【作者】 王永；

【导师】 赵增耀；

【作者基本信息】 苏州大学 ， 金融学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 随着中国资本市场的发展和上市公司质量的逐步改善,公司控制权的作用逐渐凸现,与此同时,如何防止上市公司实际控制人滥用控制权实现私有收益、最终“掏空”上市公司、侵害中小股东权益等问题也正在成为理论界和公司实践共同关注的焦点。本文在全面梳理国内外有关控制权、控制权配置、控制权私有收益、控制权市场、控制权与绩效关系等相关文献的基础上,首先,结合企业理论的发展过程界定了控制权的具体含义—剩余控制权,介绍了基于终极所有权的控制权度量方法,分析了控制权收益成本的非对称性和控制权私有收益实现的条件等基本理论;接着,在理论部分重点阐述了当今企业所处的商业环境—“非连续性”的一般特点及其对公司价值创造过程、公司经营的各个层面、以及不同层面经营绩效的影响,并构建了基于非连续性环境、现金流视角的公司价值创造动态模型,深刻剖析了公司控制权与经营绩效指标投入资本报酬率、现金股利分配率和现金持有比例之间的理论关系;最后,分析了我国民营上市公司控制权结构的统计特征,并进行了国际比较,同时以“德隆系”为例,探讨了我国民营上市公司控制权结构形成的根本原因是实现控制权私有收益。在上述理论模型构建和现状成因分析的基础上,本文提出了我国民营上市公司控制权结构与经营绩效关系的理论假说,并利用150家民营上市公司、连续五年共750个样本数据,分别从公司的产品经营、资产经营、资本经营等不同层面展开实证检验。在产品经营层面,本文在控制了影响自由现金流其它驱动因素的前提下,检验了投入资本报酬率与控制权结构之间的关系。研究发现,在民营上市公司的经营环节,现金流权的激励效应是主要的,尤其在相对控制组激励效应最为明显,当实际控制人完全控制公司的时候,实现公司规模的扩张将是他们的共同冲动和最终选择。另外,我们没有发现实际控制人利用关联交易实现私有收益的直接证据。在资产经营层面,本文以公司总资产中流动性最强的资产—现金为例,重点分析了控制权结构与现金持有比例之间的关系。研究发现控制权比例是影响样本公司资产经营尤其是现金持有决策的主要因素,具体表现为,随着控制权比例的上升,现金持有比例会显著提高;而在通过兼并重组上市的公司中,控制权比例以42.2%为界对于现金持有的影响表现出区间差异。进一步分析超额现金持有的程度与控制权特征变量之间关系,结果表明现金流权比例的提高,超额持有的程度越高,另一方面,控制权比例的提高可以减缓现金持有不足的程度。最后,我们发现样本公司现金持有比例与其预期成长性机会以及现金股利分配需要等因素均无显著关系,这进一步证明超额现金持有的“隧道效应”存在。在资本经营层面,本文首先对民营上市公司现金股利分配倾向进行了定性分析,并利用单因素方差分析和非参数秩和进一步检验,均未发现其与控制权结构特征有显著的关系。但是,当进一步考察现金股利分配力度等定量指标,并运用相关分析、回归分析等手段时,我们发现民营上市公司的现金股利分配力度与实际控制人现金流权的二次项存在显著正相关,同时还发现民营上市公司的现金股利分配力度与公司的财务状况包括每股经营活动现金流、公司的成长性指标等都没有必然的联系,尤其值得注意的是分配力度与公司每股收益表现出不合常理的负相关关系。此外,我们还发现了在2005和2006两个股权分置改革年度,民营上市公司现金股利分配力度系统性加强的证据,可见,民营上市公司实际控制人超能力派现的短期行为非常明显,但是在实际控制人指定管理层的上市公司,现金分配力度与现金流权虽然同样存在显著正相关关系,但是平均分红水平要略低一些。根据前文控制权结构与经营绩效关系的理论推演和实证检验的结果,本文最后提出如下三点建议:第一、加快多层次资本市场体系建设,推动家族企业社会化进程;第二、健全民营上市公司控制权结构等信息披露制度,提高资本市场监督功能;第三、民营企业自身要树立科学发展观,增强持续增长能力。尽管本文对我国民营上市公司控制权结构与其经营绩效关系问题进行了深入、细致的研究,但是由于控制权是一个非常复杂的问题,除了现金流权、控制权等定量指标外,股东会和董事会的构成及决策机制、管理层的素质等等都会影响公司的经营绩效,另外,对度量公司绩效的指标也存在进一步深化和系统化的必要性,因此,本文的结论仍然需要进行进一步的研究。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the development of capital market and improvement of the qulity of listed companies in China, the pattern of corporate control rights is playing an more and more important role on the corporate financial performance, However, how to prevent the ultimate controlling shareholders tunneling listed company with the aim to private benefits has attracted the wide attention in the practice. From the perspective of ultimate ownership, this paper first investigates the controlling structure of effective controller in chinese private listed companies and some related theoretical questions, then examine the relation between controlling structure and operating performance from the three levels of product or service operating、assets operating and capital operating respectively for the purpose of finding out the common paterrn of private benefits.Due to the popularity of pyramid and cross-holding in chinese Private Listed Companies and the separation between control rights and cash rights, this paper does a measurement of cash flow rights、control rights and the separation rate between them on the basis of ultiamte ownership; makes an anlysis of control right’s cost and benefits、the condition of attaining for private benefits and the ways to private benefits. In conjuction with non-continued company situation, this paper constructs an theory framework of company value creating process, especially explores the value creating principle of free cash flow and the real option value of non-operating assets,deeply study on the controlling structure and operating performance indicators such as ROIC、Cash rate、Cash dividends payout rate,finally, characterize chinese private listed companies controlling structure and make a compare internationally, and take delong corporate for example, conclude the intrinsic reason as private benefits.On the basis of the above theoretical and situation analysis , this paper proposes a series of hypothesis about the relations between controlling structure and performance from the three different levels of operating、asset and capital respectively. We employ CCER database to produce our sample about the effective controller’s control rights、cash rights and the separation rate of 150 private listed companies、during the five years of 2003-2007, use various econometric tools to conduct direct and indirect tests on the above hypothesis, disclose whether the private benefits exists in private listed companies,and if so, what is the means to the end?On the level of product operating, the paper carried empirical study on the relationship between Return On Invested Capital(ROIC) and controlling structure. The results show that control rights mainly have the convergence-of-interest effect , especially in the panel of comparative controling, while the effective controller entirely control the company, maximizing the company’s size would be their common motive and choice. It is not found that the direct evidence of the expropriation effect is significiently exist.On the level of assets operating, this paper takes the most liquidity asset—cash as example and examine the relationship between cash holding ratio and controlling structure. The results show that control rights are the major influence in the asset operating decision, particually in the decision of cash holding ratio.concretely, as the control rights increase, the cash holding ratio rises significiently. In the panel of m&a, when the control rights is higher than 42.2%, its influence on the cash holding ratio is positive, conversely, when the control rights is lower than 42.2%, the reverse is ture. Futhure examination shows that the degree of excessive cash holding would rise as the cash rights increase. On the other hand, control rights may relieve the degree of shortage of cash holding ratio. Lastly, we don’t found any evidence for excessive cash holding due to expected growth opportunity.On the level of capital operating, we first analyze the preferrence of cash dividend payout in chinese private listed companies qualitatively, and then employ the one-way ANOVA and nonparametric tests, the results show that the preferrence of cash dividends payout and control structure have no significiantly relation. However, when we examine the such quantitative variables as the ratio of cash dividend payout and employ the correlate and regression anlysis tools, it is found that the cash dividend payout ratio and cr2 have significantly positively related, meanwhile, the cash dividend payout ratio have no relation with various kinds of financial ratios yet, such as ROIC、cash holding ratio、operating cash flow per share and growth rate etc.in addition, we find out that during the year of 2005-2006, cash dividend payout ratio systematicaly increase, so the conclusion comes down that effective controller make cash dividend decision only in the short term for the private benefits. Given the management appointed this the expropriation effect would be a bit lower.Eventually, based on the theoretical evolution and situation analysis, this paper comes to the following three enlightments:the first is to construct various levels capital market and help the private companies with socialization process, the second is to perfect the information disclosure system and improve the governance function of capital market, the last is to establish the sustainable growth principle and enforce this capacity.Although the paper has studied control structure and financial performance entirely, due to the complexity of control rights, the further study would be necessary in the future.更多还原