福多“概念”理论研究

【作者】 戴潘；

【导师】 朱宝荣；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 科学技术哲学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 概念理论是当代认知科学、语言哲学、认知心理学、实验语言学所共同关注的核心问题之一。因为当前认知科学的经典假设就是,人类的心灵乃是信息处理系统,而既然心灵的运作就是对信息符号的操作,那么必然存在信息符号得以组成的基本结构,而概念就被公认为标准的信息载体。简单来说,概念是思维的基本组成要素,如果我们说思想是一个整体,那么概念就是构成这个整体的基本成分。那么什么是概念?概念是真实存在于我们的大脑中的实体还是我们虚构出的工具?概念具有结构吗?我们如何获得概念?概念是后天习得的还是先天就存在于我们的大脑中?概念的意义是如何确定的?这些问题不仅困扰着历史上的哲学家们,也困扰着当代的学者以及认知科学家们。本文就试图以福多的理论作为基本出发点,考察当前在认知科学哲学领域关于概念理论的基本面貌。我们打算从概念形而上学、概念获得以及概念意义三个问题切入,为读者展现当前关于概念理论的宏观视野。本文采取的思路如下,首先介绍福多的心理表征思想的基本原理,包括五个基本命题：作为意向科学的心理学、作为意向内容承担者的心理表征、思维的计算模型、信息语义学以及改造的弗雷格语义学。这五个基本命题是整个福多哲学的核心观点,尽管他后来做了一些修改,但是基本的原理并没有发生变化。理解福多心理表征思想之后我们才能更好的理解为什么他如此重视概念在认知科学中的基础性地位。接下来我将考察当前认知科学中的一些主流概念理论,即概念的定义理论、概念的原型理论以及概念的理论论,并指出它们共同的哲学基础乃是推论作用语义学。然后我们将详细考察福多对这几种主流概念理论的批判,针对目前最主流的原型理论,指出由于语言所具有的组合性原则,因此概念不可能是原型。并且批判了经典的经验主义概念习得模型——假说检验模型,指出经验主义的道路是不可能实现这个目标的。在考察完福多对主流概念理论的批判后,我们将详细的介绍福多自己的概念理论,我也将主要分成三个部分：首先是福多的概念形而上学,提出概念乃是心理殊相并且是以思想语言的形式存在于大脑中的；其次是福多的概念获得理论,提出概念并非像经验主义者所说的那样是后天习得的,而是先天就存在于我们的大脑中,但是同时是被经验所激发的；最后是福多的概念内容(意义)理论,指出概念的内容并非通过推论作用语义学而确定,而是通过原子式的方式而确定的,并通过在意义原子论与意义整体论的大背景下指出推论作用语义学将会导致与公共性约束原则相悖,这将会导致整个认知科学的失败。最后我将试图对福多的概念理论的第三部分,即概念内容的整体论与原子论的争论提出自己的观点,并试图整合主流的推论作用语义学和福多的信息语义学原则,提出一种综合性的概念理论,这也是本文最重要的创新之处。更多还原

【Abstract】 The theory of concept is one of the most hardcore which is discussed by contemporary cognitive science、cognitive psychology、philosophy of language and experimental linguistics. Currently, the classic hypothesis of cognitive science is that the mind of human being is information operating systems. If the processes of mind are operations on informational symbols, then there must be some basic structures of the informational symbols, then the concepts are recognized as normative carrier of information. That is, concepts are basic compositions of mind. So what are concepts? Are concept real entities in our brains or the tools we make up? Does concepts have structures? How we achieve concepts? Do we have concepts innate or acquired? How to decide the meaning of concepts? Such questions puzzle not only the philosophers and cognitive scientists historical but also up-to-date. My thesis attempt to review the basic environment of concept theory, which based on Jerry Fodor’s viewpoint. We intent to exhibit the general situations of the concept theory through three main thesis, that is, the metaphysics of concept、concept acquisition and concept content.First I would like to introduce the basic principles of Fodor’RTM theory, which including five main thesis. First, psychology as intentional science; Second, mental representation as carriers of intentional content; Third, the computational model of mind; Forth, information semantics; And the last, the reconstructive Frege’s semantics. These five propositions are the hardcore of Fodor’s philosophy. Though he has changed some of his earlier ideas, but these five principles has never changed. To understand the RTM theory we can understand why he consider concepts as the most basic terms of cognitive science.Then I will discuss the main concept theories of contemporary cognitive science, that is, the definition theory、the prototype theory and the theory theories, and hold that the inferential role semantics is the philosophical foundations of all these empirical theories. Then I will discuss Fodor’s critique of the prototype theory. Fodor hold that if languages are compositional then concepts can not be prototype. And then Fodor criticize the classic model of concept acquisition which hold by empiricists, that is the hypothesis - confirmation model, and point out the empiricist way is impasse.After the discussion of the criticism of the main concept theories, we will introduce Fodor’s concept theory, and we will also divide it into three part:First, Fodor’s concept metaphysics, which hold that concepts are mental particular and they exist in our brain as mentalese; Second, Fodor’s concept acquisition theory, which hold that concept are not acquired but innate and are triggered by our experiences; and the last, Fodor’s concept content(meaning) theory, which hold that the contents of concepts are not decided by inferential role semantics which are holistic but by some way atomic. The inferential role semantics will go against the public constraint principles, and will destroy the foundations of cognitive science.Finally, I will attempt to put forward my own opinions on the third thesis of Fodor’s concept theory, that is the controversy of concept holism and atomism. I will attempt to put inferential role semantics and Fodor’s information semantics together, and put forward a comprehensive concept theory. This is the most important point and innovations of my thesis.更多还原