【作者】 王竹园；

【导师】 赵德志；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 企业管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 迄今为止,我国资本市场发展的历程尚不足二十年,与西方发达国家相比,各项法规、制度尚不够完善,这就给各类终极股东对上市公司采取隧道行为提供了可乘之机。终极股东的隧道行为是影响我国资本市场健康、稳定发展的“痼疾”。终极股东通过构建“金字塔”式股权结构,对上市公司形成了少数人控制。进而终极股东利用其现金流权与控制权的背离,隐藏在“金字塔”式股权结构的背后,对上市公司采取转移资产,损害上市公司价值,侵害中小股东利益的隧道行为。终极股东的隧道行为违反了证券市场“公开、公平、公正”的基本原则,严重地损害了证券市场的基石——上市公司的健康发展。因此,研究各类终极股东的隧道行为的治理,对完善上市公司治理、保护中小股东合法权益,促进上市公司的可持续发展,有着极为重要的现实意义与学术价值。论文以2007年12月31日前的上市公司为研究对象,以监督与防范上市公司终极股东的隧道行为为主题。采取以实证研究为主、规范研究为辅的方法。在国外学者LLSV等人与国内学者研究的基础之上,通过对发生隧道行为的上市公司沿控制链追溯到其终极股东,深入地研究了我国上市公司终极股东隧道行为的治理问题。主要的研究内容及结论如下：首先,从终极股东隧道行为的成本与收益方面,构建了终极股东隧道行为的收益函数,以数理分析的方法揭示了终极股东隧道行为的内在动因。得出的结论为：(1)终极股东实施隧道行为所获得的收益大于其所付出的成本,是终极股东采取隧道行为的主要内在动因。(2)终极股东的控制权与现金流权的分离提高了终极股东实施隧道行为的收益,是终极股东隧道行为的重要内在动因。(3)过低的上市公司的市净率,是终极股东实施隧道行为的动因之一。其次,从外部组织制度、控制权的产权性质和法制环境等方面对产生终极股东隧道行为的外部制度根源进行了研究,并以上市公司的经验数据采用多元线性回归的方法进行了验证。得出的结论为：(1)当政府终极股东在其所控制的上市公司中持有的股权比例较低时,隧道行为的程度低于民营性质的终极股东所控制的上市公司。反之,则高于民营性质的终极股东所控制的上市公司。(2)行政级别高的政府终极股东所控制的上市公司隧道行为的程度低于行政级别低的政府终极股东所控制的上市公司。(3)民营终极股东所控制的上市公司其隧道行为程度高于政府终极股东所控制的上市公司。(4)控制链层级较多的政府终极股东控制的上市公司,其隧道行为程度低于控制链层级较少的政府终极股东控制的上市公司。(5)控制链层次较多的民营终极股东控制的上市公司,其隧道行为程度高于控制链层次较少的民营终极股东控制的上市公司。(6)法制环境较好的东部沿海地区,及北京、天津地区其上市公司终极股东隧道行为程度低于中西部地区。第三,采用多元线性回归的方法,对如何识别上市公司终极股东的隧道行为进行了实证研究,找出了能够用以判别终极股东隧道行为的指标。具体包括：应收账款、其他应收款、货币持有水平、两权分离度等指标。第四,通过上市公司的经验数据,采用逻辑回归的方法,找到了能够抑制终极股东隧道行为的因素。具体包括：发行境外上市股份、上市公司的规模、审计委员会、限制终极股东在上市公司兼职、较低的终极股东控制权等因素能够抑制终极股东的隧道行为。最后,结合前文的研究成果,对监督与防范终极股东的隧道行为,完善相应的制度与法规,提高上市公司的公司治理水平提出了相应的对策建议。论文主要的创新点是：(1)从终极股东层面分析了其隧道行为的内在动因。(2)综合外部组织结构、产权性质和法制环境三个方面的因素,研究了终极股东隧道行为的外部制度根源,并首次用上市公司的经验数据予以验证。(3)首次用实证的方法找到了能够用以对终极股东隧道行为进行识别的具体指标。(4)用实证的方法找到了内部治理与外部治理中能够对终极股东隧道行为起到抑制作用的因素。更多还原

【Abstract】 Up to now, the capital markets in China have developed for less than 20 years, so the laws, regulations, and systems are far from being perfect when compared with developed countries in the western world. This makes it possible for ultimate shareholders of listed companies to adopt tunneling behaviors, which consists a "chronic illness" that disturbs the normal and steady development of capital markets in China. By constructing the ownership structures of "pyramid" type, ultimate shareholders have realized a minority control of listed companies. Furthermore, ultimate shareholders would conceal themselves in the "pyramid" structure of ownership by making use of the deviation of cash flowing rights and controlling rights; meanwhile, they would adopt tunneling behaviors to transfer the capital, which would harm the value of listed companies, and the interests of small and medium shareholders. The tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders have violated the basic principles of "openness,fairness, and justice", and then seriously undermined the cornerstone of the stock markets, i.e. the healthy development of listed companies.Therefore, the inquiry into the tunneling behaviors by various ultimate shareholders is extremely important both in practice and in academic study, which would improve the governance of listed companies, protect the legitimate rights and interests of small shareholders, and promote the sustainable development of listed companies.This paper takes the listed companies before December 31,2007 as its object; it aims to monitor and prevent the tunneling behaviors of ultimate shareholders of listed companies;and it adopts empirical research as the major method, and standardized research as the supplement method. Based on the study of foreign scholars such as LLSV,and domestic scholars,this paper traces back to the ultimate shareholders along the control chains of listed companies adopting tunneling behaviors; and it thoroughly inquires the tunneling behaviors of ultimate shareholders of listed companies in China.This paper inquires the major contents as follows:Firstly, on the aspect of the costs & benefits of tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders, it builds the profit function of the tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders, and reveals the intrinsic motivation of the tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders with the method of mathematical analysis. The conclusions are as follows:(1) In the tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders, the benefits are greater than the costs, which is the main ultimate motivation of the tunnel acts by ultimate shareholders.(2) The deviation of cash flowing rights and cash controlling rights has increased the profit of the tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders, which is an important intrinsic motivation behind the tunnel acts by ultimate shareholders.(3) The book value of listed companies is too low, which is a certain motivation behind the tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders.Secondly, this paper inquires the external system source by which the tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders have come into being, including the external organizational system, property nature of controlling rights, and legal environment; and it further exams it, using the empirical data of listed companies with the method of Multiple linear regression. The conclusions are as follows:(1) When the Equity ratio holding by the ultimate shareholders of government in the listed companies under its control is too low, the extent of the tunneling behaviors is lower than the listed companies controlled by private ultimate shareholders. On the contrary, it is higher than the listed companies controlled by private ultimate shareholders.(2) The extent of the tunneling behaviors in the listed companies controlled by the ultimate shareholders of higher governmental degree is lower than those controlled by the ultimate shareholders of lower governmental degree.(3) The extent of the tunneling behaviors in the listed companies controlled by private ultimate shareholders is higher than those controlled by the ultimate shareholders of government.(4)To the listed companies controlled by the ultimate shareholders of government with more controlling chain-levels, the extent of the tunneling behaviors is lower than those controlled by the ultimate shareholders of government with fewer controlling chain-levels.(5) To the listed companies controlled by private ultimate shareholders with more controlling chain-levels, the extent of the tunneling behaviors is higher than those controlled by private ultimate shareholders with less controlling chain-levels.(6) To the listed companies in the eastern coastal areas, or Beijing and Tianjin, where there is a better legal environment, the extent of the tunneling behaviors is lower than those in the central and western regions.Thirdly, using the method of multiple linear regressions, this paper conducts an Empirical Study about the tunnel acts by ultimate shareholders of listed companies, and find out the indicators by which the tunneling behaviors of ultimate shareholders can be identified, including asset size, receivables, other receivables, current ratio, the degree of separation between two rights.Fourthly, with the empirical data of listed companies, this paper uses the method of logistic regression, and finds out the issues that can control the tunneling behaviors of ultimate shareholders, including:the issuance of overseas shares, the size of listed companies, the Audit Committee, a limitation about the part-time job of ultimate shareholders in listed companies, and lower controlling power by ultimate shareholders.Lastly, on the ground of the research above, it provides corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for supervising and preventing tunnel acts by ultimate shareholders, improving relevant systems and regulations, and developing corporate governance of listed companies.The main innovations of this paper are as follows:(1) From the aspect of ultimate shareholders, it analyses the intrinsic motivation of their tunneling behaviors.(2)It considers the three aspects such as the External Organization, Property Rights and legal environment comprehensively; it studies the external source of systems; and it exams with empirical data of listed companies for the first time.(3)For the first time, it finds out the concrete indicators for identifying the tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders in an empirical way.(4)It finds out the issue which can be used to control the tunneling behaviors by ultimate shareholders in Internal & external Governance.更多还原