【作者】 张薇；

【导师】 刘冬荣；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 工商管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 审计意见购买直接影响证券市场会计信息的真实、有用性,关系到证券市场秩序的维护以及公司产权所有者利益的保护,对于审计意见购买在特定证券市场环境及其动态变迁下的行为特征与规律的深入研究,既能丰富审计理论,又为独立审计行业的监管和良好证券市场秩序的形成提供重要参考。本文沿着审计意见购买的“诱因——动机——行为——治理”的逻辑展开论述,综合运用动机理论、新制度经济学理论、进化博弈论、协同演化理论等理论与方法,以2004年以来的证券市场环境作为研究背景,选取2004至2008年我国A股上市公司作为研究样本,运用无序多项Logistic模型、有序多项Logistic模型对审计意见购买行为进行实证检验。全文通过动机理论勾勒出整体框架,首先区分了我国证券市场环境中影响审计意见购买行为的制度与非制度因素,运用委托—代理理论、契约理论、交易费用理论、产权理论对制度诱因和非制度诱因加以分析。然后对审计意见购买需要及其引发的资本市场、非资本市场动机加以区分,实证检验发现资本市场、债务契约和管理层薪酬动机是我国上市公司审计意见购买的主要动机,可能的意见购买路径有变更审计师、审计收费和非年报审计收费。进一步的实证检验表明变更审计师、审计收费(包括相对高额审计收费和大幅异常增长的审计收费)和非年报审计收费这些单一路径以及变更审计师分别与审计收费、非年报审计收费结合形成的复合路径均可成功购买审计意见。审计技术和审计委托制度都是审计意见购买行为的重要影响因素。对审计意见购买行为在审计技术变迁不同阶段的博弈分析和最新审计准则在实施前后意见购买行为结果的实证检验均表明新审计技术在采用初期并不必然带来意见购买行为的弱化。同时,博弈分析发现随着审计师对审计技术的掌握、熟稔,新审计技术追加成本和协调成本将逐渐减少,审计意见购买行为将得到一定程度的抑制。对产权所有者行权和经营管理者行权两种典型审计委托模式的进化博弈分析发现前者优于后者,对我国2004年以来中央企业审计委托权模式改革后意见购买行为结果的实证检验也支持这一结论。在此基础上,本文提出“选、聘”分离审计委托模式,运用进化博弈分析得出这一模式能够兼顾审计市场秩序与产权所有者利益,从成本与效益的角度来看,不失为一般企业折衷而现实的选择。最后本文提出了“协同演化治理观”,已有关于审计意见购买治理观点从本质上来看均属于“制度治理观”,对审计技术于意见购买治理的作用有所忽视,独立审计系统具有协同演化系统的全部特征,并存在审计技术与制度、独立审计系统与社会环境、独立审计系统内组织与个体等多层级和多向协同演化关系,对审计意见购买的治理可以采用更为全面而系统的“协同演化治理观”,以提高治理的效率和效果。更多还原

【Abstract】 Audit Opinion Shopping (AOS) directly influents the trueness, usefulness of accounting information, the protection of securities markets order and the interests of property owners, It has an important theoretical value and practical significance for the monitoring of independent audit industry as well as the formation of sound order in securities markets to explore the conduct characteristics and rules of AOS under specific environment and the dynamic transition of securities markets.This dissertation follows the logic of "Incentives-Motivation-Behavior-Governance", combines theories and methodes of the new institutional economics, the co-evolution economics, the evolution game theory, it bases on the securities markets environment since 2004, selected China’s A-share listed companies of year 2004 to 2008 as the research sample and made application of the multinomial logistic and ordinal logistic model in the process of empirical examination.The whole framework of the dissertation bases on motivation theory, it makes distinction between the institution-related and institution-unrelated factors of securities markets in our country, and analyzes AOS incentives from the perspectives of principal-agent theory, contract theory, transaction cost theory, property rights theory. Then it turns to analyze the AOS needs and the capital markets related and unrelated motivations which are initiated from the AOS needs. The empirical examines show motivations derived from capital markets, debt contract and management salary are significant, changing auditors, audit fees and nonaudit fees are probable routes to shop audit opinion. Further empirical tests indicates listed companies could successfully shop audit opinion by changing auditors, paying higher audit (include relative high audit fees and abnormal greatly increased audit fees) or nonaudit fees, or combining changing auditors with the one of the other routes.Audit techniques and audit commitment institutes are two significant factors influenting AOS. Both the game theory analysis and empirical examination show that the AOS motivation won’t be weakened in the initial stage of techniques transition, the game theoretical analysis also suggests the AOS be suppressed to some extent as auditors get familiar with the new techniques. The pattern of the exertion of the right to audit commission has important influence on AOS. The analysis from the perspective of evolution game theory of two typical models as the property owners excising the right or the management levels excising it shows that the former is prior to the latter. The empirical examine focus on the central enterprises which have reformed the model from the latter to the former also supports the argument. A model of separating the selection right from the employment of auditor is put up, which is proved to be comprise as well as realistic choice of enterprises out of the central one as it takes into account the audit market order and protecting the interests of property owners, and is in line with the cost and benefits principle.At last, a view of "co-evolutional governance" is suggested. The existing governance views related to AOS are essentially "institution related" and pay no attention to the effect of audit techniques on the AOS governance. The analysis of the independent audit system from the perspective of co-evolution theory shows it pocesses all characteristics of a co-evolutional system, and the co-evolutional relations between the audit techniques and institution, the independent audit system and the social environment, the organizations and individuals in this system, so that a view of co-evolutional governance which is more comprehensive and systematic could be applied in the governance of AOS, so as to improve the effciency and effectiveness of govenance.更多还原