公司司法清算法理与制度研究

【作者】 李磊；

【导师】 胡鸿高；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 民商法学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 公司司法清算制度是市场经济法律体系的重要内容,然而长期以来,该内容在我国一直处于立法空白状态。《最高人民法院关于适用(中华人民共和国公司法>若干问题的规定(二)》出台后,虽然初步建立了司法清算制度,但迄今为止,相关案件却依然难以处理。究其原因,一方面是现实情况的复杂导致司法部门处理的困难,另一方面也反映出目前立法仍然有需要充实和修正的地方。本文认为我国应当坚持“公平优先,兼顾效率”的价值取向,建立以利益平衡为导向的公司司法清算制度,实现防止社会动荡,保持社会公平底线,高效的对资源利用的政策目标。导论在论证选题的目的和意义的基础上,对国内外的相关研究现状和主要观点进行了系统的梳理综述,给下文的论述起到铺垫作用。并对本文的总的研究思路、研究方法和结构安排进行了阐述。第一章主要对公司清算的基本理论问题进行研究和阐明,为进一步的研究打下基础。从民法角度,公司清算的内涵可以解释为公司代理机构的法定变更；从公司法角度公司清算可以解释为公司控制权随“剩余”不同而在不同主体间的转换。结合上述结论以及对利益相关人理论、企业社会责任理论的产生背景、内容以及造成的影响的分析,本文认为,利益平衡理论在公司法上的适用,应当根据公司发展阶段不同而有所调整。在公司正常经营阶段,应当坚持效率优先,侧重保护股东利益,适当考虑其他利益主体的利益,实现经营状态下的利益平衡；而在公司清算阶段,则应当坚持公平优先,侧重考虑其他利益相关人的利益和社会公共利益,实现清算状态下的利益平衡。在公司司法清算中,主要存在着诸如个人利益与公司利益、社会公共利益的冲突；财产性利益与非财产性利益的冲突；偿还性利益与非偿还性利益的冲突；财产性(偿还性)利益之间的冲突等各种利益冲突。上述利益冲突产生的原因是：公司财产的有限性、利益相关人信息的不对称性和相关法律制度的缺失。我国当前公司司法清算应当坚持“公平优先,兼顾效率”的价值取向,公司司法清算利益平衡的公共政策目标是：维护社会和谐稳定,防止出现社会动荡；保障社会公平的底线；高效的对资源利用。第二章从公司治理的视野,着重研究了司法权力对公司清算的干预。公司治理应当贯穿整个公司设立到消亡始终,广义上的公司治理应包括公司清算阶段。从西方公司治理的模式来看,在股份有限公司方面,主要有双层制和单层制两种类型。而有限责任公司的治理模式则不拘一格。法律充分尊重公司的意思自治。总的来说,公司治理是法定框架下公司意思自治的体现。在上述讨论的基础上,笔者从司法权力的特殊性着手,从四个维度讨论了司法权力介入公司清算问题。第一是公司清算是否“可诉”问题。公司清算虽非传统对抗型纠纷,但是从立法和实践来看司法权力都能够处理公司清算问题。第二是司法权力在解决公司清算问题时的能动性发挥问题。法官在处理清算案件时,应当更多地倾向于“职权主义”。司法权力应当在保障程序公正,保障信息充分公开和监督清算组履行义务,督促清算义务人履行清算义务等方面,充分发挥作用。第三是司法机构自身能力的局限性问题。司法机构对于处理群体性争议和对技术性结果的审查方面。此时,司法机构不得不部分的放弃自己的权力。第四是司法机构与当事人的互动问题。在司法清算中,法院应当坚持以言词原则为主的与当事人的直接沟通,才能保证有效性和公正性。总的来说,司法机关对公司清算的介入,应当从有利于解决公司清算中的纠纷,有利于实现各方利益平衡为目的,在具体介入的过程中有所为有所不为。第三章主要讨论了司法清算的启动中的利益平衡,并对督促清算义务人履行清算义务的法律手段进行了研究。公司清算的原因是解散。立法在选择公司解散起诉权分配条件的时候,已经考虑了两个方面的利益平衡：一是起诉股东与其他股东之间的利益平衡；二是大股东与小股东之间的利益平衡。除立法方面,司法机构在处理公司解散案件时还会针对个案的具体情况进行个案的利益平衡。公司解散后,如果清算义务人不履行相关义务,法律赋予了部分主体以司法清算的提起权。是否赋予一类主体司法清算的提起权,该主体提起权的顺位如何,应当以该主体在公司清算中所具有的利益多寡,即利益相关程度为准。债权人、股东、国家应当被赋予提起权。清算义务人不履行清算义务,可能导致公司无法清算。因此必须用法律手段督促清算义务人主动清算,包括民事责任的追究和行政、刑事手段的采用。清算义务人不履行清算义务,应当承担清算赔偿责任,而不是“清算责任”。这种清算赔偿责任的性质是一种基于高度注意义务的侵权责任。在其他手段方面,还可以采用公司解散登记备案,查封、扣押和冻结清算义务人的个人财产以及限制其出境的措施等。第四章主要讨论了公司司法清算的进行和结果确认中的利益平衡。人民法院受理司法清算申请后,首要的任务就是组成清算组。考虑到人民法院在司法清算中对于清算组成立、职责以及报酬的确定等方面,均具有决定性的权力,本文将司法清算的清算组与清算公司的关系界定为一种“司法强制代理”。本章在此基础上讨论了清算组的组成问题。现行规定可能造成清算组中缺乏“外部人”利益表达机制,从而造成债权人等利益相关人的利益损失。解决这一问题的最终方案是建立一支专业、中立的清算人队伍,不受公司内部人的制约。目前可以考虑适当让债权人和其他利益相关人的代表加入到清算组中。在对公司司法清算开展的讨论中,笔者主要对债权人与清算组权利的制衡,协定债务清偿制度以及司法清算中的清偿顺位问题进行了重点研究。债权人与清算组权利的制衡方面,包括通知公告债权人制度、债权人异议制度、清算组行为禁止制度和清算组法律责任追究制度。其中债权人异议权是债权人表达自己利益诉求的重要权利。然而目前没有形成常设的债权人会议,难以有效提出异议。故如果债权人对核定债权有异议,应允许其提出自己的候选人进入清算组。清算组违法清算,造成公司或债权人损失的,应当承担侵权责任。协定债务清偿制度应尽量平衡各利益相关人的利益,但由于债权人没有形成一个相对固定的组织,这种松散的状态实际上导致该协议的制定和认可实际上由清算组主导。因此,公司司法清算中应当有债权人会议。在公司司法清算中也要明确清偿顺序,除担保债权外,清算费用、人身损害赔偿、劳动债权应当具有优先受偿的地位,但是国家税收(包括各种非社会保险类的行政性收费、罚款)不应当列为优先受偿的债权。在公司司法清算结论的确认方面,本章承继第二章的有关结论,探讨了司法权力对于清算结论的审查的特点以及方式,并提出司法审查应当具备以下几个特征：一是从审核的内容来看,主要是对清算过程是否有违法行为和明显的不合理行为进行审查；二是从审核层面来看,主要是从法律层面进行审核；三是这些审查应当属于实质性审查的范畴。最后,本章讨论了公司注销后未清偿债权的处理问题。笔者将该问题分为两种情况分别讨论。一种情况是公司未经过合法清算而注销。该情况下也可能存在两种情形,第一种情形是公司清算义务人故意或者过失不承担法定清算义务,逃避债务。此时,公司清算义务人应当承担不作为的法律责任。第二种情形是股东在注销时向工商行政部门作出承诺清偿债务。对此,本文认为,应当承认该承诺的效力,要求承诺人对注销后未清偿债权进行清偿。另一种情况是公司经过合法清算注销后,仍有债权人主张债权。此时,有三种情形：在一般情形下,公司合法清算完毕后注销,不再清偿任何债务。第二种情形是有人自愿承担相应的债务,则属于自愿承担债务的范畴,应当允许。第三种情形是发生公司股东在注销时承诺偿债的情形,则也应当予以承认,但是股东只需要在其分得的剩余财产范围内清偿,超过部分可以不予清偿,以平衡股东和债权人的利益。更多还原

【Abstract】 For quite a long time, China has not established a company judicial liquidation system. Though the system of judicial liquidation has been initially established upon the Judicial interpretation No.2 issued by the Supreme People’s Court, but so far, is still difficult to deal with relevant cases. On one hand, the reason lies in the complexity in reality leading to the judiciary difficulties; on the other hand, it shows the current legislation still need to be supplemented and amended. This paper, from the perspective of interests balance theory, comprehensively utilizes the law and economic theory, combined with foreign legislation and relevant cases, categorizes and analyzes the current fundamental legal principles and systems on Chinese company judicial liquidation, and clarifies some vague theatrical issues, and put forward the author’s own viewpoints.In addition to the introduction, this paper has four chapters.The first chapter illustrates and studies the basic theories of company liquidation to lay a foundation for further research. This chapter, from the perspective of the Civil Law, citing "fictio" as the theoretical basis, illustrates the nature of company liquidation, the nature of company liquidation can be interpreted as company agency’s statutory changes.The theoretical tool to explain the nature of company liquidation from the perspective of the Company Law is "enterprise contract theory". Company liquidation can be interpreted as transfer of the control of the company with different remaining between different subjects. The author, in combination of these conclusions and analysis of interests balance theory and corporate social responsibility, believes that utilization of these two theories should vary based on specific stages of the company’s development. At the company’s normal operation stage, it should focus on encouragement and protection of the interests of shareholders, and with appropriate consideration to the interests of other stakeholders; at the company liquidation stage, priority should be given to the interests of other stakeholders and the public interest.This chapter then analyzes the conflict of the company stakeholders in judicial liquidation. In judicial liquidation of the company, the main confrontations lie between personal interests and corporate interests, different social public interests, property interests and non-property interests, reinstitution interests and non-reinstitution interests, and among different property (reinstitution) interests. The causes of the interest conflicts include the limited property of the company, information asymmetry between stakeholders and lack of relevant legal system.This chapter concludes with the public policy objectives for balance of the interests in judicial liquidation of the company:to maintain social harmony and stability, and prevent social unrest; to protect the bottom line of social equity; and to maximize the utilization of wealth.ChapterⅡ, from the perspective of corporate governance, focuses on the intervention of judicial power for the company’s liquidation. Corporate governance should be implemented throughout the whole lifespan of a company, it is a dynamic process, and in a broad sense, corporate governance should also include the company’s liquidation phase. The major western corporate governance models for the listed incorporated companies are composed of two types:single-layer system and double-layer system. For a limited liability company there are many different governance models to meet the flexible mode of operations. The goal of corporate governance should include the economic objectives and organizational goals. Among which the economic objective is a development mode that can realize the balance of the interests of all stakeholders in the company; and the organizational goal is to establish an organizational system conducive to a balanced development among the interests.Based on the above discussions, the author, from the special features of the judicial power-its strong focus of equality and comparatively limited influence, discuss four aspects in the dimensions of the involvement of judicial power in company liquidation. The first is whether the company’s liquidation is an "actionable" issue. Although company’s liquidation is not a traditional confrontational dispute, legislations and practice have proved that judicial power is able to deal with the issues of company liquidation. The second is the initiative of the judicial power to play in resolving the company’s liquidation issues. Judges should not stick to "adversary system" in dealing with confrontational disputes, but should be more inclined to "doctrine of justiceships". For matters such as whether to start liquidation proceedings, whether to apply or replace members of liquidation team etc., the judge should conduct more in-depth review, for matters such as weather the liquidation team is in compliance with obligations of notice for asserting claims, whether to allow additional declaration for creditor’s right etc, the judge should conduct formal review. The third issue is the limitation of the company’s own capabilities. The legitimacy and rationality of the cases review by the judiciary faces difficulties in some areas. The most obvious examples are the handling of mass justice and on the aspects of the review on technical results. The fourth point is the interaction between judiciary and the concerned parties. Such interactions possess the features of inequality and legality. According to Habermas’s theory of communicative action, the author holds that effective interaction is the most important part for legislative and judicial issues, and also the base of legitimacy for the above acts. Therefore, in judicial liquidation, the courts shall adhere to the principles of basing on languages to communicate directly with the concerned parties to ensure effectiveness and impartiality.The third chapter discusses the trigger mechanism for judicial liquidation, at the same time studies legal means to urge the liquidation obligor to perform the obligations of liquidation. Liquidation is due to dissolution of the company. Relevant legislations have taken into account of the balance of interests between two aspects in the choice of the conditions for the right to sue the company in dissolution. The first is the balance of interests between prosecuting shareholders and other shareholders; the second is the balance of interests between the large shareholders and the minor shareholders. In addition to legislation, the judiciary, in dealing with cases of dissolution of the company will also consider the specific circumstances of the case to address balance issue. The law, in distribution of the instituted right of judicial liquidation, should follow the principal that those who possess majority of the interests in the company shall take priority in the liquidation. The top priority shall be the creditors, followed by the shareholders, with the last of the State.If the Liquidation obligor fails to perform the obligations, it may result in liquidation of the company can not proceed. Therefore, legal means must be used to supervise the liquidation obligor to take the initiative in liquidation, including the means of accountability of civil liability and administrative and criminal measures. Where liquidation obligor fails to perform obligations of liquidation, he shall be liable for damages of liquidation, rather than the "liquidation responsibility". Nature of the damages of liquidation is a tort liability based on high duty of care. In other instruments, measures of register of the record for company dissolved, seizure and freezing of the personal property of the liquidation obligors, as well as restrictions on going abroad.Chapter IV focuses on the implementation of the liquidation of the company and the judicial results recognition mechanism. Upon receiving the application of judicial liquidation, the top task of the people’s court is to form a liquidator panel. Taking into account of the decisive power of the people’s court in the "core interests" of the judicial liquidation, which includes establishment of the liquidator panel, determination of its duties and remuneration of the liquidator panel etc., this paper defines the relationship between judicial liquidator panel and the liquidated company as a "Judicial enforcement agency". Features of this model include the following aspects. Firstly, this kind of agency has a strong mandatory characteristic, but meanwhile also possesses some autonomy characteristic; Secondly, this kind of agency will be launched under the circumstance that civil agency model can not be achieved so to protect the interests of stakeholders; finally, this agency model possesses a strong policy characteristics. This chapter then discusses the composition of the liquidator panel. Existing regulations may cause the lack of expression mechanism for "external" interests in the liquidator panel, which will result in the losses of creditors and other stakeholders. The final plan to solve this problem is to organize a team of professional, neutral liquidators without constraints from inside the company. Now it may be considered appropriate for creditors and other stakeholders to represent in the liquidator panel.In the discussions of judicial liquidation of the company, the author selects the checks and balances of the rights of creditors and liquidator panel, mechanism of pay-off for common debts, and settlement sequence of judicial liquidation of the system as the key research issues. For the checks and balances of the rights of creditors and the liquidator panel, the notification system of notice to creditors, creditors’objection system and restriction system on the actions of the liquidator panel are illustrated. Among which creditors’objection right is an important right for the creditors to express their demands of the interests. However, currently there is no formation of a permanent meeting of creditors, decisions can not be effectively challenged, and the creditors themselves can not enter into the liquidator panel to effectively claim their rights. Therefore, if disputes on assessed claims by the creditors have been approved, it should be allowed for the creditors to nominate their own candidates into the liquidator panel. System of pay-off for common debts should try to balance the interests of all stakeholders, but since the creditors have not formed a relatively fixed organization, this loose state actually leads to the definition and approval of the agreement in fact guided by the liquidator panel. Therefore, during judicial liquidation of the company there should have a meeting of creditors, which aims at the interest representation on behalf of all creditors; full exchange of information, mutual supervision; and coordination of the internal interests to reduce potential conflicts. Judicial liquidation of the company shall also clarify a clear liquidation sequence. In addition to secured creditors, the liquidation costs, damages for personal injuries and harms, labor claims should enjoy priority to be paid off, but state tax revenue (including non-social insurance administrative fees) should not be listed as priority in compensation claims.In terms of confirmation on the conclusion of the judicial liquidation of the company, this chapter, inheriting from the conclusions of the second chapter, explores the characteristics and methods of the judicial power in reviewing the conclusions of the liquidation, and categorizes the characteristics of the judicial review as followings: Firstly, from the reviewed contents, the review mainly focuses on whether the liquidation process has violated the laws or involved obviously unreasonable conduct; secondly, from the level of review, the review is mainly from a legislative perspective. Thirdly, the review should belong to the scope of substantive review.Finally, this chapter discusses the issues on the treatment of outstanding claims after cancellation of a company. The author divides the issue into two circumstances and gives respective discussions. The first circumstance is the company has been cancelled but not through the legal liquidation process. There may be two different cases for this circumstance, the first case is the company’s liquidation obligor tries to evade debt by intentionally or negligently avoid the legal liquidation obligations. At this point, the company’s liquidation obligor shall be liable for not act rationally. The second case is during cancellation of the company, the shareholders have made a commitment to the industrial and commercial administrative department to pay off the debt. For this case, this paper believes that the effectiveness of the commitment should be acknowledged, and people committed shall be required to pay off the outstanding claims a after the write-off. Another circumstance is that there are still claims on the rights by the creditors after the cancellation of a company through legal settlement process. At this point, there are three different cases. In normal case, a company, after cancellation through legal liquidation process, will not pay off any debt. If someone is willing to take the corresponding debt, then it falls into the scope of voluntary assumption of debt, and should be allowed. In the event that the shareholders promise to pay for debt after write-off, it should also be recognized, but the shareholders only need to pay off within the realm of their distributed share of the remaining property, the part in excess may not be settled.更多还原