【作者】 梁德明；

【导师】 李瑜青；

【作者基本信息】 上海大学 ， 社会学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文以地方国企管理层收购中的民众集体失语为研究对象,以法社会学的组织分析和制度分析为方法,以有组织行动理论为基本框架,以无结构式访谈调查研究为接近社会事实的手段,阐释改革开放以来、特别1997年以来中国地方国企产权制度变迁中的民众集体失语现象及其所体现的社会意涵。地方国企民众集体失语现象,它是中国深化国企改革进程中所出现的一个副产品,直接与国家法律、政策等制度相违背,它是我国国企改革中一些特殊利益群体规避法律政策等制度的结果。地方政府部分官员与地方国企高管层,他们从地方财政减负或小集团利益最大化角度,借助各种正式或非正式组织展开有组织行动,采取避让、曲解、抵抗、放任等方式,消解宪法、法律、政策等制度的效力。在地方国企改制方案制订、审批、国有产权界定、财务审计、资产评估、国有产权转让等一系列改制过程中,地方政府部分官员与国企高管层、以及中介服务机构等主体联合采取的“遮蔽机制”,使地方国企普通职工等民众对本国企改制和产权出售过程处于全然无知状态。地方国企普通职工等民众,既无法通过本企业职代会、工会党委等组织来了解相关改制信息、参与改制过程,无缘分享改制国企产权再分配,也不能通过地方的党组织、人大、司法、政协等组织来及时获得事后保护或充分的经济补偿。地方国企民众集体的渐进失语,作为一个动态过程,它既构成地方国企改制过程中利益失衡的原因,也成为我国地方国企深化改制出售的必然结果。地方政府部分官员、国企高管层、以及国企普通职工等民众,各自在本企业改制出售中所采取的关系策略,以及各自背后所拥有的权力或人力资本等资源的多寡,从根本上决定了地方国企改制中谁受益、谁受损,进而使得我国宪法、法律和党和国家政策等制度,在事实上出现许多扭曲变形。当前亟须在国企改制中实事求是地建立起保障机制:其一,职代会、工会等组织不能限于空设,否则,老百姓的利益会继续受损;其二,与改制有关的法律政策等制度不能停留在纸上,一定要能有效地指导改制实践。我们需要研究,怎样才能有效监督、引导和控制政府部分官员、国企管理层以及中介机构等主体的行为,使其合法合规,从而有效维护普通职工民众的基本利益。然而,我国目前国企只要一触及改制,却依然普遍缺乏这种保障机制。地方国企改制的相关法律政策等制度规定应充分体现宪法精神,地方国企改制中普通职工等民众利益保护不能流于空谈,工人阶级先锋队的精神不能淡忘。为了化解日益积聚的社会矛盾、避免失衡的行政权力过度放纵所可能造成的各种消极社会结果,保持长期安定团结的局面,亟须通过特殊的制度和相应的机制设计,使普通职工等民众的意见能通过正当途径得到及时反映,使普通职工等民众、国企管理层、政府这三方权益得到恰当的平衡与保护。这就需要对地方国企和地方国企的职代会、工会、人大、司法、政协、地方党政组织加以制度性重构,使得与国企改制相关的各种社会力量趋于相对平衡状态。这种制度和社会力量的重建,将在很大程度上取决于我们党和国家政府深化政治体制改革的决心、以及行之有效的具体措施。制度重建是至关重要的一步:因为,这将对其它类型企事业单位改制乃至我国整个经济体制转轨的顺利、社会转型的和谐乃至全社会共同富裕创造条件。本文篇章结构安排如下:全文共分七章,除了第一章导论、第二章文献综述之外,主体部分有五个章节,通过五个方面展示我国社会转型期地方国企MBO行动中的民众集体失语。在这一过程中,国企内部出现明显的结构分层,职工和社会民众的社会角色发生根本逆转,而这将是国企MBO改革中民众集体失语的社会学本质所在。第三章以华东地区K市四家国企产权制度变迁为背景,回顾国企产权制度变迁的动因和依据。具体分为两个方面:第一,国企产权转让的动因和理论支持;第二,国企产权转让的法律政策等制度依据。其中,国企产权转让动因和理论支持涉及三方面内容:国企产权转让前期的行动、国企产权转让全面改革的启动、国企产权转让全面改革的理论支持;地方国企产权转让中的法律政策等制度依据,从促进中国生产力发展、保证改制过程规范、透明和程序公正、维护国家、职工等各方合法权益等制度性规定展开。第四、五章借助法国组织社会学派的有组织行动理论框架,实证分析K市四家地方国企改制的方案制订、审批、国资产权界定、以及审计评估与国资产权转让环节的基本过程与民众集体失语结果:这四家国企分别是I罐头食品厂、H焦化集团、东城区Y公司和L路面机械有限公司。第六章再现K市四家国企MBO之后,在国企外部寻求权利救济方面,普通职工等民众的集体失语,以及其中、宏观经济社会后果。具体内容涉及高管买断I罐头食品厂后民众集体抗争无效、H焦化集团管理层和主管部门联合买断后民众抗争失语、Y公司、L公司被买断后民众集体的麻木不语。地方国企MBO中民众集体失语后果是严重的:民众集体经济利益普遍被篡夺、官员权力和国企高管人力资本结盟愈发无从制衡、民众政治地位日益底层化、收入分配畸形、内需乏力与经济危机逼近。第七章描述K市国企产权制度失灵状态与相关行动者关系策略,这主要是对K市国企产权改制不同阶段出现民众集体失语现象的原因分析和对策建议。国企产权改制中出现民众集体失语的直接原因,在于国企产权相关制度失灵,无法对国企普通职工等民众加以有效保护;而深层原因则是相关行动者、特别是既得利益群体的关系策略主导了国企改制过程。国有产权正式制度的失灵,包括正式制度的搁置不用、变通或修正执行。国企内部各主体之间的关系策略涉及两个层面:一是国企内部各主体间的关系策略,包括高管层对中层正职干部笼络买通或弃之不顾,高管层对其他技术骨干的交易、利用,管理层对普通职工的蒙骗、专制,以及职代会、工会组织对普通职工的形同虚设;二是国企高管与“中继者”之间的关系策略,包括国企高管与政府部门中继者之间送礼处感情与提供庇护、国企高管与中介组织中继者之间的“礼”遇、尊重与互给面子。非正式产权制度的创设与盛行背后,是国企高管层、政府部分官员主导和控制着整个局面,于是,在国资产权改制、转让中新规则渐次生成,非规范MBO的实践规则逐步合法化。最后,本文提出尚需进一步研究和解决的问题:如何有效控制非正式国有产权制度创设中的违规、违法和犯罪行为?关键是在国企改制再分配中如何保持各行动主体的权益相对平衡——特别是要在职代会、工会等相关制度实践中,切实落实对普通职工等民众的保护措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 In this paper, collective aphasia of the ordinary workers, which took place in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during their management-buy-out(MBO) in City K, becomes the object. The research explores this phenomenon and its social implications during the reform and opening-up in China, especially when the Property Rights Systems (PRSs) of the local SOEs changed since 1997. Organizational analysis and system analysis of Sociology of Law are employed. The organized-action theory is applied here as basic framework, with the investigation of non-structured interviews as the means close to social facts.The emergence of the ordinary workers’s collective aphasia among the SOEs is a by-product of the Central government’s policies of empowerment and benefit-sharing for local governments and the managers of local SOEs. The local governments and the managers of the local SOEs gamed with the Central government policies or regulations that piloting and modulating the local SOEs’restructuring, seeking more autonomy and interests of themselves. They cleared up the effectiveness of the Constitution and the Central policies or regulations with necessary precautions, distortion, resistance, laissez-faire, etc., an effort to debase local financial burdens and maximize the benefits of small groups. The whole restructuring process of the local SOEs was complicated, say it, the setting down of restructuring scenario, the examination and approving, definition of state-owned property, financial auditing, assets evaluation and transfer of state-owned property, among other things. Local government officials, enterprise managers and intermediary service agencies, jointly adopted a masking mechanism, keeping the ordinary workers in the local SOEs entirely ignorant of the state. The mass could not learn the information related to their SOEs’restructuring, the process involved, missed the shares redistribution of the state-owned property rights. More deplorably, hardly could they receive compensation timely or sufficiently through any channel of their own labour union, the local Communist Party committee, the local people’s congress, the local judiciary, the local CPPCC or other local organizations. The workers’s progressive aphasia, as a dynamic process, both constitute the reasons for the imbalance of the interests redistribution during the SOEs-restructuring and an inevitable result of further restructuring. The tactics adopted and the amount of relational resources underlying by the leaders from the local government and the SOEs, together with that of their counterpart, the ordinary workers, in their respective fields, decided fundamentally that who benefit, who suffer. Along with which, the deformation of the Constitution, the laws and the government policies, took place. It’s imperative to establish a protection mechanism during the SOEs-restructuring. Firstly, the employee congress, labor unions and etc. can not be limited to be furnishings, otherwise, the interests of the ordernary workers will continue to suffer. Secondly, systems such as the Constitution, the laws and the government policies must direct effectively the practice of the SOEs restructuring. It’s urgent to study how to effectively supervise, direct and take control of the actions of those small groups of officials, managers and etc.. Unfortunately, as long as the local SOEs in China underwent a PRSs-conversion, a general lack of such protection appeared.The laws, the regulations and the government policies on the local SOEs should reflect fully the spirit of the Constitution, to protect the interest-related should not remain on paper, the spirit of the working class vanguard should not be forgotten. In order to defuse the growing accumulation of social conflicts, avoiding over-indulgence of administrative power that may cause a variety of negative outcomes, maitaining long-term stability of our society, it’s urgent to scheme out strategies by and for all of the representatives of the interest-related. Views of the ordinary workers’s collective must be taken into account, interests of both employers and employees must be balanced through proper channels. It requires a systems reconstruction, within which, the relevant social forces of the SOEs-related become relatively balanced. These forces would be composed of the local SOEs, and local workers congresses, the labor unions, people’s congress, the judiciary, the CPPCC, the local Communist Party committee, local government. It depends greatly on the determination of the Central Communist Party and the State Department whether it will undergo a forceful political reform.The reconstruction of the PRSs and those social forces will help to create a favourable condition for the deepening of the SOEs restructuring, smooth the transition of China’s economy, and direct a harmonious social transformation and the prosperity of the whole society in the near future.The structure of this research paper is divided into seven chapters: in addition to the first introductory chapter, and Chapter II, literature review, the main part is composed of five chapters. Through the display of the five aspects, the workers’s collective aphasia is revealed during the MBO-restructuring of the local SOEs. During the process, structural stratification is apparent within the SOEs, and social roles of the ordinary workers simply reversed, which constitute the essence of collective aphasia during the MBO-restructuring of China’s local SOEs.The third chapter reviews the motivation and basis of change in SOEs’PRSs in the context of East China City K. It is divided into two parts. Firstly, motivation and theoretical support for the transfer of SOEs’PRSs. Secondly, institutional basis. Among them, motivation and theoretical support related to three aspects: early transfer of SOEs’PRSs, a comprehensive reform of the System began, and the supporting theories. The Systems of laws and policies which supported the exchanging of Local SOEs’Property Rights, can not only promote China’s productive forces, ensure the restructuring process normative, transparent and procedurally fairful, but also safeguard the legitimate rights of the nation and the ordinary workers.Chapter IV and Chapter V, within the theoretical framework of the French school of organized-action, analyze empirically the four SOEs-restructuring in City K. Accompanied by the basic process including the restructuring scenario of these SOEs, government approval, state assets demarcation, auditing, assessment and exchanges of the SOEs’PRSs, the results of collective aphasia came into being. The four SOEs are Cannery I, H Coking Group, Y Co. in Dongcheng District, L Road Machinery, Ltd..Chapter VI, after MBO-reform of the SOEs, collective aphasia of the ordinary workers appeared again in seeking their relief outside of the SOEs, and in which negative economic and social consequences took place. The collective protest was invalid after Canned Food Factory“I”being bought-out by the Executives, aphasia took place after H Coking Group being jointly bought-out, the numb collective kept silent after Corporation Y and L were bought out. The consequences of which is serious. Many people were generally usurped of the collective economic interests, some government officials and SOEs’executives were increasingly unable to check, the political status of the ordinary workers declined to bottom, income distributed unfairly, domestic demand shrinked and economic crisis approximated.Chapter VII describes the ineffectiveness of the SOEs’PRSs and the relational tactics of the relevant actors in City K, a further analysis of the reasons for the collective aphasia at different stages of the SOEs-restructuring. The ineffectiveness of the SOEs’PRSs lies in two aspects, being unused or being modificated. The main relational tactics of the relevant actors were involved in two aspects: the relational tactics within the SOEs, including that of the SOEs’chief executive to win over the middle managers by bribery or to abandon, to exchange with or make use of the technical staff. That of the middle managers to blindfold,deceive and be authoritarian to the ordinary workers. And that of the workers congresses or the trade unions to be of no use for the ordinary workers. The other aspect of the relational tactics is that between the SOEs’executives and key governmental intermediary, including gifts-giving by the executives and providing shelter by the key governmental intermediary. And that between the SOEs’executives and the key intermediary from the intermediary organizations, including gifts-giving, respecting each other and mutual face-saving. The creation and prevalence of informal PRSs reflected a situation, which had been dominated by the senior managers of the SOEs and some government officials. New rules generated and informal MBO-rules legalized gradually during the SOEs-restructuring. Finally, further research still needs to solve the problem: how to control effectively transgress, getting out of line, and crimes in the creation of SOEs’informal PRSs? The key is to answer: How to maintain a relative balance between the interests of the different groups in the redistribution of SOEs’PRSs. In the practice of the systems of the SOEs’workers congresses and labor unions, We need in particular to strengthen the implementation of the protection measures for the ordinary workers.更多还原