【作者】 田丽娜；

【导师】 但斌；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 随着经济的持续高速增长,企业广告投入逐年上升。但是,由于企业在进行广告决策时仅从企业自身角度出发,使得广告促销往往不能达到预期的效果。因此,企业制定广告策略时应该在充分认识广告对产品销售额影响的基本规律的基础上,考虑其它市场力量对实现本企业广告目标的影响。互补品企业便是一个影响企业广告决策的重要市场力量。由于互补品之间存在的互补性需求关系使得互补品企业间的广告促销存在一定的溢出效应,会对企业双方的广告决策以及广告促销投入的预期收益造成一定的影响,因此,如何在广告促销决策中充分考虑互补品企业间广告促销存在的溢出效应,从而保证企业的广告促销投入能够有效地增加产品销量、发现潜在顾客,进一步使企业在当前激烈的竞争环境中获得竞争优势,是一个具有重要理论意义及现实意义的研究问题。在国内外研究成果的基础上,本文综合运用博弈论和信息经济学等理论对互补品企业的广告决策问题进行深入地研究。首先,针对企业为了降低广告促销费用及风险,选择“搭便车”的方式,利用广告溢出效应从其互补品企业的广告促销中获得促销成果,从而损害了企业广告投入积极性的现象,研究了互补品企业间广告投入决策和价格决策完全非合作、部分合作和完全合作方式下企业双方的最优决策,并且考察了不同合作情形下广告溢出效应对企业双方的广告促销投入和收益的影响作用,对企业通过广告促销获得的收益进行了对比分析,并在上述研究基础上,提出了互补品企业合作广告的实施策略。其次,针对互补品需求关联性造成互补品企业广告促销存在溢出效应的现象,构建了基于广告分担率的互补品企业合作广告博弈模型,研究了斯坦克尔伯格博弈和纳什合作博弈两种合作情形下互补品企业双方的最优广告决策、最优广告分担率、最优收益以及互补品销售系统的最优收益,对比分析了不同合作形式下的均衡结果,进一步论证了纳什合作博弈均衡具有帕累托优势,并在此基础上利用鲁宾斯坦恩——斯塔尔讨价还价模型对增加的收益进行了分配,得到了一种帕累托最优合作广告方案,实现了互补品销售系统的协调。再次,考虑到不对称信息下具有需求信息优势的企业利用拥有的信息优势,将广告投入作为市场需求的信号,有选择地向其互补品企业传递需求信息,以刺激其互补品企业增加广告投入的问题,建立了考虑溢出效应的互补品企业广告决策的信号博弈模型,得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,并对不同均衡状态下企业双方的最优广告决策和最优收益进行了分析。在此基础上,进一步讨论了互补品企业双方的广告策略选择问题。最后,针对不对称信息下互补品企业合作广告中具有信息优势的企业的理性背叛行为,分析了互补品企业基于广告分担率的合作广告关系中逆向选择的发生条件;从互补品企业中不具有需求信息优势企业的视角,采用机制设计理论和显示原理构建了该企业如何诱导其互补品企业报告自己真实需求信息的逆向选择模型,设计了逆向选择条件下考虑溢出效应的互补品企业最优合作广告合约。结果表明,该合约能够达到诱导具有信息优势的企业讲真话的目的,由此保证互补品企业基于广告分担率的合作广告关系的建立,解决互补品企业合作广告中产生的逆向选择问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the sustained and rapid growth of economy, enterprise’s advertising investment increased year by year. But, enterprises make advertising decision only from their own point and this makes advertising promotions often fail to achieve the desired effects. So, enterprise should make advertising dicision by considering the impact of other market forces on advertising objectives and based on the full awareness of the impact of advertising on product sales. Complementary goods enterprise is an important market forces which impacts enterprise’s advertising decisions. The spillover effects in sales promotion between complementary goods enterprises arising from the interrelated nature of complementary good can impact advertising decisions and expected prfits on advertising promotion investment of enterprises. So how to take full consideration of advertising spillover effects in the process of making advertising promotion decisions is a profound theoretical and realistic problem of ensuring advertising promotions invest to increase product sales and find potential customers and gaining competitive advantage in the intense competition environment.Based on the previous research works, we pursued an in-depth research on advertising decision between complementary goods enterprises by using game theory and economics of information theory.Firstly, acoording to the problem that enterprise selects free-riding behavior to obtain promotion results by using the advertising spillover effects of complementary enterprise in order to decrease advertising investment and risk and which will decrease complementary enterprise’s advertising investment enthusiasm, the complementary goods enterprises’optimal strategies of total non-cooperative, partly cooperative and total cooperative cases were researched respectively. Additionally, the impact of advertising spillover effects on complementary goods enterprises sales promotion investment and profits was discussed, and the enterprises’profits from the sales promotion were compared. On the base of these, the implementation strategies of cooperative advertising were proposed.Secondly, Aimed at the spillover effects in advertising sales promotion between complementary goods enterprises arising from the interrelated nature of complementary goods, the cooperative advertising game model based on participate rate between the complementary goods enterprises was based. Based on the model, the complementary goods enterprises’optimal strategies and participate rate and profits and system benefits of Stackelberg game and Nash cooperative game were researched respectively. Additionally, the optimal advertising strategies and profits of complementary enterprises under two equilibriums were compared. The cooperative game equilibrium having more Pareto advantage than Stackelberg equilibrium was proved. Further, the surplus in advertising cooperation was distributed by Rubinstein bargaining model and obtained a Pareto cooperate scheme which can realize coordination of marketing system.Thirdly, considering the enterprise with demand information priority would use its priority send demand information selectively in order to stimulate complementary enterprise’s advertising investment by using advertising investment as demand signal, signaling game theory model on advertising decision-making between complementary goods enterprises considering spillover effects was established. Based on the model, the condition of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium were obtained, and the optimal advertising strategies and profits of complementary enterprises under these two equilibriums were analyzed. Additionally, the advertising strategy choices of complementary enterprises were discussed.Lastly, Aimed at the rational betray problem of the enterprise with information superior in the process of cooperative advertising, the occurrence conditions of adverse selection of cooperative advertising relationship based on advertising participation rate were analyzed. On the base of these, by using mechanism design theory and revelation principle, in order to induce the manufacturer with information priority show its true demand information, an adverse selection model was constructed from the perspective of the manufacturer without information priority, and the cooperative advertising contract was designed. The results show that the contract can induce the manufacturer with information priority show its true demand information and can ensure the cooperative advertising relationship based on advertising participation rate between complementary enterprises and solve adverse selection problems in the process of complementary goods enterprises cooperative advertising.更多还原