【作者】 宋寒；

【导师】 但斌；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 随着竞争全球化和经济一体化的深入发展,以及网络通讯技术的快速发展,服务外包以低成本、高效率优势正对传统完全自主生产的经营模式形成有力挑战。客户企业参与外包服务生产能降低服务成本、提高服务效率,但现实交易环境的信息不对称往往阻碍了客户企业参与。对此,本文研究不对称信息下,客户企业如何制定有效的服务外包合同实现最优参与的问题。首先,考虑签约前客户参与对服务成本的影响信息不对称的情况,设计了客户参与度与服务费用相结合的外包合约菜单,以达到真实显示客户参与对服务成本的影响信息。能显示服务提供商真实成本信息的服务费用包含一定的信息租金,为减少信息租金,最优合约菜单的客户参与度将产生“扭曲”。客户参与投入资源限制下,客户设计的合约菜单存在“分离合约”和“混同合约”两种情况,并给出了两种合约存在的条件。最后,运用算例对合约菜单的相关性质进行了验证。其次,在前面研究的基础上,考虑签约后服务提供商道德风险问题,设计了客户参与对服务提供商的激励服务外包合同,分析了客户参与对服务提供商工作努力程度的影响。运用资源外包理论,根据客户企业参与对服务提供商成本及边际成本的影响,将客户企业参与资源与服务提供商自身资源的关系分为互补与替代,进而分析了互补与替代两种情况下客户企业参与对服务提供商工作努力程度的影响。资源互补关系时,客户企业参与能激励服务提供商努力工作,同时客户企业参与激励与收益共享激励正相关,而资源替代时,客户企业参与不能激励服务提供商提高工作努力水平。再次,考虑客户参与对随机产出的影响,设计了客户参与下的服务外包合同,重点分析了服务提供商风险厌恶度、双方成本系数等外生变量对合同的影响。服务提供商风险厌恶度与客户最优参与度之间并非单调关系,随着服务提供商风险厌恶度的增加,客户最优参与度先增加后减少,当服务提供商是风险中性或风险厌恶度特别大时,客户企业不需参与外包的服务项目,而最优参与度和最优收益共享系数都与双方成本系数负相关,与产出系数正相关。最后,考虑客户参与影响确定产出的外包合作生产关系,设计了客户和服务提供商双边道德风险下的服务外包合同。当客户和服务提供商签订正式契约时,不存在合同参数能协调双方共同努力,实现系统最优。为解决这一问题,运用关系契约理论,建立了基于客户参与承诺的多周期动态博弈模型,模型分析显示折现系数是影响关系契约执行效果的重要影响因素,随着折现率的增加,非正式的关系契约对双方激励效果越显著,当折现率足够大时,关系契约能有效激励双方共同努力,实现系统最优。更多还原

【Abstract】 With in-depth development of competition globalization and economic integration as well as rapid development of network communication technology, service outsourcing is forming a forceful challenge against traditional business mode of fully independent production with its advantages of low cost and high efficiency. Customer enterprise’s participation in outsourcing service can reduce cost and improve efficiency. However, the customer enterprise may involve in a dilemma for asymmetric information. In this regard, this thesis studies how to develop effective services outsourcing contracts for customer enterprise to achieve optimal participation under asymmetric information.Firstly, under the assumption that the customer enterprise cannot clearly know its effect on the production cost of service provider, the service outsourcing contract menu with combining participation degree and transfer-price is designed to achieve the true information of cost. The total price for service provider contains the information rent. The participation degree of customer enterprise is upward distortion to reduce the information rent. The analysis demonstrates that if effect of the participation degree of customer enterprise on production cost of service supplier is slightly, the separating contract can be designed. Otherwise, there is pooling equilibrium in region near the service provider with the highest production cost. In addition, a corresponding example is presented to illustrate the character of contract menu.Secondly, on the base of the former study, considering that the customer enterprise cannot observe action of service provider, the incentives service outsourcing contract is designed and the effect of customer enterprise’s participation is analyzed. It is assumed that customer enterprise’s participation and service provider’s effort are complements or substitutes according resource based theory and the change of cost and marginal cost affected by customer enterprise’s participation. The analysis demonstrates that when the customer’s participation and the service provider’s effort are complementary, the service provider can be incented and the proportion of revenue-sharing should be increased with participation increasing. Otherwise, the service provider cannot be incented and the proportion of revenue-sharing should be decreased with participation increasing.Thirdly, considering that stochastic output is affected by customer enterprise’s participation, the service outsourcing contract is designed and the effect of exogenous variable, such as degree of risk aversion and the two sides cost coefficient, is analyzed. The analysis demonstrates that the revenue-sharing incentive coefficient should increase with the increase in customer participation, there is not a monotonic relationship between the risk aversion of service provider and customer participation, the optimal revenue-sharing incentive coefficient and the best customer participation are positively related to output coefficient, is negatively related to cost coefficient.Fourthly, considering that service provider’s work effort and customer’s participation will decide the final output of the outsourcing service project, the service outsourcing contract is designed under double moral hazard. Based on the problem that the formal outsourcing contract cannot incent simultaneously the effort of service provider and customer, a relational outsourcing contract is designed with principal-agent theory, then the incentive effect of the relational contract is analyzed. The conclusions indicate that customer’revenue and system profit under the relational contract are not less than that under the formal contract for all discount rate; the incentive effect of the relational contract increases with the discount rate increasing. When the discount rate is large enough, the first best outcome can be achieved through the relational contract.更多还原