and on-the-job consumption behavior, so as to enrich empirical research on the theory of literature. Combined with the special case of state-owned enterprises in China and based on the practice of state-owned enterprises, this paper also proposes the theoretical framework of the executives’s financial behavior which encroaches on the state-owned assets. Moreover, this paper also theoretically analyzes the executives’s financial behavior which based on the motives of the social responsibility. From the view of the practice, on the one hand this paper can find some useful control factors which can help state-owned enterprises govern executives’s selfish financial behavior. On the other hand, our study also provides theoretical basis and practical incentives to the executives’s financial behavior which based on the motives of the social responsibility.The main content in the paper includes:Part one:We propose some basic theory using them to analyzes executives’s financial behavior and discuss research summary of executives’s financial behavior. In this part, this research is expounded from the theoretical basis, and it also discuss behavior connotation, behavior characteristic, behavior expression and the value relationship of executives’s financial behavior.Part two:This article analyzes theoretically and empirically over-investment behavior of executives. On one hand, it analyzes theoretically the over-investment behavior’s concept, characteristics, and its consequences, motives,the measure ways and so on. On the other hand, it also analyzes empirically executives’s characteristics’s influence to over-investment behavior, and over-investment behavior’s influence to the company’s performance.Part three:This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically on-the-job consumption behavior of executives. First, it analyzes theoretically the on-the-job consumption behavior’s concept, characteristics, and its economic consequences, motives, the measure ways and so on. Second,it construct economic models to test whether free cash flow influences executives’s on-the-job consumption behavior, and also analyzes empirically to find whether companies’s conrestriction mechanism influence executives’s on-the-job consumption behavior.Part four:This research theoretically analyzes the executives’s financial behavior which encroaches on the state-owned assets. First, it analyzes the concept of encroaching on the state-owned assets, and find the essence of encroaching on the state-owned assets is to obtain the private benefits from management authority. Second, it finds eight common modes of encroaching on the state-owned assets, which contains corrupting or diverting funds, bribery with enterprise assets, covert management-buy-outs, Sale of state-owned assets and so on. Third,it also proposes three kinds of encroaching effect, suchas economic effect, social effect, legal effect.Finally,it discuss factors of encroaching on the state-owned assets,containing executives’s personality traits,social integrity, internal property rights system, compensation mechanism and external macro environment in the capital market, professional manager market, property market and external audit supervision strength.Part Five:This research analyzes the executives’s financial behavior which based on social responsibility.First,the paper expounds the background and humanity basis for social background accounting concept of social responsibility.Second,it points out the way to realize executives’s financial behavior which based on social responsibility.Third,it also analyzes factors affecting the behavior choice.Finally, combined with examples,the paper analyzes specifically the executives’s financial behavior which based on social responsibility in "5.12 WenChuan earthquake".Part Six:The paper studies the ways to govern the executives’s financial behavior.lt suggests restricting the executives’s financial behavior based on the motives of the agent and encouraging the executives’s financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility.The main innovation in the paper:First, under the theoretical guidance to materialistic dialectics,the paper proposes the "dual character" of executives’s financial behavior,and overcome one-sidedness of traditional "unified theory". At the present, Chinese and overseas scholars only discuss the executives’s financial behavior based on the motives of the agent,no literature about the executives’s financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility.Based on this current situation, the paper proposes the executives’s financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility,which develops a new field of research vision.Second,this paper analyzes empirically executives’s characteristics’s influence to over-investment behavior,which finds the way to curb over-investment behavior.Moreover, it analyzes empirically executives’s characteristics’s influence to over-investment behavior,and over-investment behavior’s influence to the company’s performance.Third,the paper analyzes empirically find whether companies’s conrestriction mechanism influence executives’s on-the-job consumption behavior,which finds the way to curb executives’s on-the-job consumption behavior. At the same time,it finds free cash flow influences executives’s on-the-job consumption behavior,and finds companies’s conrestriction mechanism can restrict executives’s on-the-job consumption behavior.And these findings provide the theoretic support to govern excessive executives’s on-the-job consumption.Fourth, for the first time,the paper analyzes theoretically the executives’s financial behavior which encroaches on the state-owned assets. Through the study, this paper expounds the connotation,the features and the specific ways, and also analyzes various encroaching effect and factors of executives’s financial behavior which encroaches on the state-owned assets.Five, for the first time,the paper analyzes theoretically the executives’s financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility and use actual case to verify it,even proposes some policy suggestions.Finally, The paper comes up with the ways to govern the executives’s financial behavior.It suggests restricting the executives’s financial behavior based on the motives of the agent and encouraging the executives’s financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility.These measures will provide useful train of thought and theoretic foundation to corporate governance of the state-owned enterprises更多还原