【作者】 丁兆君；

【导师】 鲁昕；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 财政学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 财政体制是国家在财政管理中,划分各级政府之间以及国家与企业、事业单位之间的职责、权力和相应利益的制度。财政体制的建立是一个涉及历史、政治、经济、文化、社会等各方面因素,并对一国的经济发展、社会安定、国家统一起到重要作用的大问题。从财政社会学的角度来看,财政权力是政治系统与社会其他子系统,主要是与经济系统之间相互交换的媒介,财政权力的配置规则体现为一种财政权力结构。我国三十年的财政体制改革就见证了社会子系统之间通过“权力”进行交换,进而构建新的社会系统的过程。在经历了“放权让利”的不断摸索和尝试后,1994年我国建立了以“分税制”为基础的财政体制,在新税制的基础上形成了中央与省两级政府之间相对稳定的税收收入分配方案,有效提高了“两个比重”。但目前我国的财政权力结构并不符合市场经济下财政权力结构合法性及有效性的要求,对政府权力与市场权力以及政府间财政权力的界定始终缺乏法律层面的依据,致使各级政府财政权力的行使呈现出一定的随意性及不规范性：政府拥有大量介入市场经济的权力,国有经济的大规模以及多领域分布,使得政府与市场之间的关系还未得到妥善的处理；各级政府间的财政支出权力始终没有一个明确的划分,大量的财政支出被推向更低一级的政府；而地方政府没有获得相对独立的一级财政权力主体地位,几乎没有税收立法权,也无发债权,再加上转移支付制度的不完善,致使地方政府通常会利用非规范权力寻求财政资金以解决地方性事务；目前的政府预算无法涵盖各级政府全部的财政收支行为,政府财政权力的行使以及财政资金的使用缺乏有效监督,造成浪费及使用效率的低下。可以说,1994年的“分税制”仅仅是对政府间税收收入的一种分配,并没有真正触及财政权力的重新配置,因此,很难形成与市场经济相适应的一种稳定的财政权力结构。之所以从经济社会学的一个分支——财政社会学的角度对财政体制问题进行研究,是因为大多数真正的问题并非可以轻易地按学术性质归类。“经济利益研究方式”使得经济学能够向纵深发展,但对于现实社会问题的解释能力却受到了很大的局限。相对于主流经济学对财政体制问题的分析,财政社会学是用社会学的传统分析政府财政行为,并试图用社会学的传统解释各种财政现象。从财政社会学角度对财政体制问题进行研究,将经济学中的经济利益分析方法与社会学中的社会关系分析方法相结合,从以权力为基本因素的社会关系入手,构建财政权力结构这一概念及研究思路,是对以往主流经济学中财政体制问题研究的一种突破。跳出纯经济学的研究范式,可以从更广阔的视角划分国家权力与社会权利、协调各种利益分配和利益冲突、提高政府自我整合能力以及促进政治系统与其他社会子系统的配合。鉴于社会学独特的知识模式,要根据不同性质的研究对象以及不同的研究角度采用不同的研究方法。本文尝试在归纳推理和演绎推理有机结合的“假设演绎法”的逻辑过程中,采用利益分析与社会关系分析相结合、动态(历史)与静态分析相结合、实证与规范分析相结合的研究方法对我国财政权力结构问题进行研究。在对财政权力结构的基本界定中,本文从财政社会学的基本议题出发,以经济社会学主要取向——结构功能主义的理论为基础,大胆运用分析和综合、抽象到具体等方法,阐释财政权力结构的基本内涵以及相关理论。对西方成熟市场经济下的财政权力结构采取了静态分析的方法,从经济学的角度,论述了财政权力结构构建的依据；对我国财政权力结构的分析则采用了动态(历史)分析的方法,回顾了其在社会“危机”推动下的演化路径,并运用实证与规范相结合的研究方法,对我国现行财政权力结构的有效性及地方政府财政权力进行了分析。最后,通过与成熟市场经济下财政权力结构的一般性相比较,并结合我国财政权力结构的特殊性,提出优化我国财政权力结构的方案。本文共包括七章内容,第1章为本文的导论,第2章到第7章是本文的主体内容。第2章是对财政社会学视角下的财政权力结构的基本界定。在阐明财政权力概念的基础上,根据经济社会学中的主要研究取向——结构功能主义,对财政权力结构进行了明确的界定,并提出了有效的财政权力结构的涵义。同时,借助生产函数构建了一个财政权力结构的演化路径模型,揭示了由此产生的不同的社会发展绩效。最后,结合建立在现代市场经济基础上的社会形态,提出了与之相适应的财政权力结构的合法性及有效性标准。第3章借鉴经济学的财政联邦主义理论,提出了市场经济下财政权力结构的构建依据,为之后对我国财政权力结构的分析以及优化提供了经济学理论视角下的标准模式。第4章阐述的是我国财政权力结构的理论基础及演化路径。我国财政权力结构构建的理论依据是中国特有的“国家分配论”以及财政体制原则论。在这种理论的指导以及社会“危机”的推动下,我国财政权力结构的演化经历了U型组织结构下的统收统支模式、M型组织结构下的包干制模式以及U型与M型相结合结构下的分税制模式。第5章对我国现行财政权力结构有效性缺失进行了分析。参照市场经济下财政权力结构构建的依据,认为我国现行财政权力结构有效性的缺失主要表现在：财政权力与市场权力界定不清；政府间财政支出权力未明确划分致使政府间分工不规范；财政收入权力集中造成地方政府收入与支出的不匹配；现行转移支付制度未对财政权力结构起到协调作用。第6章进一步对我国地方政府财政权力进行了分析,并得出结论：我国现行财政权力结构有效性缺失的根本原因在于,政府间财政权力没有得到明确规范的界定,地方政府无法作为相对独立的一级财政权力主体履行其职能。第7章提出市场经济下优化我国财政权力结构的设想。优化我国财政权力结构的目标就是建立地方政府相对独立的一级财政权力主体地位,以法律的形式规范地方政府财政权力的行使,地方政府可以在其权力范围内对地区性公共事务的变化做出相应的调整。优化我国现有财政权力结构必须按照正确的逻辑顺序进行：在市场经济体制不断深化的过程中,通过限制并规范政府对生产经营性资源的控制及配置权力,转变政府职能的实现方式、发展市场和社会中介组织,对政府财政权力与市场权力的边界做进一步划分；在此基础上,明确各级政府的财政支出权力,重点是要明确并落实中央的财政支出权力(避免再出现中央支出权力下移的情况)。依据对各级政府财政支出权力的划分,赋予地方政府必要的税收权力,并针对我国现阶段地方政府在经济建设中发挥的重要作用,规范其投融资权力。以地方财力均衡化、基本公共服务均衡化为目标,规范我国现行转移支付制度；并根据两个均衡化目标的实现情况以及相关配套条件,调整一般性转移支付与专项转移支付的比重。最后,强调了优化我国财政权力结构不可忽视的两个问题,一是整合我国政府预算,硬化各级政府的财政预算约束；二是健全我国的地方财政民主制度。本文的创新之一在于采用了20世纪70年代在西方学术界复兴的财政社会学的研究视角。以利益分析与社会关系分析相结合的研究方法,将财政体制问题置于宏观社会历史发展的大背景中,强调从政治、经济、制度和文化等连接国家与社会的因素,来综合研究政府财政收支行为的产生、发展以及财政权力的演变过程及其对政治、经济和社会等各方面的影响。综合运用公共经济学、经济学、新政治经济学、财政学、政治学等方面的相关理论和概念,试图从一个更为广阔的视角对财政体制这一问题进行研究。本文的创新之二在于借鉴经济社会学中的主要取向——结构功能主义理论,大胆引申出财政权力结构这一概念,并将其作为社会系统中的一个子系统,进而探讨财政权力结构与社会发展绩效之间的相互作用。根据结构功能主义的相关理论,本文认为一个合法且有效的财政权力结构是一种能够促使各财政权力主体应对不确定性,发挥其能动性,同时又为整体目标服务的“虚拟秩序”或“制度”。在这种“秩序”或“制度”下,权力作为社会各子系统相互交换的媒介,才能发挥其应有的作用。因此,根据市场经济下财政权力结构合法性和有效性的特质,优化我国财政权力结构的目标就是建立各级政府相对独立的一级财政权力主体地位,明确市场与政府、各级政府间权力的划分,并逐步以法律的形式对此种“制度”进行确定。本文的创新之三在于注重对我国财政权力结构特有理论基础——“国家分配论”及“原则论”的研究,并结合工业组织理论中的U型及M型组织结构,描述了我国财政权力结构从“统收统支”模式、“包干制”模式到“分税制”模式的演化路径。更多还原

【Abstract】 Fiscal system is the institution of the division of responsibility, power and related interest among the different levels of governments as well as the state and enterprises in the financial management of the state. The establishment of the fiscal system is a matter of historical, political, economic, cultural, social and other factors. It also plays an important role in the areas of the country’s economic development, social stability and national unity. From the view of Finanzsoziologie, the fiscal power is the exchange media between the political system and other subsystem of society mainly the economic system and the rules of fiscal power configuration embody in the fiscal power structure. The three decades reform of fiscal system in China has witnessed the process of exchange between the social subsystems by the "power", and the construction of a new social system. After the attempts of decentralization reforms, China set up the "Tax-Division" system in 1994, it re-adjusted the tax revenue allocation pattern between the central and local governments (mainly the central government and the province), and effectively improved the "two proportions". However, China’s existing fiscal power structure does not comply with the legitimacy and effectiveness requirements of the fiscal power structure under the market economy. The division of power between the government and the market as well as the government of different levels has been lack of legal bounds, resulting in various fiscal behaviors of arbitrariness and non-normative. Governments bear the substantial economic construction functions, and the existence of numerous state-owned enterprises (SOE) blurred the relationship between the government and business; the higher-level government shifts or dumps financial expenditure downwards because there is no formal, legal assignment of fiscal expenditure power; the lack of a relatively independent status of fiscal power, no legislative power of tax and issuance of government debt, imperfect transfer system induce the local governments to find the fiscal funds to solve local affairs in non-normative ways; the public budget of China can not cover all the fiscal behaviors of the governments of different levels, which is lack of supervision. Therefore, China’s current fiscal system is just a distribution of tax revenue but it is difficult to form a stable fiscal power structure which is consistent with market economy. The reason of the study from the Finanzsoziologie perspective which is a branch of the economic sociology is that the majority of the real problem can not be easily classified according to the academic nature. "The Method of Economic Benifit Research" can make the Economics to develop in depth, but limit the reality of the explanatory power of social problems. With the method of the Economics research comparison, Finanzsoziologie analyses the fiscal behaviors and tries to explain the fiscal phenomenon by sociological tradition. From the view of Finanzsoziologie, to combine the Method of Economic Interest Research and the Method of Social Relation Research and to build the concept of fiscal power structure with the "power"-the fundamental factor of social relation is the break of mainstream economics research on the fiscal system in the past. Out of pure economics research method, the Finanzsoziologie provides a broader perspective to divide the state power and social rights, to coordinate the distribution of a variety of benifits and to increase the capacity of self-integration and to promote the political system with other social subsystems. With its own knowledge pattern, sociology must adopt different research modes according to the studies of different nature as well as the different perspective.This paper attempts to research on the fiscal power structure in China with the methods of combination of economic benifit and social relation analysis, combination of dynamic (history) and static analysis, combination of empirical analysis and normative analysis in the logical process of "hypothetical deductive method". On the base of the Structure Functionalism Theory, this paper explains the basic meaning of the fiscal power structure and the related theory by the methods of analysis and synthesis. From the view of the Economics, this paper discusses the standard of fiscal power structure construction with the static analysis method of the fiscal power structure in mature market economy. With the method of dynamic (history) analysis, this paper reviews the evolution path of China’s fiscal power structure driven by the "crisis" and analyses the effectiveness and the fiscal power of local governments with the combination of empirical and normative research method. At last, this paper proposes the optimization program of China’s fiscal power structure with the comparison of fiscal power structure in the mature market economy.The content of this paper consists of seven chapters:Chapter 1 is the Introduction to this paper; Chapter 2 to Chapter 7 is the main content of this paper. Chapter 2 is the basic definition of fiscal power structure from the view of the Finanzsoziologie. This chapter clearly defines the concept of fiscal power structure and puts forward an effective means of fiscal power structure according to the Structure Functionalism which is the major oriented research of the Economic Sociology. Meanwhile, it builds an evolution path of the fiscal power structure with the production function and reveals the performance of different social development. Finally, Chapter 1 proposes the legitimacy and effectiveness standard of fiscal power structure on the basis of the modern social formation. With the reference of Fiscal Federalism Theory, Chapter 3 puts forward the standard of fiscal power structure in the market economy in order to provide the standard model of the analysis and the optimization of China’s fiscal power structure on the perspective of Economic Theory. Chapter 4 expounds the theoretical basis and the evolution path of China’s fiscal power structure. The theoretical basis of China’s fiscal power structure construction is the China’s unique "National Distribution Theory" as well as the principle of fiscal system. China’s evolution path of fiscal power structure goes through unified system under the U-organizational structure, the contract system under the M-organizational structure and the tax-division system under the combination of U and M organizational structure. Chapter 5 analyses the lack of the effectiveness of China’s current fiscal power structure. With the reference of the market economy’s standard, the chaper discusses the main problems of China’s current fiscal power structure. There is no clear bound between the fiscal power and the market power as well as the power division among the governments of different levels; and the concentrated revenue power causes the local governments’ revenue and expenditure does not match. The current transfer system does not play a coordinating role in the current fiscal structure. Chapter 6 analyses the fiscal power of China’s local governments further and comes to a conclusion:the root cause of the lack of its effectiveness is that the local government can not perform the main fiscal function as a relatively independent power body because of no clear defined norms. Chapter 7 tries to optimize the China’s fiscal power structure under the market economy. The optimization goal is to establish the relative independence fiscal power agents of local governments and to standardize the fiscal behaviors of local governments by the law form in order to make the appropriate adjustments with the fiscal power. Optimization of the existing fiscal power structure must be in accordance with the logic correct order. The first step is to transform the government functions and develop the market and social intermediary organizations by limiting and regulating the government’s power of production resources for the further delineation of the fiscal power border. On this basis, to definite the fiscal expenditure power of different level governments is the second step and the focus is to identify and implement the central government’s fiscal expenditure power. According to the division of fiscal expenditure power, the third step is to endow the local government the necessary tax power, and to regulate the power of Treasury Investment and Loan in order to complete the current fiscal function of the economic development. The fourth step is to standardize the existing transfer system with the goal of equalization of local fiscal funds and basic public services and to adjust the proportion of the general transfer and the special transfer based on two equalization goals as well as the related conditions. Finally, Chapter 7 emphasizes two important issues which can not be ignored:one is the integration of China’s government budget and hardening the different level governments’ budget constraints, another is to build a sound democratic system of local finance in China.Innovations of this paper are reflected in the following three areas:Firstly, the research perspective is Finanzsoziologie which reviewed in western academic in 1970’s. Specifically, this paper combines the method of benefit analysis and social relation analysis, analyses the fiscal system problems at the context of macro social and historical development, emphasizes the political, economic, institutional and cultural factors which connectes state and society, studies the generation and development of the government’s revenue and expenditure behavior, the evolution of fiscal power and their effects on politics, economy and society etc comprehensively. The paper uses the related thoeries and concepts of Public Economics, Economics, New Political Economics, Fiscal and Political Science in order to study the fiscal power system from a broader perspective. Secondly, the paper builds up the concept of fiscal power structure learning from the main orientation of Economic Sociology, that is, theory of Structure Functionalism. Regarding the concept of fiscal power structure as a subsystem of social system, the paper discusses the interaction between fiscal power structure and performance of social development furtherly. According to the theory of Structural Functionalism, conclusion of this paper is that a legitimate and effective fiscal power structure is a "virtual order" or "institution" which induces the agents of fiscal power to cope with the uncertainty, to play a dynamic role and make contributions to the overall objectives. Only in this "order" or "institution", rihgts can play its role of mutual exchange media of all of the social subsystem. Therefore, according to the characteristics of legitimacy and effectiveness of fiscal power structure in market economy, the objective of optimizing China’s fiscal power structure is to establish a relatively independent status of fiscal power agent at all levels of government, make clear of the rihgts division between market and government, between governments of all levels and gradually establish the "institution" through legal form. Thirdly, the paper payes much attention on the unique theoretical basis of China’s fiscal power structure, that is, "National Distribution Theory"and "Principle Theory". Based on the U and M organizational structure in Industrial Organization Theory, this paper depicts the evolution path of China’s fiscal power structure from "Unified System" mode to "Contract System" then to "Tax Division" mode.更多还原