中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的政治经济学分析

【作者】 胡志平；

【导师】 李慧中；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 中国正从生存型社会向发展型社会转型,公众对公共服务的需求快速增长,而中国公共服务的供给却是赶不上公众之需求,导致公共服务的供求矛盾成为中国近年来社会的主要矛盾之一,而其中的中国农村公共服务的供求矛盾尤为突出。经过了30年来的改革开放,城乡之间的差距日益扩大,“三农问题”日益凸显,如何解决“三农问题”成为学者研究的热点。当前其解决的途径正逐步转向农村公共服务供给,实现城乡基本公共服务的均等化目标。当前中国农村公共服务供给不仅没有与城市实现公共服务均衡化发展,而且在供给结构和地区结构上也存在非均衡供给的现象。纵观国内外现有的研究主要集中在农村公共服务的提供体制机制方面,而且单从经济学或公共管理学的视角进行研究,没有融合经济学与公共管理学、政治学的政治经济学视角进行分析,特别是对中国农村公共服务的非均衡供给的机理涉及较少,而这恰恰是中国农村公共服务均衡化发展的前提。由此,中国农村公共服务供给问题研究有待深入,需要一个更加综合的分析视角加以扩展与深化。本论文正是针对当前对改善农村公共服务非均衡供给存在迫切的社会需要而农村公共服务供给又面临的困境以及学理上存在研究农村公共服务非供给的一定缺陷而展开的,力求回答以下几个问题：(1)学理上需要一个梳理,公共产品还是公共服务,两者是否指同一个意思?(2)中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的特征事实表现在那些方面,有何经济效应?(3)中国农村公共服务非均衡供给是否一个短期现象还是一个长期问题,是否仅仅是一个财政问题?其存在的政治经济逻辑机理是什么,即宏观政治经济逻辑与微观政治经济逻辑是什么?(4)基于对中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的特征事实以及政治经济逻辑机理的梳理与分析,如何改善中国农村公共服务的供给,提出实现从非均衡走向均衡的政策建议?按照以上思路,本论文内容包括以下七章：第一章为导论部分。主要介绍本文的研究选题背景与意义、研究内容与框架、研究方法与创新点。主要对有关中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的国内外的学者的研究进行了文献梳理并加以评析,发现其中有待分析的视角,构成本文研究的起点。第二章是本文分析的理论基础,对什么是公共服务?公共服务与公共产品的区别等问题进行了理论上的回答,并按照与基层政府行为的关系对农村公共服务进行了新的分类；同时就有相关的公共服务供求均衡模型、公共产品理论、公共选择理论和治理理论进行了梳理,就本论文的主要概念进行了界定。第三章,对什么是农村公共服务非均衡供给?进行了概念界定并分成了三种基本类型：中国农村公共服务不仅与城市之间存在巨大差异的城乡公共服务非均衡供给类型Ⅰ,同时农村公共服务存在提供不足的总量非均衡供给类型Ⅱ；而且农村公共服务同时存在供给不足和供给过剩的状况,即结构非均衡供给类型Ⅲ。以此为起点,详细阐述了这三种非均衡供给类型的特征事实,依据其具有的经济效应并对其进行了实证分析。第四章,既然农村公共服务存在三种非均衡供给,对农村经济社会很不利,为何会一直存在呢?这就是必须深入分析中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的政治经济逻辑,本论文尝试借鉴政治学概念中的政治合法性概念,在对流行的财政压力决定中国农村公共服务供给体制变迁的观点进行反思的基础上,从政治合法性的角度分析中国农村公共服务非均衡供给三种基本类型的体制变迁,回答了政治合法性基础转变与农村公共服务非均衡供给的关系,从而进一步说明了中国农村公共服务的非均衡供给存在其深刻的政治经济内涵。第五章,从政治合法性视角解剖中国农村公共服务非均衡供给问题是一种宏观透视,缺乏一种微观机理分析,因而本章从中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的相关利益主体的博弈视角出发,运用政治经济学模型分别对三种非均衡供给类型进行了分析：运用公共政策的压力集团模型分析了城乡公共服务非均衡供给形成的政治经济机理；借鉴博弈模型分析了总量非均衡供给形成的政治经济机理；运用多任务委托代理模型和公共服务政治市场模型分析了结构非均衡供给形成的政治经济机理；因而认为利益主体之间的博弈是中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的深层次原因,而财政压力并不是其根本原因。第六章是对策篇。按照第三、四、五章的逻辑分析结论,实现中国农村公共服务的均衡供给是一项系统的工程。本章认为要实现从非均衡走向均衡发展的中国农村公共服务必须从宏观、中观、微观三个层次进行体制机制的再架构；提出了在宏观上要从战略上根本改变城乡关系、地区关系和提供主体之间的关系,在中观上就是政绩考核制度的改变,构建公共服务型政府和公共服务型财政体制,在微观上实现提供模式从单中心向多中心治理模式的转变的政策设计与途径。第七章,结语与展望本文的主要的结论：1、公共服务并不是完全等于公共产品,公共服务包含了权利与政府职责的内涵,公共服务是同时具有公民权利、政府职责与公共产品特征,是政府为实现公民权利和承担政府责任而向居民提供的具有公共产品性质或因社会发展而成为公共需求的产品与服务,不仅包括物质形态的产品也包括无形的服务,是有形与无形的统称。2、中国农村公共服务非均衡供给可以分成三种基本类型：非均衡供给类型Ⅰ：城乡非均衡供给；非均衡供给类型Ⅱ：总量非均衡供给；非均衡供给类型Ⅲ：结构非均衡供给；同时农村公共服务具有收入效应和消费效应,说明改善农村公共服务非均衡供给具有重要意义。3、政治合法性是中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的宏观政治经济逻辑机理。政治合法性基础的转变导致中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的产生与变迁,而财政压力或者财政分权不是中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的根本原因,根源在于中国政治合法性基础的演变上,因此改变中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的状况单靠县乡财政体制的完善是不够的,还需要国家从根本上改变国家与农民的关系。4、利益主体的博弈是中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的微观政治经济逻辑。中央政府、基层政府、农民三个主要主体之间的利益博弈偏离了最优均衡,基层政府困难或财力不足并不是中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的主要原因,因而改变中国各个行为主体的激励与约束机制,形成合理的利益关系才是改善中国农村公共服务非均衡供给的微观途径。5、中国农村公共服务从非均衡走向均衡发展是一项系统的工程,不仅需要提供机制的改革,更需要从从宏观、中观、微观三个层次进行体制机制的再架构,才能够完成这一宏大目标。这是本文的一个政策结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 As China is transforming from an existential society to a developing society, the public’s demand for public service is increasing at a fast pace. But the supply of public service can’t catch up with the demand of the public, causing the conflict between supply and demand in public service one of Chinese social principal contradictions in recent years. And this is especially manifested in the rural public service supply. Since initiating the reforms and open policy thirty years ago, the urban-rural gap has been widening, the problems of the "agriculture, countryside and farmer" have been worsening, and so how to solve those problems has become a heated study among scholars. The current way tries to realize the equilibrium in urban-rural public service. However, there is not only the disequilibrium of the urban-rural public service supply, but also that of the supply structure and regional structure. In addition, the studies concerning the rural public service supply at home and abroad are concentrating on the systems of the rural public service supply. They are analyzed either in Economics or in Science of Public Management, but without a comprehensive analysis by combining Economic, Science of Public Management and Politics all together. Moreover, they discuss little about the political and economic logic of the disequilibrium of the rural public service, which is the prerequisite of the development of the equilibrium of it. Therefore, we need a more comprehensive perspective to discuss such problems. This paper, based on the emergency need for the equilibrium of the rural public service supply and the problems in studying it, aims to seek the answers for the following questions:(1) To make clear in theory:the "public service" means public goods or public service, or both are equal in meaning?(2) What are the manifestations of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply, and what are their economic effects?(3) The disequilibrium of the rural public service supply is a short-term or long-term phenomenon? Or is it just a financial problem? What are their political and economic logic on both macro and micro levels?(4) How to improve the supply of the rural public service, and what are the policy suggestions for the realization of the equilibrium on the basis of the manifestations of disequilibrium of the rural public service supply and the clarification and analysis of their political and economic logic?According to the above thinking, the paper includes seven chapters as the following:Chapter One is the introduction. The part makes a brief introduction about the research background and significance, content and frame, research approaches as well as the innovative points. Though reviewing and analyzing the bibliographies concerning the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply at home and abroad, the paper tries to find the perspectives needed to be further discussed.Chapter Two is the theoretical basis of the paper, giving answers to questions like what is public service, and what are the differences between public service and public goods, and making a new classification of the rural public services according to their relationship with the grassroots government action. The part also makes a clear explanation on the relevant equilibrium models of public service supply and the theories in public goods, public choices and governance.Chapter Three gives a definition of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply, which is divided into three types:type I is the disequilibrium of the urban-rural public service supply, type II is the disequilibrium of the total public service supply, and type III is the disequilibrium of the structure of the rural public service supply. The part gives the manifestations of these three types, and analyzes them according to their economic effects.Chapter Four tries to analyze the political and economic causes of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply. Since the three types of disequilibrium exist in the rural public service supply, it will be harmful to the rural economy and society, and therefore the reasons of their existence are the political and economic logic we have to analyze. The chapter tries to borrow the idea of the political legitimacy in Politics to analyze the transformation of the three types of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply on the basis of the notion that the financial pressure determines the systematic transformation of the rural public supply service. Moreover, it explains the relationship between the evolvement of the basic of the political legitimacy and the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply.Chapter Five proves that the fundamental cause of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply is not from financial pressure but the interest game among the stakeholders. This chapter begins from the game among the stakeholders in the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply to analyze the three types of the disequilibrium with models in Political Economics. It analyzes the political and economic logic of the formation of the disequilibrium of the urban-rural public service supply with the pressure group model in Public Policy, that of the disequilibrium of the total supply the with game model, and that of the disequilibrium of the structure of the public of the public service with the multi-tasks agency model and the political market model of public service.Chapter Six focus on the solutions. According to the conclusions from the above chapters, we know that the realization of the equilibrium of the rural public service is a systematic project. The chapter reveals that the realization requires the system reframing on the macro-, middle, and micro-levels:To make fundamental changes of the relationships between cities and rural areas, relationships within different areas and relationships among the providers on the macro level; to change the assessing system of the political achievement, and to construct a public service government and financial system on the middle level; to realize the policy design and approaches for the transformation from the single centric to multi centric governance model on the micro level.Chapter Seven is the conclusion and the prospect.The main conclusions of the paper are:First, the public service is not equal to the public goods. The public service, including the characteristics of civil rights, government responsibilities, and public goods, is a combination of tangible goods and intangible service. It not only helps the government achieve civil rights and bear the responsibility, but also satisfy the need of the public in our developing society.Second, the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply is divided into three types:type I is the disequilibrium of the urban-rural public service supply, type II is the disequilibrium of the total public service supply, and type III is the disequilibrium of the structure of the rural public service supply. Moreover, the rural public service supply has both the income effect and the consumption effect, which prove the significance of improving the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply.Third, the political legitimacy is the macro political and economic logic of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply. The fundamental cause of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply lies in the evolvement of the basic of the political legitimacy, but not the financial pressure or financial decentralizations. Therefore, depending on the improvement of the financial systems in rural areas is not enough, what we should do to change the relationship between the government and the farmers.Fourth, the game among the stakeholders is the micro political and economic logic of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply. The game among the central government, the grassroots government, and the farmers has deviated from the best equilibrium. The financial problems in the grassroots government are not the main causes of the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply. The effective way of improving the disequilibrium of the rural public service supply is to change incentive and tied mechanism for social actors, and to form a reasonable interest relationship.Fifth, it is a systematic project to develop from disequilibrium to equilibrium for the rural public service supply. The project not only calls for the reform of the systems, but also the reframing of systems on the macro, middle and micro levels.更多还原