【作者】 万江；

【导师】 鲁篱；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 人口学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 “天下之事,不难于立法,而难于法之必行。”任何带有良好愿望的法律或政策要起到实效,关键在于落实。制度再完善,得不到执行也只是一纸空文,无法发挥应有的作用。考察房价调控、产业调整、节能减排、耕地保护、反不正当竞争、煤矿治理、环境整治等等,都可以发现诸多中央法律和政策未得到地方政府的严格执行。在一个被认为高度集权的国家里,中央的法律和政策为什么会失去约束力?中央政府为什么会容忍地方政府的违法违规行为?如何控制地方政府?与此同时,中央先后多次发文要求促进依法行政与法治政府建设,越来越多的地方政府也开始强调依法行政。但政府为什么会自缚手脚?依法行政建设与政策软约束有无关联?依法行政能否解决央地关系失调?在法律制度不健全、司法作用有限的情况下,中国经济获得了持续高速的增长,地方政府功不可没。分灶吃饭、分税制改革都准许地方政府分享经济发展的收益,共容利益的存在调动了地方政府与政府官员发展地方经济的激励,加之官员政绩考核机制的改变,还促进了中国的地方竞争,这本是支撑中国经济高速增长的动力。但要在地区竞争中获胜,就需要比其它地方有更好的吸引力,这包括更低的成本、更好的投资回报。一方面,地方政府展开了简化审批、提高社会治安、完善法院司法等方面的法治建设竞争；另一方面,地方政府之间又展开了牺牲环境、税收、土地资源等利益的让利竞赛。尽管实践中让利竞赛比法治竞争明显得多,但由于中央监管能力的有限性,加之要发挥地方积极性,中央—度容忍了地方政府的违法违规行为,默认甚至鼓励制度软约束之存在。随着招商引资竞争的加剧与扩展,耕地浪费、环境污染、低水平重复建设等愈发严重。我国目前的现实是,地方政府忙招商引资竞争、忙发展,中央政府就不得不收拾地方招商引资竞争的残局,处理环境恶化、耕地浪费、政府民众冲突、宏观经济失调等问题。但地方政府却是“有令不行,有禁不止”,中央政令被悬空得不到落实。执政权威与执政合法性受到严重威胁,中央不得不对地方政府的越轨行为进行校正,防止基层政府的不规范行政影响政府权威与社会稳定。中央为此开始强化法律和政策的约束力,要求地方政府依法行政,严格执行土地利用、税收、环境等法律和政策。但执行这些法律和政策会导致地方政府在地区招商引资竞争中处于不利地位,地方政府就通过各种策略来削弱中央政策和法律的影响。中央不得不对政策和法律进行再细化与再完善,中央地方的这种双向互动博弈就演变为“上有政策、下有对策”之局面。中央近年来的策略是推行依法行政,要求地方政府严格按照法律和政策行政,但由于制度设计不当以及信息不对称之存在,仅有口号式的依法行政难以解决地方政府行为失控这一现实。与此同时,中央还出台了工业用地最低出让价限制、税收减免控制等配套制度,并辅以相应的人事考核制度改革,这就改变了招商引资优惠政策竞争的成本收益结构。地方政府发现仅靠优惠政策无法在地区竞争中获胜,加之企业对法治水平的敏感度提高,地区竞争开始从让利竞赛转向法治竞争。不过由于地方民众缺乏约束能力,地方政府的法治竞争更容易被资本俘获,地方民众收益不大。如此,调整地方政府及政府官员的激励,强化地方民众的约束能力是必须的。第一章从地方政府招商引资文本入手,分析了地方政府为在地区引资竞争中获胜所采取的策略,包括低税收、低地价、“先上车后买票”等优惠政策以及政府职能转型、优化社会治安、完善法院司法等法治竞争,法治竞争与逐底竞争同时存在。进而,以招商引资竞争中的工业用地竞争为例,分析了中央和地方在政策执行中的博弈,刻画了地方政府选择性执行与中央政策再调整双向互动下的制度演变路径。而这种中央与地方经济政策的双向互动和博奕,正是改革开放三十年来我国经济转型制度变迁的主要推动力和基础之所在。第二章转而分析地方政府执行中央法律和政策的7种策略,包括政策变通、象征性执行、公然违反等。我们发现法律和政策并不能完全约束地方政府,法律和政策约束能力软化的关键原因是地方政府违法成本低守法成本高。问题在于,为什么会出现中央政策软约束呢?随后的分析指出,由于法律和政策的不完备、制度统一性和地方多样性之矛盾、社会转型、中央目标函数的多元,单一制国家里中央只得容忍政策约束的软化。第三章则考察中央治理策略的演变。中央调整了中央地方权力的配置,并一改以往“光打雷不下雨”、“高高举起、轻轻放下”之做法,通过依法行政来对地方政府进行制度化规束。中央之所以推进依法行政的原因与传统法学的假设显然有区别。中央策略的调整也改变了地方政府优惠政策竞争的成本收益结构,地方政府不得不改善投资软环境以吸引外来投资者。这部分解释了为什么优惠政策竞争与地方法治竞争会同时存在,并揭示了中国法治政府生成的另一条道路。第四章则考察中央现有治理策略存在的问题。尽管依法行政约束了地方政府行为,但在法律和政策不可能完备的情况下,地方政府在具体行政中总有剩余控制权,亦即地方政府总能脱离中央控制,中央的单向约束必然是有限的。由于地方民众对地方政府行为更为敏感且有更好的信息获知能力,与其让地方政府失去控制不如让地方选民参与到地方政府的约束中去。此外,法院的去行政化、去地方化亦不可缺,最终应建立对地方政府的中央、民众、法院的多层次约束机制。最后一章是对全文的总结与提炼,并指出了存在的不足与待进一步研究的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 The implementation is essential for the institution design, but lots of Law and policies did not get local governments’Strictly implementation, such as house price curb, cultivated land protection, anti-unfair competition, environmental protection, we treat this phenomena as soft policy—constraint which learned from Janos Kornai’s soft budget—constraint. So the question is that why the central-policies don’t get strictly implementation by local governments since China is highly centralization of the governmental power? and why the central government stand for the local governments’ unlawful practice? how to control the local government?At the same time, the central-government put forward slogans of legal administration and government ruled by law, and many local-governments have promised to promote legal administration. so why does the government promise to legal administration? why does the government constrain itself?China miracle means that a country has achieved rapidly economic growth without completed legal system and good justice system,it is a challenge to the law and development theory. the phenomenal industrial growth in China has been assigned the combination of political centralization and economic decentralization. More and more scholars,such as Qian Yingyi,Weingast,Zhou Li’an, regard the fiscal decentralization as the major institutional framework of China miracle for it provided officials with enough incentives to develop local economies, and the local experiments have provided a way for institution innovation. especially, the centralized state power plays a key role when compared with Russia. but the decentralization also leads to inter-regional market segmentation, free-cost land, environmental pollution and so on. and the local-governments don’t implement the Law and central-government’s polices.For these reasons, the central-government strengthen legal administration and government ruled by law, which would help the central-government restrain the local governments and officials. Legal administration has changed the cost-profit structure of the competition for investment, and forced the local governments compete for investment by legal environment rather than preferential policy. the interactions between central-government and local governments composed a path of the evolution of rule-of-law and legal administration.This dissertation containes six parties, the first party reviewes the exsited literature. The previous studies focused on the functions of legal-administration and government ruled by Law, but neglects the reasons of governments’ and officials’ incentives to promote the legal administration; some thesises have noticed the local-governments’ unimplementation, but did not analyse why did the central government stand for the soft institution-constraint.Then chapter one is about the legal competition and race to bottom, the competition for investment are race to top and race to bottom simultaneously. then we describes the interactions of land institution between the central-government and local governments.Chapter two characters seven implementation strategies of local-government with Matland’s ambiguity-conflict model, we calles it selective policy implementation. then we analyses why didn’t the local-government implement the central policies and why the central government standed for the local governments’unlawful implementation.Chapter three turns to the governance strategy change of central-government, and points out it would force the local-governments compete for better legal environment. China is now following the path of rule of law and legal administration.Chapter four discusses the fault of the central-government’s governance strategy, such as strong capital Vs weak citizen, strong central-government weak Vs local-government, and we should improve the incentive and restraint mechanism, include institutional decentralization and coordinating restraint.The last chapter is the conclusion.更多还原