【作者】 刘晓霞；

【导师】 张兆国；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 在两权分离的条件下,管理者报酬激励制度是一种重要的公司治理机制,但也可能是产生盈余管理动机的一种原因。因此,管理者报酬激励与盈余管理问题既是公司治理研究中的一个重要课题,也是经济管理中的一个棘手问题。本文在系统综述国内外相关研究成果的基础上,借鉴国际经验,结合我国国有控股公司的制度背景,综合运用委托代理理论、机制设计理论、现代契约理论、产权理论等经济理论,采用契约分析法、规范分析法、实证分析法等研究方法,沿着“理论研究——实证研究——对策研究”的研究路线,对其选题从管理者报酬与盈余管理的理论分析、国有控股公司管理者报酬与公司业绩的实证研究、国有控股公司管理者报酬激励与盈余管理的实证研究、完善国有控股公司管理者报酬激励制度的制度安排等方面展开了全面而深入的研究,得出了一些具有一定理论价值和实践价值的观点和结论。首先,通过对管理者报酬激励与盈余管理的理论分析,建立了理论模型。通过研究,得出如下三个结论：一是推导出盈余管理发生的充分必要条件,即管理者努力提高公司业绩的成本与管理者进行盈余管理的成本之间的权衡；二是这两种成本的高低取决于公司内外治理机制的完善程度；三是盈余管理机会的存在在一定程度上抑制了管理者报酬的激励效应。其次,从管理者报酬激励引发盈余管理的动机和管理者进行盈余管理的可能两方面实证分析了国有控股公司管理者报酬激励对盈余管理的影响。与以往研究相比,本文首先通过对国有控股公司管理者报酬水平与公司业绩之间相关性的实证研究,结果显示两者呈显著正相关,说明管理者可能产生盈余管理的动机；然后,在此基础上,结合我国国有控股公司的治理环境,通过对国有控股公司管理者报酬水平与盈余管理之间相关性的实证研究,结果表明两者呈正相关,说明管理者存在盈余管理行为。最后,将管理者报酬激励效应与盈余管理相结合。本文在实证分析管理者报酬水平与盈余管理相关性的基础上,将盈余管理从公司业绩中剔除,检验管理者报酬激励水平与剔除盈余管理之后的公司业绩之间的关系,结果表明两者呈负相关,说明管理者报酬没有起到应有的激励作用。此外,在上述理论分析与实证分析的基础上,理论联系实际,为完善国有控股公司管理者报酬激励制度从而抑制盈余管理行为提出了一套制度安排,包括合理确定国有控股公司管理者报酬结构、合理确定管理者报酬水平、完善业绩考评制度以及完善国有控股公司管理者报酬披露制度等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Managers’incentive compensation is an important governance mechanism to resolve the agency problem, meanwhile it is one of the motivations of earnings management. It has important theoretical significance and practical significance to study the relationship between the incentive compensation and the earning management of the state-owned companies.Based on the systematic review of the relevant research literature, under the special background of Chinese state-owned companies, this paper integrates the principal-agent theory, property rights theory, incomplete contract theory and other modern economic theories, uses contract analysis, normative analysis, empirical analysis and other research methods, follows the research path of "theoretical research-empirical study-Strategies", studies the topics of " the study of management incentive compensation and earnings management of state-owned companies" in a comprehensive and deep way. Some theoretical and practical valuable ideas and conclusions are obtained in the end.Firstly, this paper analyzes the related theories of incentive compensation and earnings management, and then sets up the theoretical analysis model to illustrate that under the incentive conditions of the incentive related to the performance of the company, the earnings management occurred in the necessary and sufficient conditions, and analyzes the model of earnings management behavior which is resulted by incentive compensation. It finds that the severer the company’s external competitive environment, the greater likelihood of occurrence of earnings management; the higher the costs of earnings management, the more difficult for the managers to conduct earnings management. Therefore the level of the company’s internal governance and external regulatory environment impact the earnings management, and the existence of earnings management opportunities may cause the fail of the incentives mechanism.Secondly, this paper studies the sensitivity of compensation to the performance empirically in order to examine if there are earnings management motivations in the state-owned controlling companies. By analyzing the incentive compensation system background of the state-owned controlling companies, this paper concludes that after the reform for non-tradable shares, the state-owned controlling companies face a more competitive environment and have a higher level of reward incentive intensity, which means that the companies have earnings management motivations. In the empirical result of the study of the sensitivity of management compensation to performance, it is also confirmed that the management incentive compensation is related to the corporate performance, indicating that the state-owned controlling companies have incentive compensation motivation created by the manager incentive compensation.Finally, this paper empirically tests if the earnings management motivation created by incentive compensation can weaken the effectiveness of incentives. Empirical research covers that the governance effect will be affected if the incentive mechanism creates the earnings management behavior, which is a certain kind of inefficiency of governance.Based on the above findings, this paper puts forward the system arrangement advices to improve the manager incentive compensation and the system arrangement of the corporate governance of state-owned controlling companies.更多还原