【作者】 李静；

【导师】 彭韶兵；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 一、研究目的2007年12月11日,国家国资委会同财政部颁发了《中央企业国有资本收益收取管理办法》。该办法规定：国有独资企业应交利润的比例按照不同行业分三类执行：第一类是具有资源型特征的企业,上交比例为10%；第二类是一般竞争性企业,上交比例为5%；第三类是军工企业、转制科研院所企业,暂缓3年上缴。国有资本经营预算的核心,即是国有企业向国家分配利润,俗称“国企分红”。自此,国有企业结束了13年未向国家分红的历史。国有和国有控股企业向控股股东分红,标志着以公有制为主体的中国现代企业制度正在向更深的层次发展。国有和国有控股企业向政府分红,仅仅是改革的一个开端,很多地方还都只是探索和试点,政府要成为国有企业真正意义上的股东,还要经过长期的制度建设和博弈过程,这为本文的研究提供了重要的契机。国企分红,从财务角度看就是国有企业的收益分配问题,其背后反映的是产权双方的经济利益关系。因此国家作为生产资料的所有者,国有企业经营风险的最后承担者,根据所出资的份额,行使出资人职责,享有资产收益、参与重大决策和选择管理者等权利。近几年,随着学术界关于国企分红的讨论不断高涨,国家开始对国有企业征收红利,但是。但为什么交?如何上交?交给谁?怎么用?等等问题一直得不到很好的解决。这既有理论上的原因,也有现实的原因。任何理论的研究都来源于实践的需要,国有企业分红问题也不例外。目前专门针对国企分红问题的研究成果多集中在实务操作层面。针对国企分红问题的理论研究相对较少,尤其是对国企分红效果的理论分析和实证检验更是缺乏系统的研究。因此本文的研究主要解决以下三个问题：1.基于我国特殊的制度背景,深化我国国企分红的理论研究,针对我国国有企业存在的特殊代理问题,从管理层代理关系的角度为解决我国国企分红效果问题提供新的研究视角,这是本文研究的第一个目的。2.目前流行于学术界的股利代理理论认为,自由现金流能引发代理成本,股利的支付可以降低管理层掌握的自由现金流,进而抑制代理成本。那么,由于我国国企特殊的委托代理关系,国有企业存在高昂的代理成本,国企分红作为一种股利支付,对于抑制代理成本的效果如何,将是本文的研究的重点。我国国有企业管理层的代理问题突出表现为内部人控制,内部管理层通过过度投资和在职消费获取私人收益,因此本文试图通过分析和实证检验国企分红对代理成本的抑制效果,为国企分红政策提供理论和经验的支持。3.目前国企分红的政策已经实施,国企分红作为一种股利分配契约,它是以会计盈余作为契约执行的基础的,而最能反映企业本质的是现金流’,那么,管理层可能会在一定程度上基于自身的信息优势而操纵的会计盈余,进而影响盈余分红,减少自由性现金流的流出,这将削弱国企分红对于抑制代理成本的效果,如何完善股利分配契约以保障国企分红效果的实现,这是本文研究的第三个目的。二、研究内容和结论本文共分为八章：第一章是导论,首先介绍了本文的研究背景；然后明确本文的研究目的；再次提出本文的研究思路与逻辑框架,概述本文的内容安排；最后提出本文创新。第二章是文献综述,首先对国内外国企分红的研究做回顾和评析；接着查找国内外围绕验证股利代理理论的相关文献,为后文国企分红理论分析奠定基础；最后梳理盈余管理的契约动机,为国企分红的契约动机做好理论和经验证据的铺垫。第三章是重点分析了国企分红的现状,明确了国企分红实施的必要性。首先对国有企业的盈利能力的现状做了描述,发现随着国家国有经济布局调整,以及对国有企业的战略定位和相关的保障措施,国有企业尤其是中央企业近年来盈利能力大增,这是国企分红得以实施的前提和条件。然后从中央国有企业集团和地方国有企业集团和国有控股上市公司分别描述国有企业的分红现状,从总体上说,国企分红的水平还比较低。最后,通过对比分析国外国有企业的分红现状,发现我国国企分红的无论是水平还是支付方式都与国际上有很大的差异。第四章从股利代理理论出发,分为两部分对国企分红效果进行理论分析,验证了自由现金流假说。第一部分从国有企业特殊的委托代理关系出发,由于国有股权整体上在我国的重要地位,这使得通过国有企业分红发挥治理效应、抑制管理层代理动机成为可能。先对于国企管理层突出的代理问题进行分析,我国管理层的代理问题突出表现为内部人控制,内部管理层通过过度投资和在职消费获取私人收益,然后从股利代理理论出发,说明国企分红能够降低管理层掌握的自由现金流量,对抑制企业内部管理层的代理问题的具有很好的效果；第二部分,管理层通过盈余管理降低盈余分红,尽可能多的保留可供使用的现金,进而削弱国企分红对代理问题的抑制的效果,这为后面章节提供政策建议提供理论支撑。第五章运用Richardson模型估计出来残差作为衡量过度投资的替代变量,实证检验了国企分红对过度投资的抑制效果,通过实证检验得出,国企分红对于管理层的过度投资能够起到显著的抑制效果,显著地缓解了管理层的代理冲突,为了检验结论的可靠性,本文参考了Ghose度量过度投资的指标进行稳健性检验,得出的实证结论不变。第六章根据James和李增泉度量在职消费的做法,将管理费用占主营业务收入的比例作为在职消费的替代指标,实证检验国企分红对内部管理层的在职消费的抑制效果,验证了在其他条件不变的情况下,国企分红对于国企管理层在职消费能够起到显著的抑制效果,显著地降低了管理层的代理成本。为了检验结论的可靠性,本文参考了陈冬华和罗宏对于在职消费的度量方法,仍然得出了一致的实证结论。第七章运用修正的Jones模型估计出来的残差作为盈余管理的替代变量,然后实证检验国有企业实施分红政策前后可操控性应计的特征,发现,作为盈余管理的替代变量可操控性应计显著出现了负向,说明国有企业管理层通过盈余管理减少盈余分红,以达到减少自由现金流的支出,削弱了国企分红抑制管理层代理成本的效果,因此为后面章节提出国企分红政策应该以自由现金流作为分红的参考指标提供了经验证据,避免管理层通过盈余管理影响国企分红抑制代理成本的效果。第八章依据本文对国企分红效果的理论分析与经验证据,提出相应的政策建议。本文提议从三个方面保障国企分红对管理层代理问题的抑制效果。首先构建多元指标体系,以自由现金流作为会计盈余的参考指标,完善国企分红；其次,加强对国有企业财务预算的审计监督和引入奖惩机制,降低管理层机会主义动机；最后建立固定比例与变动比例相结合的弹性分红方式,增加分红的灵活性。三、主要的创新点1.本文将国有股权、管理层代理成本与国企分红纳入同一分析框架进行研究,拟从抑制国企管理层代理成本出发,对国企分红的效果进行理论分析和实证检验,具体研究了国企分红与管理层过度投资和在职消费之间的关系。验证了国企分红在约束管理层代理问题时,具有显著的抑制效果,这为国企分红能够改善国企公司治理内部控制机制提供了经验证据。2.本文验证了国企分红政策导致了管理层盈余管理的倾向,检验了国企管理层会通过盈余管理削弱国企分红对过度投资和在职消费的抑制效果,并且做出了理论和经验上的证明,目前还没有发现与这方面相关的实证研究；同时指出在我国国有企业特殊的委托代理关系下,以会计盈余作为分红的基础容易引发内部管理层的机会主义行为,从而影响了国企分红的实施效果,这为后文提出政策建议提供了理论上的支撑。3.根据本文对国企分红效果的理论分析和实证检验,总结出以下三点建议,首先应该通过构建多元指标体系,以会计盈余作为基础,以自由现金流作为的参考指标,提高盈余分红的可靠性,降低因盈余管理而削弱国企分红对管理层代理问题的抑制效果的可能性,保障国企分红政策的实施。其次,加强对国有企业财务预算的审计监督并引入奖惩机制,抑制管理层机会主义行为；最后建立固定比例与变动比例相结合的弹性分红方式,增加分红的灵活性。更多还原

【Abstract】 1.The main purpose of this studyState-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (S AS AC) and Ministry of Finance issued Administrative Policy of the SOEs’capital operation income in 2007. The Administrative Policy regulate different dividend rate for three types of State-Owned Enterprises. The generally competitive SOEs use dividend rate of 5% and resource-based SOEs use dividend rate of 10%, military SOEs and strypped-down scientific research institute turn over profits three years later. From then on, SOEs ended the history of not turning over profit about 13 years.If agency cost theory of dividend can explain Chinese SOEs’dividend policy, it is very important in the field of SOEs’dividend policy and corporate governance that should be studied in depth. The dissertation is composed of three main study purposes.(1) Based on the special institutional background of our country, this paper try to deepen theoretical study on cash dividend policy of SOEs and provide a new perspective from the management of agency relation to resolve the issue of dividend policy of SOEs’effect. This is the first purpose of this paper.(2) Agency cost theory of dividend is the present popular theory in academia which can explains the benefit of cash dividend in reducing agency cost of free cash flow. Since the payout of cash to shareholders can reduce agency costs of free cash flows grasped by the management, it can reduce the agency cost. Chinese SOEs exist high agency cost based upon the special complicated principal-agent relationship between state owner and the inside management, in fact the manager is the actual controller. The SOEs’cash dividend as a type of dividend policy, how the effect on inhibiting the agency cost is this paper’s research point. Two main forms of agent problems are over-investment and non-pecuniary compensation. Therefore, this paper attempt to find the theoretical evidence of SOEs’cash dividend can reduce the agent cost through empirical study.(3) Since there is information asymmetry between state shareholder and inside managers, managers will reduce annual report profit by earnings management, which can avoid decreasing the free cash flow they grasped. Therefore, earnings management can affect and weaken the inhibiting effect of SOEs’cash dividend on agent cost. How to improve the cash dividend policy of SOEs is the third purpose of this dissertation.2. The primary study content and conclusionThis dissertation is composed of eight chapters:Chapter one is an introduction. This part covers the paper’s research background, research purpose, research thinking and logical framework, main research content and main contributions.Chapter two is a review of the literature related to the main study purpose. First of all, this chapter has done a summary on the overview of domestic and foreign study of dividend policy of SOEs. Secondly, this paper overviews the domestic and foreign empirical research on agency cost theory of dividend. Thirdly, this paper overviews the empirical research on motivation of earnings management induced by contract and dividend. Accordingly, this dissertation proposes breakthrough point and the study perspective:effect analysis and testing of the dividends in State-Owned Enterprises.Chapter three is current description of SOEs’dividend from the perspective of domestic and foreign countries. Firstly, this paper describes the capacity of earnings in chinese different central SOEs groups, local SOEs groups and SOEs’ listed Companies. Secondly, this paper describes the Chinese SOEs’dividend which central and local SOEs groups and SOEs’listed companies paid out recent years and describe the current Characteristics of SOEs’dividend. Thirdly, based on a survey of SOEs’dividend in foreign countries, this paper compares and analyzes the Characteristics with domestic SOEs’ dividend so as to summarizing the features respectively.Chapter four is the theoretical analysis of effects of SOEs’dividend. There are three main sections in this chapter. The first section is the theoretical logic starting points, including the property rights theory, state finance theory and free cash flow hypothesis. The second section analyzes the inhibiting effect of dividend of SOEs on over-investment and non-pecuniary compensation from the perspective of management agent problem in SOEs. The last section analyzes the earnings management will affect and weaken the inhibiting effect of dividend of SOEs. Management try to keep sufficient free cash flow as possible as they can. This free cash flow will benefit them but weaken the dividend of SOEs’inhibiting effect on agency cost.Chapter six is empirical study on benefit of the SOEs’dividends in reducing the over-investment. This paper adopts Richardson model to estimate the over-investment. The result verifies the hypothesis that put foreword and show that high cash dividend significantly reduces the level of over-investment in the sample of state-controlled listed companies. Finally, we adopt different measurement as the proxy for over-investment to test our empirical findings, and still find results very similar to our previous findings.Chapter six is empirical study on benefit of the SOEs’dividends in reducing the non-pecuniary compensation. This paper adopts administrative expenses rate as a proxy for non-pecuniary compensation. The results show that high cash dividend can significantly reduces level of non-pecuniary compensation in the sample of state-controlled listed companies. Finally, we adopt different measurement as the proxy for over-investment to test our empirical findings, and still find results very similar to our previous findings.Chapter seven is the empirical study on testing whether earnings management exists after dividend policy of SOEs issued. Adopting adjusted Jones model to estimate the level of earnings management, this paper tests the feature of discretionary accruals after SOEs implement the dividend policy. The results show that the discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings management turn out to be significantly negative, which suggests that the managers using earnings management to reduce the dividends to state shareholder in order to decrease the expenditure of free cash flow. This will weaken the dividend policy of SOEs’ restrictions effect on the management agent cost.Chapter eight is policy implications and the conclusion of this study. First of all, this chapter gives an advice from the financial point of view on the policy of SOEs’dividend policy. The government should construct the system of multivariate statistics which should put accounting numbers to be the basis of dividend and Put free cash flow to be the reference index in order to improve the credibility of accounting profit. Second, the government should audit financial budge of SOEs strictly and introduce the rewards and punishment mechanism. Finally, the government should construct more flexible dividend policy that including fixed and variable dividend ratio.3. The main contribution of this dissertation(1)This paper puts state ownership, management agent cost and dividend policy of SOEs into a unified framework, which gives a reasonable explanation of the relationship among them and provides more scientific and empirical evidence to the cash dividend policy of SOEs. This paper gives a scientific analysis to study the dividend policy of SOEs from a new angle of corporate governance and agency relationship.(2) This dissertation verifies that dividend policy of SOEs policy induce managers to manage earnings. Managers of SOEs reduce dividend to state shareholder through earnings management and furthermore weaken the restriction effect on over-investment and non-pecuniary compensation. In the present situation of SOEs, the dividend policy based on the accounting report earnings will induce the management opportunistic behavior.(3) This dissertation concludes three main proposals to enhance the implementation effect of dividend policy of SOEs. First of all, this chapter gives an advice from the financial point of view on the policy of SOEs’dividend policy. The government should construct the system of multivariate statistics which should put accounting numbers to be the basis of dividend and Put free cash flow to be the reference index in order to improve the credibility of accounting profit. Second, the government should audit financial budge of SOEs strictly and introduce the rewards and punishment mechanism. Finally, the government should construct more flexible dividend policy that including fixed and variable dividend ratio.更多还原