【作者】 刘强；

【导师】 覃成林；

【作者基本信息】 河南大学 ， 区域经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 中国的改革开放是从计划向市场转型的过程,也是政府角色从资源配置者转向公共服务提供者的过程。我国实现这种转换的重要策略之一就是“放权让利”:一方面国家将经济资源的配置权力下放到企业,另一方面中央将经济资源的配置权力部分下放到地方政府,前者可以称之为“市场化”,后者即为“行政性分权”。尽管“放权让利”改革并不是利益主体之间展开激烈竞争的充分条件,但毫无疑问的是,上世纪80年代开始的放权让利和一系列分权化改革,提高了基层经济决策主体的地位,突显了利益主体的利益自主权,加剧了地方政府在经济领域的竞争,地方政府之间的竞争也逐渐进入了“为增长而竞争”的阶段。那么,我们应如何评价在这个阶段里地方政府竞争行为对地区经济增长的影响呢?换句话说,地方政府竞争行为是地区经济增长的动力还是阻力?推动经济增长的影响是大于还是小于阻碍经济增长的影响呢?本文将对以上问题进行研究。本文认为,随着财政分权体制在中国逐步确立,地方政府利益独立化,地方政府之间为经济利益展开了越来越激烈的竞争,同时地方政府官员的晋升制度进一步强化了地方政府之间的竞争激励。地方政府之间的竞争方式大体上可以分为对抗性竞争、差异化竞争和合作性竞争,本文分别以税收竞争、公共支出竞争为例来分析前两类竞争方式的经济效应得失,认为这两类竞争方式尽管对地区经济增长有一定的正效应,但负面效应也不容忽视,恶性化竞争的趋势将抵消竞争的正效应。同时,随着地方政府竞争的加剧,地方政府在实施差异化竞争过程中,将发现通过制度创新能够获得长期的垄断性的竞争优势。因此,通过建立良好的差异性的制度环境吸引区外的经济资源,将成为各地方政府实施差异化竞争方式的最终选择。这样的竞争方式引发了各地区在制度层面上实现大规模的变迁,推动中国从计划经济逐渐向市场经济转型,有效地促进了改革开放以来中国连续30年的经济增长。但需要注意的是,由于约束地方政府竞争行为制度安排上的缺失,使得地方政府的竞争行为对地区经济转型和经济增长也产生了一些不容忽视的负面影响。这些负面影响如不能得到及时消除,将严重影响中国的经济转型进程,并最终降低中国经济增长的效率和速度。本文的基本结论:一是过度的对抗性竞争不利于地区经济增长,差异化竞争则引致了地区经济合作;二是地方政府推动制度创新以形成长期的竞争优势;三是地方政府竞争推动了地区经济转型,进而促进了地区经济增长;四是由于对地方政府行为的约束机制不完善,地方政府竞争对地区经济增长产生负面效应。本文对相关理论的贡献在于两个方面:一是初步理清了地方政府竞争影响地区经济增长的路径;二是揭示了地方政府竞争对地区经济转型和经济增长产生负面影响的原因。为了进一步完善中国的地方政府竞争,本文认为应从以下四个方面采取措施:一是建立制度化和法制化的中央与地方分权关系;二是构建以基本公共服务均等化为目标的地方公共财政体系;三是逐步形成科学规范的官员政绩考核体系;四是设置有效的跨区域协调管理机构。更多还原

【Abstract】 China’s reform-opening is a process changing from the planned economy to the market adapted, meanwhile the role of government is shifting from allocating resources to providing public services. One of the most important strategies China chooses to achieve this transformation is to decentralizing authority. China’s decentralization reformation can be divided into two parts, one is that the government releases the authority of allocating economic resources to the enterprises, another is that the central government decentralizes parts of authority of allocating economic resources to the local government. The former part is called "marketization", while the later one is "administration decentralization". Although the decentralization reformation is not a full condition to fierce the competition among the interest bodies, there is no doubt that it raises the status of the grass-roots economic decision-making body, and exacerbates the competition among local governments in economic fields since the 80s of the last century, and the competition gradually enters into the stage of“compete for growth”. Then how to evaluate the affection on economic growth with these competitive practices? In other words, is the local government competitive behavior a driving force or an obstacle to the regional economic growth? Or which force exerts more affection if both exist at the same time? We will carry a deep investigation and analysis on above questions in this paper.With the gradual establishment of the fiscal decentralization system in China, the independent interest of the local government is highlighted and this give rise to the situation that they compete fiercely for the economic interests, what is more, the promotion system of local officer strengthen the competition among local governments. The forms of competition among local governments can be divided into antagonistic competition, differentiation competition and cooperative competition in general. Here we’ll analyze the gain and loss on economic effect of antagonistic competition and differentiation competition by enumerating the competition affection on the area of tax and public spending. Although these two competition patterns exert the result of promoting the regional economic growth, the negative effect should not be ignored because the trend of vicious competition would offset the positive effect. On the other hand, along with the intense and intense competition among local governments, they would find that they are able to obtain a long-term monopolistic advantage by institutional innovation. So the effort to setup a nice and different institutional environment for attracting the resources outside their region would sure comes to be the final selection by local governments. These competition patterns trigger a large-scale institution innovation among local governments. This promotes the Chinese economic reformation from centralized planned to market adapted, and effectively stimulates the economic growth which went on for over 30 years. However, it should to be noticed that the lack of institutional restriction to the competition behavior of the local government results in a negative effect to the regional economic transition and economic growth. If this defection was not eliminated quickly, it would seriously damage the process of China’s economic reformation and would finally slow down the efficiency and speed of Chinese economy.The final conclusion of this paper is as follows: Firstly, excessive antagonistic competition pattern is not conducive to regional economic growth while the differentiation competition pattern leads to regional economic cooperation. Secondly, the local governments hope to promote institutional innovation in order to form a long-term competitive advantage. Thirdly, the competition among local governments promotes the regional economic transition which stimulates the regional economic growth. Finally, because of the defect in restraint mechanism on competition behavior, the competition among local governments produces a negative effect to regional economic growth. The contribution of this paper to the relevant theory is incarnated with two aspects: Firstly, it initially sorts out a path on how local government competition affects regional economic growth. Secondly, it reveals the reasons why the competition among local governments does harm to the regional economic transition and economic growth. In order to consummate the local government competition mechanism in China, the following four actions should be taken: Firstly, we should establish an institutional and legalized decentralization relation between the central and local governments. Secondly, we should construct the local public finance system aiming to equalize the basic public services. Thirdly, we should improve the evaluation system for government officials. Finally, we should establish an effective inter-regional coordination and management department.更多还原