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基于认知差异的企业生产要素配置机理研究

A Study on the Configuration Mechanism of Firm Factors: Cognitive Perspective

【作者】 施涛

【导师】 李传昭;

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 , 技术经济与管理, 2010, 博士

【摘要】 企业作为要素所有者之间通过契约达成的合作机制,目的是通过对资源的统一配置来创造资源的最大化价值。围绕人们如何达成生产要素统一配置的契约问题,本文对认知差异条件下的企业生产要素配置机理进行了研究。生产要素所有者签署企业契约,规定企业中所有生产要素配置的原则与程序是企业创建的标志。在完全理性的情况下,所有要素合作者都清楚最优的企业生产要素配置方式,因此达成合作契约顺理成章。然而,现实世界中的个体是认知理性的,不仅难以准确认识事物,基于不同信息和经验的生产要素所有者之间还存在认知差异。他们可能提出不同的生产要素配置方案,对同一生产要素配置方案的看法也各不相同,这就可能阻碍生产要素的相互结合。认知差异条件下要素所有者如何实现对企业生产要素的最优配置?这个问题的研究对于提高企业生产要素配置效率具有重要意义。本文假定,个体根据其经验和获得的信息预测项目的未来价值分布,并以此为基础判断特定索取权的价值。为了清楚展示企业未来价值分布与特定索取权期望价值之间的关系,作者在第三章探索了能清楚描述索取权期望价值的图示方法,并以此为基础分析索取权顺序与企业总价值分布变化之间的关系。第三章的研究发现,不同顺序的索取权期望价值与企业总价值之间是正相关关系,但企业风险对于索取权价值的影响不同,优先的固定索取权价值变化与企业风险变化负相关,靠后的索取权价值变化与企业风险变化正相关。第三章证明,正是索取权价值的这种变化特征为不同要素所有者之间奠立了的相互合作的基础。通过对不同投入者知识与信息差异的假设,第四章证明,具有保守认知的投入者愿意获得优先索取权,认知更全面的投入者则愿意获得剩余索取权。知识和信息在人口中的分布是不均匀的,大多数人口只拥有较少信息和知识,认知理性决定了他们的保守行为,即他们在整体上只会选择优先索取权并获得较低报酬率,而知识和信息较多的投资者则因为能够将具有成功潜质的项目从大量项目中分辨出来,这决定他们选择剩余索取权并获得高的报酬率。第四章证明,工人群体因为知识和信息较少会主动选择优先的固定索取权,而管理阶层则选择较多剩余索取权,索取权的分配决定了控制权的分配,最终的均衡结果是,企业中生产要素配置的控制权由企业家和管理层获得。资本提供者之间也具有认知差异,第五章证明,拥有更多企业知识、信息和管理能力的投资者选择股权,而较少企业经营知识的投资者选择债权,资本结构就反映了不同投资者的相互比例关系。当市场中存在着大量具有认知差异的投资者时,不同的资本结构划分会导致不同的企业市场价值,企业管理层会因此主动调整资本结构来寻求最大的企业市场价值。本章从认知理性的角度也证明,在信息不充分的情况下,为了保持资本成本最小化,企业将首先考虑内部融资,然后是债务融资,最后才是股权融资。由于债务融资成本随着债务比例上升而加速上升,企业存在着一个最优资本结构。本章通过建立联立方程模型,使用2002年-2006年深沪上市公司188家中小企业共计940个样本数据对资本结构进行了检验,检验结果支持从认知理性角度得出的资本结构变化假设命题。第六章从认知差异和社会生产要素配置的角度研究金融机构的演化。企业中的资源配置是由只具有认知理性的个体进行的,不同企业配置生产要素的有效水平自然不同,金融机构的重要功能是发现具有更强资源配置能力的企业,并将资源配置给那些企业,由此才能实现投资者的最大价值。第六章证明,个体财富越多,就越愿意投入个人努力来搜集信息和研究投资方案,由此拥有越多的投资能力,反之亦然。因此拥有不同财富的投资者需要不同的金融工具和金融服务,这推动了金融机构的发展和演化。随着社会中富裕人口比率增加,对证券和投资银行的需求增加,资本市场就将越发达,而在大多数人口都只有少量财富时,商业银行必定是金融体系的主体。第六章还使用纽约不同类型金融从业人员数量的变迁实证数据来验证了本章的主要结论。第七章研究认知差异条件下企业配置生产要素的数量和范围边界。本章从认知理性发展的角度分析了一体化的收益和成本,证明当价值链上相互配合的企业存在着认知差异导致难以协调时,企业就有一体化的动机来消除协调的障碍,由此企业的边界将扩展。通过对企业历史上诸多一体化案例的研究,本章发现协调成本和协调收益是决定企业边界的主要因素。第八章研究了企业内部和外部两种企业家的识别和培养机制。企业家是发明新生产技术和创造新生产函数的人,是企业内生产要素配置决策者。分析发现,企业内部的层级结构由企业蓝图的数表特征决定,不同层级人员的工资和奖金索取权结构与他们的认知差异水平相一致,越是高层的管理者,对于企业总体价值越清楚,其靠后的浮动索取权比例就越高。本章阐释了企业是培养和识别企业家的基本内部环境,设计恰当的层级和晋升制度是识别和培养企业家的关键。外部识别和培养企业家的主要机制是金融系统,金融系统识别出有成功潜力的企业家和企业蓝图,并通过将资源提供给最具潜力的企业家实现其企业蓝图来实现社会资源的最优配置。本章也证明,一个社会识别优秀企业的能力越强,配置资源的效率就越高,这个社会的企业系统就会发展越迅速。

【Abstract】 I developed a production factors allocation theory on the basis of cognitive rationality. Efficient integration of production technology, capital and human resources factor is the key to economic prosperity. If factor owner is completely rational, which is the basic assumption in the Classical economics, they can reach cooperation easily. But if they have different knowledge and view on the firm program, how can they cooperate smoothly and made efficient decisions? Cognitive rationality means people have different view on a project, which is very universal in the world. In order to reach cooperation, people must remove the influence of disagreement.I assume that investors would estimate the value of a firm in the form of distribution function before he could make an investment decision, and then the investors would compute the value of claim rights which are based on the firm. In order to show the relation between the value of claim rights and value of a firm directly, we develop a graphic method. By the graphic method, we analyze how the change of a firm value distribution affects the value of a claim rights. The result is, as the firm value increase, value of all claim rights increase. On the contrary, as the firm risk increase, the value of senior claim rights would decrease, but the value of residual claim rights increase.When investors have different estimation about a firm’s value, how could they reach a contract? The equilibrium outcome is, common investors would select senior claim rights, but experts prefer residual claim rights. As there are only a small number of experts, they have strong bargain power, and then the residual claim rights show a higher payback. On the contrary, common investors are majority in a society, they can only get low payback for they competing each other severely, and so senior claim rights always accompanied with low pay back. Experts play a role of increasing social resource allocation efficiency when they endeavor to distinguish true entrepreneur from common people, and high payback is their motivation. Knowledge difference is the reason that workers select senior claim rights and management get residual claim rights. Control rights are associated with residual rights, as an equilibrium outcome, the stockholders get most of the control rights.Chapter V shows, capital structure reflects the relation between investors who have different beliefs, the investor who have more information and knowledge would like to be a stockholder, and others to be debt holders. Capital structure can enhance a firm’s value in a public market if there are large amounts of investors with different view about a firm’s value distribution. As investors hardly knew more information than management, financing from market is always expensive than from firm, as stockholder asked more payback than debtor, financing by debt instrument is cheaper than equity instrument. But marginal cost of debt would increase as the financial leverage increase. So there is an optimal capital structure.Chapter VI shows, Investors can get more payback if they invest their factors to the best firm. As investors have finite information and finite rationality, they maximize their value by using the financial organization. As different investors need different services, the changing of distribution of different investors determines the evolution of the financial system. As rich people ratio in society increasing, the need for invest bank services increased, and financial market flourished. As majority of the population have few wealth, the commercial bank would be the main financial organizations. We proved our main conclusion by using the data of New York financial industry.The amount and scope of allocating factors is the firm’s boundary. In chapter VII, we analyze several cases of vertical integration and horizontal integration. The analysis shows, purpose of integration is to eliminate the cost of hardly coordination, which is the key for the success of value chain. Benefit and cost of coordination is the key for firm boundary.Entrepreneurs are the power of modern economy. In chapter VIII, we argued that firm is the elementary circumstance in which entrepreneur are discovered and brought up. Organization structure is determined by firm blueprint, the structure of reward for employee in different hierarchical level is dissimilar, and bonuses proportion increases along the hierarchy. We argued that one of the elementary functions for financial system is to find out and support potential entrepreneur, enhancing the success rate of new venture equals enhancing the resource allocation efficiency, which would help a society greatly.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 重庆大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2010年 12期
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