【作者】 赵璐；

【导师】 王玮；

【作者基本信息】 山东师范大学 ， 世界史， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 第二次世界大战之后,国际体系完成了从欧洲体系向两极体系的转换,欧洲在退出全球政治中心的同时,以分裂的状态成为两大阵营对垒的冷战前沿。美国将西欧国家视为“天然的盟友”,将确保欧洲大陆的稳定作为仅次于本土安全的国家安全目标。在北大西洋公约组织的架构下,美国的核保护和直接军事援助确保了欧洲大陆得以维持两极均势下的“和平”。欧洲安全政策是美国全球战略和外交政策的重要内容,本文针对尼克松政府的欧洲安全政策进行研究。二战结束初期,美国凭借核垄断的绝对优势,在欧洲奉行地区性遏制与核威慑相结合的战略,确立了将遏制政策与大西洋联盟政策结合运用的欧洲安全政策模式,以此确保欧洲局势的稳定和美国在西方世界的领导地位。1949—1962年间,美国在战略武器上处于优势,这一时期美国的欧洲安全政策侧重于强调核威慑在地区性遏制中的作用,在推行“大规模报复战略”的同时积极推进北约机构和功能的不断完善,加深大西洋联盟的军事一体化程度。肯尼迪、约翰逊时代,美苏在战略核力量上差距的不断缩小使美国最终失去了压倒性的单边优势,“灵活反应战略”与“多边核力量计划”取代了“大规模报复战略”。面临重重危机的尼克松政府选择了“现实威慑战略”,通过发展美欧伙伴关系、支持欧洲一体化进程、促进防务分担与共同防御等途径构建美欧关系新蓝图。尼克松政府的欧洲安全政策源于二战后美国欧洲安全政策的历史传承,受制于复杂的国内外形势,服从并服务于其全球战略。在欧洲安全问题上,尼克松政府面临着无法规避的地理难题、常规力量的劣势、大西洋联盟内部的矛盾以及沉重的军备负担等诸多困难。尼克松政府的欧洲安全政策主要围绕两大问题展开:一是如何在欧洲实现最佳的安全与合作,二是如何实现北约与华约的均衡裁军。在认真分析两大阵营力量对比和主要影响因素的基础上,尼克松政府确定了遏制与缓和、稳定的威慑、美欧共同防御与防务分担三大政策目标,将美苏缓和与限制战略武器会谈、四国柏林协定、欧洲安全与合作会议和中欧均衡裁军作为主要着力点,采取“防御加缓和”的战略,利用多种外交手段,避免单纯军事对抗可能引起的风险,通过交流与合作向东方进行政治经济渗透,在加强大西洋联盟内部团结和巩固美国领导地位的基础上减轻自身军备负担,缓解国内矛盾。东西方缓和的发展、美苏首脑会晤和四国柏林协定的签署为酝酿已久的欧安会与中欧均衡裁军铺平了道路。美国起初对召开欧安会持否定态度,后鉴于欧洲国家对欧安会的热衷,为不致在北约组织中陷于孤立,遂表示接受。欧安会是在冷战缓和的背景下东西方进行对话合作的一次有益尝试,尼克松政府在会议的筹备召开过程中奉行现实主义外交和联系策略,欲在维护西方利益的基础上达成与苏缓和。两大阵营的利益冲突和联盟内部的意见分歧为尼克松政府的政策推行增加了难度,会议达成的最后宣言对各国并没有实际的约束效力。欧安会的短期效果虽然有限,但会议倡导的官方和民间的沟通与交流打破了苏联二战后在欧洲苦心营造的壁垒,正是这种政治文化的渗透和软实力的较量帮助西方最终取得了冷战的胜利。中欧均衡裁军的意向是在美苏军备竞赛和规避冲突的纠葛中逐渐产生的。尼克松政府在中欧均衡裁军问题上的政策目标一是利用苏联对欧安会的急于求成获取其在欧洲缓和与裁军问题上的让步;二是通过裁军谈判缩小两大军事集团在中欧常规力量上的差距;三是通过多边裁军会议推行美欧的防务分担,减轻自身的军费压力。“均衡”与“对等”,美苏各执一词,在裁军地域的界定、裁军类型和比例、时间表和确认措施等问题上争执不休。尼克松政府准确把握了苏联对欧安会的迫切心态,最终实现了以同意推进欧安会进程换取苏联对中欧均衡裁军谈判的认可,成功建立了两会在时间安排上的关联性和议程设置上的独立性。由于两大阵营不可调和的矛盾和双方在实力对比上的高度敏感,实质的裁军方案并未最终落实,苏联依旧保持了在中欧常规力量上的优势。领导权的独占和义务的分担是美国防务分担设想中的固有矛盾,欧洲各国的离心倾向和对美国战略力量的依赖加深了美欧在防务分担问题上的分歧。相互依赖的增长为国家间的合作提供了激励,而且至少潜在地对某些传统形式的竞争和敌对施加了限制,这是缓和的驱动力。但缓和是手段而非目的,尼克松政府的欧洲安全政策受到政治压力、经济形势、苏东因素和美欧盟友关系等多种因素的影响,充分体现出现实主义外交的贯彻和局限,联系策略的审慎推进与力不从心。美国对其盟国的支配权最终是要保证美国利益的顺利实现,美国竭力把欧洲地区性战略与美国的全球战略协调起来,希望与欧洲成为“真正的伙伴”。但在美苏均势和欧洲复兴的背景下,美国的霸权管理体制难以简单地采用垂直式的管理方式,而必须建立在多边主义国际制度的基础上。同尼克松的缓和战略相似,尼克松政府的欧洲安全政策从某种程度上正是美国外交中“目标与力量”这一矛盾的集中体现。更多还原

【Abstract】 The international political system had been transformed from Europe system to Two-poles system after the Second World War. While withdrawing form the centre of whole world politics, the divided Europe had been the frontline during the Cold War which the two camps confronting each other. The United States looked upon the West European as "the natural allies" and regarded ensuring the stablity of European Continent as one of the vital national security goals which only inferior to the security of the U.S. local territory. Under the NATO’s frame, the American nuclear umbrella and its direct succor had ensured the European continent could be maintained "peace" under the balance of power of US-Soviet. European Security was the key element of American global strategy and foreign policy, this dissertation focued on the European Security policy of the Nixon government and carried out the monographic study.At the initial stage after the Second World War, the U.S. relied on the nuclear monopolizeation, pursuing the provincial containment and the nuclear deterrent strategy in Europe, and established the Containment combing with Atlantic alliance policy style in European Security, which ensuring the stability of Europe situation and the U.S. leading position in the West. 1949-1962, the U.S. had the superiority on strategic arms, its European Security poliy emphasised on the effect of nuclear deterrent. Accompanying with the Massive Retaliation Strategy, the U.S. pushed the organization and functional ceaselessness of NATO actively, in order to improve the military integration degree of the Atlantic Alliance. In Kennedy-Johnson times , US-Soviet Union gap in strategy nuclear force had been vanished gradually, which made the U.S. lost the overwhelming single-side advantage and the Flexible Response Strategy and MLF (Multiple Force) had substituted the Massive Retaliation Strategy. The Nixon government confronted the serious crisis and had chosen the Realistic Deterrent Strategy, and tried to realize the genuine partnership with Europe allies, according to support Europe Unity, expenditure sharing and common defense. The European Security policy of the Nixon government originated from the history of the U.S. European Security policy, under the control of the complicated domestic and international situation, which obeyed and served it’s global strategy essentially.In European security affairs, the Nixon government confronted a lot of difficulties such as the geographical problem, routine strength inferior, internal contradiction of alliance and heavy armament burden. Its European security policy was centered around the two basic questions: how best to achieve security and cooperation in Europe, and how to reduce both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. On the basis of analysing the force of East and West and other main influencing factors carefully, the Nixon government had ascertained three great policies target: containment and detente, effective deterrent, the U.S. and Europe working together for expenditure sharing and common defense. Its policy foused on US-Soviet detente, SALTⅠ,Berlin agreement, CSCE ( the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and MBFR ( the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations in Central Europe). The Nixon government pursued the defense and detente stratedy, by means of making use of various diplomacy means, such as political and econmic exchanging and cooperation between East and West, in order to avoide simple military confliction, lighten its armament burden and internal pressure, reinforcing the unity of the Atlantic Alliance and ensuring the U.S. leading position.With the development of detente, US-Soviet Summit Meeting and signature of Berlin Agreement, the prerequisite of CSCE and MBFR was resloved. The U.S. hold negative attitude to CSCE initially, however because of active attitude of the Europe countries, the Nixon government adopt the CSCE to avoid be isolated in Atlantic Alliance. CSCE was a beneficial attemption of communication and cooperation between East and Weat in the Cold War. The Nixon government pursued realistic diplomacy and Linkage tactics in the preparing process of CSCE, in order to protect the West benefit and promote detente with Soviet Union. The confliction between East and West and the view diffenences in allies, which gave many difficulities to the Nixon government to pursuing its policy, and the Final Act of CSCE was not compulsory to any countries. The short-term effect of CSCE was limited but it initiated official and popular ways for communication and exchange in East-West, which had broken the barriers Soviet Union building in Europe after the Second World War and helped the West to get the Cold War victory ultimately through the penetration of politics and culture and the trial of soft power.The intention of MBFR came into being gradually in the combined action of US-Soviet arms competition and evading confliction. The Nixon government had three mainly targets in MBFR. Firstly, the U.S. wanted to make use of Soviet Union’s eager for CSCE to gain whose concession on European detente and disarmament issue. Secondly, the Nixon government wanted to reduce the disparity on conventional military strength in central Europe between East and West by the disarmament negotiation.Thirdly, the U.S. wanted to pursue expenditure sharing with European allies and lighten its military budget pressure. The U.S. insisted a mutual and balanced force reductions, however the Soviet Union insisted the mutual eaqual force reductions, the two super powers had argued ceaselessly about the region of disarmament, the force type and the proportion, the schedule and affirming measure, edc. The Nixon government grasped the Soviet’s eager for CSCE, having come true ultimately to agree pushing forward CSCE to get the Soviet Union ratification to MBFR in return, and realized the separate negotiation and the connected agenda successfully. Because the two bloc had the implacable benefit conflicts and highly sensitive on strength contrast, there wasn’t a final disarmament scheme, and Soviet Union had still kept the superiority on conventional strength in Central Europe. The leadership monopolizing and the responsibility sharing are the inherence contradiction of the U.S. expenditure sharing policy, separatist tendency of Europe allies and their dependence on U.S. nuclear strength deepened the contradictory between Europe and the U.S. on defense problem.The increasing interdependence has been a driving force of detente, which has provided an excitation to countries cooperation and restricted some tradition forms of their competition. But the Detente Strategy was measure but not purpose. The European Security policy of the Nixon government confronted the political pressure , the economic promble, the Soviet and East factor, and European allies distrustion, which showed the effection and limitation of realistic foreign policy and the Linkage tactics. The U.S. dominance to the allies was to ensure its benefit coming true ultimately, and the Nixon government tried to hold its Europe provincialism strategy and global strategy together and hope become "the Genuine Partnership " with European allies. In the situation of strategy balance of US-Soviet Union and European revival, the U.S. hegemony management system was difficult to adopt the dyadic supervisor mode of perpendicularity simplely, but must build on the multilateral doctrine international system basis. Similar to the Detente Strategy of Nixon doctrine, its European Security policy exactly showed the essential contradictory between power and goal in U.S. diplomacy on some degree.更多还原