【作者】 王资峰；

【导师】 齐明山；

【作者基本信息】 中国人民大学 ， 行政管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 近年来,流域水环境管理体制研究在我国学术界方兴未艾。然而从现有文献看,既有研究大多停留在现象描述层面,很少有从理论上深入探究中国流域水环境管理体制的成果。结合行政学的研究成果,流域水环境管理体制应当从四个维度进行研究,即中央与地方关系、地方政府间关系、职能部门间关系以及政府与社会的关系。这些维度总体上反映着流域水环境管理体制的内部结构及其与外部社会的关系。中国流域水环境管理体制研究需要从历史变迁的角度发现问题。民国时期(1949年以前)的流域管理体制是我国现行流域水环境管理体制的基础。根据环境保护机构和流域管理机构发展演变,建国后我国流域水环境管理体制变迁可以划分为四个阶段,即起步阶段(1949-1978)、转变阶段(1979-1994)、深化阶段(1995-2005)、强化阶段(2006-)。从演变历史看,我国流域水环境管理体制变迁的动力包括五个方面,即突发性流域水污染的影响、高层领导的重视与推动、地方政府间关系的变化、政府职能的转变以及社会公众的参与意识和能力的提高。从管理实践和理论研究看,我国流域水环境管理体制的弊端主要包括四个方面,即层级节制权威弱化、地方政府以邻为壑、职能部门争功诿过、持续改进机制缺失。在单一制国家结构下,中央与地方关系成为我国流域水环境管理体制的主导因素。其实质是保障中央的流域水环境政策得到地方政府有效执行。中央与地方关系的基本原理可以从分权制和集权制两个理论视角进行阐述。前者强调地方政府相对于中央的利益独立和行为自主性,后者强调中央政府对地方层级节制的权威性。因此,中央与地方关系的实质就是如何发挥地方积极性和保障中央权威的问题。就流域水环境管理而言,地方政府和中央政府分别代表流域局部和整体利益,亦即特殊利益和共同利益。这种利益冲突与我国流域水环境分级管理的体制相结合,形成政策执行阻滞机制,中央权威受到损害。为了维护中央权威,保障政策得到有效贯彻执行,我国流域水环境管理体制提供了三类保障机制,即人事任免机制、专项转移支付机制和业务监督机制。从实践情况看,这些机制都存在一定缺陷,不能在流域水环境管理过程中有效维护和实现中央权威。地方政府间关系改进有助于消除流域水环境管理“公地悲剧”。其核心在于通过地方政府间竞争与合作机制,实现流域水环境污染外部性的内部化。地方政府间关系的基本原理可以从竞争与合作两个视角进行阐述。前者植根于地方政府所具有的特殊利益或地方利益诉求,后者则植根于地方政府行为的外部效应。利益冲突导致地方政府间竞争,政府间竞争产生负外部性,社会交易成本增加。地方政府间合作能消除负外部性,降低交易成本,实现社会福利的帕累托改进。然而从理论上看,地方政府间竞争关系比合作关系更牢固;从实践看,地方政府间竞争同样能实现外部性的内部化,但需要恰当的制度设计。地方政府追逐经济利益的竞争与流域水环境产权公有制结合,造成流域水环境恶化的“公地悲剧”。地方政府间竞争目标受到中央政府和社会公众的双重制约。如果能扭转地方政府以追求经济利益为中心的“企业式”行为,就能有效遏制流域水环境“公地悲剧”。就流域水环境管理中的地方政府间合作而言,其组织形式包括“市场签约”、“组织签约”以及二者的混合型态。在流域水环境管理过程中,地方政府间合作需要相应的推动机制,主要包括市场机制和科层机制。这些组织形式和推动机制在流域水环境管理的地方合作过程中各有优劣,互为补充。职能部门间关系改进有助于实现流域水环境管理的综合目标。其核心在于实现政府有关部门权力和责任的恰当配置。职能部门间关系的基本原理可以从分工与协作两方面进行阐述。职能部门专业分工旨在提高效率。由于部门隔阂、特殊利益等因素的影响,旨在提高部门行政效率的分工却阻碍整体行政效率的提升。这就是专业分工悖论。部门协作是不同职能部门围绕管理目标开展的协作行动。职责边界妨碍公共管理活动共同目标的形成,部门特殊利益阻碍部门协作的进展,旨在提高整体管理绩效的部门协作非但没有发挥积极作用,反而阻碍管理绩效改进。这就是结构-功能悖论。两种悖论表明,基于职责导向的部门分工与协作无法避免其固有困境。目标导向的分工协作原则能够为改进部门分工协作的效率提供新的契机。职能部门只有通过基于目标导向的组织变革,部门协作才能得到根本改进。就流域水环境管理而言,有关职能部门可分为统一监管、行业分类管理和综合调控管理等三类,彼此存在职责边界问题并形成双边垄断局面。部门特殊利益与双边垄断相结合,造成流域水环境管理分工异化,降低分工效率。职能部门的单一功能和流域水环境管理的复合目标之间的冲突表明,目标导向应成为职能部门分工的基本原则。流域水环境管理整体目标的实现需要有关职能部门协作,利益冲突和技术性限制却导致部门协作陷入困境。流域水环境管理的部门协作动机来源包括部门利益、共同愿景和组织压力等方面。流域水环境管理的部门协作形式包括联合发文、联合执法检查等,部门协作的协调机制包括科层协调和制度协调。无论哪种协作形式或协调机制,都各有优势和不足。管理体制开放是我国流域水环境管理持续改进的关键所在。其核心在于妥善处理政府与社会在流域水环境管理中的关系。管理体制开放的基本原理主要从官僚制、系统论等理论视角进行阐述。官僚制为应对不确定性,主张行政组织封闭,从而引发组织回应性不足的弊端。系统管理的思想和政治系统论都把行政管理体系视为开放系统,力促管理体系与外部环境进行能量交换。本文认为管理体制改进的根本动力来源于管理体系外部,只有实行体制开放才能为体制改进提供动力。行政管理体制开放伴随着潜在风险,这种潜在风险与风险社会的不确定性密切相关。行政管理体制开放的风险消解依赖于两个因素,一是政府实行逐步开放,二是社会公众有序参与。就流域水环境管理而言,我国政府开放程度较低,降低了管理体制的回应性。在流域水环境管理过程中,制约政府开放程度的体制内部因素包括三个方面,一是中央政府关于社会稳定的政治权衡,二是地方政府的既得利益,三是职能部门的组织惰性。推动流域水环境管理体制开放的内部力量有三类,即中央政府、地方政府和职能部门。我国公众参与流域水环境管理的程度也比较低,甚至造成政治参与的畸形发展,损害政府的合法性。从实践看,制约我国流域水环境管理体制开放的社会因素主要有三个方面,即社会公众传统的政治文化观念、社会经济发展水平和水环境污染的不确定性。推动流域水环境管理体制开放的社会力量主要包括新闻媒体、环保组织和利益相关者。基于对以上四方面关系的分析,本文认为我国流域水环境管理体制应当在这四个方面分别做出相应的改进。第一,就中央与地方关系而言,流域水环境管理体制改进需要提高权威链条强度,调整地方政府利益权衡格局,坚定中央政府环境保护决心。第二,就地方政府间关系而言,流域水环境管理体制改进需要调整中央政府的导向作用,鼓励社会公众对地方政府竞争目标施加积极影响,以立法等手段来规范地方政府间竞争与合作关系。第三,就政府职能部门间关系而言,流域水环境管理体制改进需要合理界定职能部门权责,推进目标导向的组织结构重塑,改进职能部门协作机制。第四,就政府与社会的关系而言,流域水环境管理体制改进需要推进流域水环境公共治理,实行政府信息公开,进行基于开放导向的功能结构重塑和行政流程再造;同时,执政党和政府应当致力于增强公众参与意愿、提高公众参与能力。综上所述,流域水环境管理体制具有系统性、权变性和价值倾向性。我们可以结合实践和需要设计合适的流域水环境管理体制。本文在研究过程中存在逻辑推理不够严谨、搜集资料不够全面等问题,仍需留待将来进一步完善。未来研究的努力将主要集中于建构理论框架和开展实证研究等方面。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, study on river basin environment management system is arising in the intellectual community of China. However most of existing literature is describing phenomena, and there is little research deeply exploring river basin water environment management system. According to existing research on public administration, study on river basin water environment management should include four dimensions, which are central-local government relationship, relationship among local governments, relationship among different functional departments and relationship between governments and society. These dimensions generally reflect the inside structure of river basin water environment management system and outside relationship with the society.In the study on river basin water environment management system, we should find questions from evolution history of management system. River basin management system in Kuomintang Period (before 1949) is the foundation of existing river basin water environment management system. According to the development of environment protection institutions and river basin management institutions, the history of river basin water environment management system of China can be divided into five periods, such as Kuomintang Period (before1949), Starting Period (1949-1978), Transition Period (1979-1994), Deepening Period (1995-2005) and Strengthening Period (after 2006). Seeing from the history of its development, river basin water environment management system of China is driven by five impetuses, which are unexpected river basin water pollution, attention and improvement from high leaders of state, changing of relationship between local governments, conversion of government function and promotion of public participation. According to the management practice and theoretical research, there are four aspects of defects in river basin water environment management system of China, which are authority of bureaucratic control weakening, local governments harming each other, different departments cooperating badly, and sustained improvement mechanism being absent.According to the unitary state structure, central-local government relationship is the dominating factor in river basin water environment management system of China. The essence of central-local government relationship is to ensure that local governments effectively implement the environment policy for river basin water pollution from central government. The basic principle of central-local government relationship can be interpreted from two viewpoints which are Theory of Decentralization and Theory of Centralization. The former emphasizes local governments’respective interest and independence from central government, and the latter pays more attention to the authority of bureaucratic control on local governments from central government. As so, the essence of central-local government relationship is how to stimulate local governments’positive action and ensure authority of central government. During river basin water environment management, local government and central government are respectively on behalf of partial interest and whole interest of the residents dwelling along the river basin, that’s to say, special interest and common interest. The combination of this interest conflict with decentralized management system of river basin water environment in China impedes policy implementation, and then weakens authority of central government. In order to uphold authority of central government and ensure effective policy implementation, there are three kinds of ensuring mechanisms in the river basin water environment management system of China, which are mechanism of personnel appointing and removing, mechanism of special transfer payments, and mechanism of business supervision. Viewed from practice, these mechanisms are not perfect, and can’t effectively ensure authority of central government.Improvement of the relationship among local governments is helpful to get rid of“tragedy of the common”in river basin water environment management. The core of relationship among local governments is to internalize externality of river basin water pollution through mechanisms of competition and cooperation. The basic principle of relationship among local governments may be analyzed from two viewpoints as competence and cooperation. The competence viewpoint arises from pursuit for special interest of local governments or other local interest, and the cooperation viewpoint is put forward to internalize the externality of local governments’action. Interest conflict causes revival among local governments, which is along with negative externality and increases social transaction cost. Cooperation among local governments is helpful to eliminate negative externality and decrease transaction cost, so as to make Pareto improvement of social welfare. Viewed from a theoretical point, competence relationship among local governments is more stable than the cooperation relationship among them. Viewed from practice, competence among local governments can also internalize externality in case of proper designation of institution. Combining with public ownership of river basin water environment rights, local governments’pursuits for economical benefits cause“common tragedy”of river basin water environment. The objects local governments competing for are influenced by central government and civil society. If the“firm-like action”pursuing for economic benefits by local governments can be converted, the“common tragedy”of river basin water environment will be restrained. As for cooperation among local governments in river basin water environment management, there are many kinds of organizing form, such as“market signature”,“organization signature”and the mixture of them. During river basin water environment management, cooperation among local governments needs certain promotion mechanisms such as market mechanism and bureaucracy mechanism. These organizing forms and promotion mechanisms all have good and bad effects in river basin water environment management, and may be complementary to each other.Improvement of relationship among functional departments is helpful to achieve the comprehensive goal of river basin water environment management. The core of relationship among departments is to properly arrange power and obligation for different functional department. The basic principle of relationship among functional departments may be interpreted from two aspects such as labor division and department coordination. The labor division of functional departments aims at efficiency improvement. Due to influence of barrier among departments, special interest and other factors, professional labor division aiming at department efficiency improvement hinders increasing efficiency of the whole administration. This is paradox of professional labor division. Department cooperation is the coordinating action for common management object among different departments. With boundaries of departments’obligation destroying common object of public management and special interest of departments hindering process of department coordination, department cooperation aiming at improvement of the whole administration performance decreases management performance. This is structural-functional paradox. These two paradoxes show that labor division and department cooperation based on obligation-aimed principle can’t avoid original defects. Object-aimed labor division and cooperation among departments provides opportunity for efficiency improvement of labor division and coordination. Only through object-aimed organization reform, cooperation among functional departments can be improved entirely. As for river basin water environment management, related functional departments can be divided into three kinds such as departments of general supervision, industry-classified management and comprehensive regulation, which have boundary questions of obligation and come into bilateral monopoly. Combined with bilateral monopoly, special interest of departments causes alienation of labor division and decreases efficiency of labor division. Conflict between single function of functional department and comprehensive object indicates that the basic principle of professional labor division should be object-aimed. Achievement of the object of river basin water environment management needs cooperation from relevant functional departments, but interest conflict and technological hindrance bring trouble to coordination. Motivation of department cooperation during river basin water environment management comes from department interest, common vision, organization pressure and so on. Forms of department cooperation during river basin water environment management include joint dispatching documents, association of enforcement and inspection and so on, which need proper coordination mechanisms such as bureaucratic coordination and institutional coordination. All these cooperation forms and coordination mechanisms have advantages and disadvantages.Opening system is the key to continuously improve river basin water environment management system. The core of opening system is to properly deal with relationship between government and society during river basin water environment management. The basic principle of management system opening may be interpreted from such viewpoints as Bureaucracy Theory, System Theory and so on. In order to avoid uncertainty, Bureaucracy Theory argues administrative organization should be closed which causes lack of organizational response. Systematic theories on management and politics all regard administrative system as open system, and argue that management system should exchange energy with outside environment. The opinion of this dissertation holds that fundamental motivation of management system improvement exists outside system, and only management system opening can provide motivation for system improvement. Administrative management system opening is along with potential risk, which is closely related to the uncertainty of risk society. Elimination of risk from opening of administrative management system depends on two factors, one of which is government opening gradually and the other is social participation in good order. As for river basin water environment management in China, government openness is so low that decreases response from government to public. During river basin water environment management, there are three aspects of internal factors hindering system opening, which are political considering on social stability from central government, original benefits of local governments and organizational inertia of functional departments. There are three internal impetuses promoting system opening, which are central government, local governments and functional departments. As for river basin water environment management in China, public participation is so limited that political participation is distorted and legality of government is destroyed. Viewed from practice, there are three aspects of social factors hindering system opening, which are traditional political culture of society, degree of social economy development and uncertainty of water environment pollution. There are three social impetuses promoting system opening, which are news media organizations, environment NGO and some stakeholders.On the basis of analysis above, river basin water environment management system should be improved with these four aspects. As for relationship of central-local government, it requires to enhance the authority chain of central-local government, adjust interest balance structure of local government and strengthen central government’s determination for environment protection. As for relationship among local governments, it requires to revise the guidance function of central government, encourage the public to affect positively on competition object of local government and standardize relationship among local governments with the method of legislation and so on. As for relationship among functional departments, it requires to properly define obligation and power of each department, promote object-aimed organizational structure reform and improve cooperation mechanism among different departments. As for relationship between government and society, it requires to promote public governance of river basin water environment, practice opening of government information, and implement open-aimed functional and structural reform and administrative process rebuilding. At the same time, CPC and government should be engaged in enhancing the public’s desire for participation and ability of participation in river basin water environment management.In a conclusion, river basin water environment management system is comprehensive, flexibility and full of valuable tendency. According to practice and demand, we may design suitable river basin water environment management system. Otherwise, there are some shortcomings in the study such as imperfect logical reasoning, incomplete resource collecting and so on, which need to be improved in the future. Future study will be focused on construction of theoretical framework and applying empirical study methods and so on.更多还原