脆弱性博弈与非霸权体系下国际制度的创建

【作者】 马兰起；

【导师】 江瑞平；

【作者基本信息】 外交学院 ， 国际关系， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文的研究问题是“在非霸权体系下国际制度如何创建?”研究国际制度的国际政治经济学理论,以霸权稳定论和新自由制度主义为代表。霸权稳定论认为非霸权体系下国际制度无法创建,而新自由制度主义认为在非霸权体系下,国际制度能否创建,取决于各行为体能否认识到共同利益。运用东亚(“10+3”)贸易领域制度建设滞后、金融领域制度顺利发展的现实,可以证否霸权稳定论的不能创建和新自由制度主义有共同利益就能够创建的结论。所以,现有的国际政治经济学理论解释力不足。就此问题,本文提出假设:在非霸权体系下,国际制度将经历脆弱性博弈的过程。国际制度作为公共产品,在霸权体系下由霸权供给,这一点为学界所共识;但是在非霸权体系下,也就是在均势状态下,国家之间,尤其是主要国家之间关注相对收益,对即使有供给意愿的国家所应该享有“选择性激励”也刻意降低。并且,国际制度的公共产品属性,即无论谁供给大家都受益,决定了国家的搭便车偏好。这样,在非霸权体系下国际制度的创建便陷入集体行动困境。那么国际制度在非霸权体系下如何创建呢?在国际制度缺失时,国家都在遭受着损失,缺失时间越长,国家的损失越大,国家的损失忍受力便越弱,因此脆弱性便越强,脆弱性博弈便成为国际制度创建所必须经历的过程。脆弱性分为绝对脆弱性和相对脆弱性,绝对脆弱性指国家的绝对损失,相对脆弱性指国家之间损失的比较。绝对脆弱性决定着博弈持续的时间,当国家因为公共产品缺失所遭受的损失或预期损失超过因供给公共产品所需担负的成本时,便会采取积极行动;相对脆弱性影响着国际制度成本的分配,一般相对脆弱性较强的国家对于创建国际制度最为积极、担负成本的意愿也最强。在东亚,贸易领域“10+3”自由贸易区之所以迟迟没有建成,在于世界绝大多数国家都是WTO成员国,关税已经很低,这样东亚各国贸易转移效应不高,贸易绝对脆弱性不强,所以博弈持续的时间便相对较长;金融领域,之所以合作进展顺利,如建成东亚外汇储备库和亚洲债券基金等,在于1997年金融危机使东亚各国金融绝对脆弱性彰显,因此缩短了博弈时间,另外,受金融危机首当其冲的泰国以及东亚国家的最大债权国日本金融相对脆弱性最强,因此在危机后的金融合作中发挥了比较重要的作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 The puzzle of this paper is how to establish international institution in the non-hegemonic system.The hegemonic stability theory and neo-liberal institionalism are the representatives of international political economy theory which research on international institution. As for hegemonic stability theory, it holds that the international institution can’t be established in the non-hegemonic system, but the neo-liberal institutionalism are more optimistically, which maintains the establishment of international institution relies on the recognized common interests not the hegemony. The conclusions of the above two theories don’t apply on the reality of East Asia (“10+3”) regional cooperation, which enjoys the smooth development of the financial cooperation and the slow development of“10 +3”FTA. Therefore, the explanatory power of the existing international political economy theories is weak.In this regard, this paper assumes that the establishment of international institution will experience the the process of vulnerability game in the non-hegemonic system. As public product, the international institution is supplied by the hegemony in the hegemonic system, which is consensus among international relations scholars; but under the non-hegemonic system, namely the balance of power, the states, especially the major states show more concern on relative gains, and cut down deliberately the "selective incentives" disserved by the public goods’contributor. And the public goods attributes of the international institution, that whoever contributes or not will enjoy the benefits, spur the states’ free-rider preferences. Thus, the establishment of international institutions always gets into collective action dilemma under the non-hegemonic system.Then, how to establish the international institution under the non-hegemonic system? During the absence of the international institution, all the states will suffer losses. The longer the absence, the greater the states suffer, the weaker the tolerance of losses, and so the more vulnerability. Vulnerability game becomes the necessary process of the establishment of the international institution under the non-hegemonic system. Vulnerability falls into absolute and relative vulnerability. Absolute vulnerability refers to the absolute loss of state, and the relative vulnerability refers to the comparison of the loss among countries. Absolute vulnerability determines the duration of the game. When the country’s loss or expected loss because of lack of public goods in excess of the cost required by the supply of public goods, it will take positive action. Relative vulnerability affects the cost distribution. Generally, the countries with more relative vulnerability always show more positivism and ready to bear more cost.In East Asia, the reason why the“10 +3”FTA lag behind, is that most countries are WTO members and enjoys low tariffs, so that the trade diversion effect of East Asian countries isn’t high and the consequent absolute vulnerability of trade not big. It is not surprisingly to see the game last so long; In financial field, the reason why the cooperation develop so fast, such as the already achieved fruits the East Asian foreign exchange reserve and the Asian Bond Fund, is that 1997 East Asian financial crisis demonstrated the absolute vulnerability of national finance. Consequently the time of vulnerability was reduced. Apart from that, Thailand who suffered the financial crisis first and Japan who are the most creditor nation of the East Asian countries played big roles in financial cooperation after the financial crisis.更多还原