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基于演化博弈理论的跨国公司技术转让策略研究

A Study on Strategies of Mncs’ Technology Transfer Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

【作者】 赵佩华

【导师】 张卫国;

【作者基本信息】 华南理工大学 , 金融工程与经济发展, 2010, 博士

【摘要】 跨国公司的技术转移(让)的问题,国内外学者已作了大量的研究,但大多数学者都是通过实证研究方法,去判定跨国公司的技术转移(让)对东道国是否存在正的溢出效应。当然也有一些学者开始运用博弈论的方法分析技术差距等因素与技术溢出的之间的关联性。但还鲜有学者探讨更微观、更具体同时也更现实的问题——跨国公司的技术转让策略。即哪些因素将影响跨国公司是否转让技术给东道国?哪一类跨国公司更愿意、更有可能转让技术给东道国企业:是已进入东道国的、还是未进入的跨国公司?是赢利能力强的、还是赢利能力相对弱的跨国公司?与东道国企业合作中,东道国企业有研发能力,或无研发能力对跨国公司的技术转让策略又有何影响?东道国企业应何时与跨国公司合作更有利?等,这些问题,对于希望利用跨国公司的科技资源快速提升自主创新能力的我国这样发展中国家,都是十分现实而迫切的问题,亟需从理论加以研究和解决的。跨国公司的技术转让问题实质上是跨国公司与跨国公司之间、跨国公司与东道国及企业之间的博弈问题。而且,跨国公司在是否转让技术给东道国的决策上,也不可能达到传统博弈论的“完全理性”,而是一个模仿学习和不断调整的动态过程。因此,本研究将演化博弈论方法引入跨国公司技术转让领域。本研究先通过演化博弈论模型的方法进行分析,然后运用MATLAB软件,对所有的命题进行数值模拟,以保证论证的正确性、可靠性,最后,本论文还结合我国相关领域跨国公司的技术转让实证案例加以分析印证前几章的理论研究结果,得出结论。本研究得到的创新性结论主要是:第一,对于技术溢出而导致损失较大的行业,会出现两种极端的情况,跨国公司要么都不转让其技术,要么都转让。第二,当转让技术所获得的收益很大时,技术溢出而导致的损失大小就不再成为影响跨国公司转让技术的因素,已到东道国设厂与准备到东道国设厂这两类跨国公司最终都将选择转让技术给东道国企业的策略。第三,在通常情况下(技术溢出而导致的损失不太大),已经进入东道国设厂的跨国公司比尚未在东道国设厂的跨国公司更有可能转让技术给东道国企业;只在技术转移所需的成本特别大的特殊情况下,结果则正好相反。第四,对于都只是准备进入东道国的跨国公司而言,转让条件与跨国公司赢利能力的强弱没有关系,但与转让成本密切相关。技术转让成本低的跨国公司更有可能转让技术给东道国企业。一般来说,对于已经进入东道国设厂的跨国公司来说,赢利能力相对弱的跨国公司更愿意转让技术给东道国企业。第五,对于东道国企业不能研发的行业,待跨国公司进入东道国后,东道国企业再与其合作最容易获得成功,而且,此时东道国企业股权收益比例也可能比跨国公司未进入时提高。第六,对于东道国企业能研发的行业,跨国公司进入东道国后,再合作最不易获得成功。但对于东道国企业,此时合作会更有利,因为其股权收益比例会提高。

【Abstract】 About the issues of technology transfer from multinational corporations (MNCs), domestic and foreign scholars have made a lot of researches, but most scholars used empirical research methods to test whether technology transfer from MNCs have positive spillover effects on the host country. Of course, some scholars have begun to use game theory to analyze the correlation relationship between some factors (such as the technology gap) and technology spillovers. However, few scholars explore more micro, more specific and more practical problem - the transfer strategy of technology for MNCs. What are the factors that will influence whether MNCs transfer technology to the host country? What kind of MNCs are more willing and more likely to transfer technology to the host country enterprise: the enterprises that have entered the host country, or not enter the host country? Is strong profitability, or profitability relatively weak MNCs? What is the impact of R & D capabilities of host enterprises on the technology transfer strategies of transnational corporations during the business cooperation? When is it more beneficial for the host country in collaboration with MNCs? These problems are very real and urgent to be studied and resolved for the developing countries that hope to take in the scientific and technological resources to enhance capability of independent innovation rapidly.In fact, the problems of MNCs’technology transfer are the game theory problems between MNCs and MNCs, MNCs, host countries and local enterprises. Actually, in the process of decision-making on whether MNCs transfer their technologies to the host country, it is impossible to achieve entirely rationality of traditional game theory, but rather a dynamic process of limitation learning and constant adjustment. This paper will introduce evolutionary game theory to the field of MNCs’technology transfer.This study uses the model of evolutionary game theory firstly, and then uses the MATLAB software to process numerical simulation to all propositions in order to make ensure validity and reliability of the proof, at last make the conclusions. This study provides some new conclusions, including: first, for the industries who lost too much because of technology spillovers, there will be two kinds of extreme situations, MNCs either do not transfer their technologies, or transfer their all technologies; Second, when the gains of technology transfer is too large, the loss caused by technology spillovers will no longer be a factor that impacts MNCs’technology transfer, and two types of MNCs that have set up factories in China and ready to set up factories in China eventually will choose the strategies of technology transfer; Third, in normal case(the loss caused by technology spillovers is not too large), MNCs that have been set up factories in China are more likely to transfer their technologies to Chinese enterprises than ones that have not been set up factories in China;only under the special situation that the costs of technology transfer are too large, the results are just the opposite; Fourthly, for the MNCs who are just preparing to enter China, the transfer conditions are not related to the strength of profitability of MNCs, but is closely related to the transfer cost, and MNCs with low-cost of technology transfer, is more likely to transfer their technologies to Chinese enterprises. In general, for the MNCs that have set up factories in China and with weaker profitability, are more willing to transfer their technologies to Chinese enterprises; Fifth, for the industry that Chinese enterprises can not research and develop, it is most likely to succeed that Chinese enterprises cooperate with MNCs after their entering, and the return on equity ratio of Chinese enterprises at this time may also be increased;Sixth, for the industry that Chinese enterprises can research and develop, it is most difficult to be successful that Chinese enterprises cooperate with MNCs after their entering. But for Chinese enterprises, cooperation at this time would be more beneficial because their returns on equity ratio will be increased.

【关键词】 跨国公司技术转让演化博弈
【Key words】 MNCsTechnology TransferEvolutionary Game Theory
  • 【分类号】F276.7;F273.1;F224.32
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】1210
  • 攻读期成果
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