【作者】 戴芳；

【导师】 王爱民；

【作者基本信息】 河北农业大学 ， 林业经济管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本项研究的目的在于,在清晰界定林权及林权制度等相关概念的基础上,从工业化进程视角,对建国后林权制度变迁过程进行深入分析,找出影响林权制度安排政策效果的重要因素,总结出林权制度变迁的规律性,并对林权制度变迁的未来政策取向提出建议。为了达成这一目的,主要进行了以下研究并形成了相应研究结论：第一,以产权理论和制度变迁理论为主要理论依据,对林权以及林权制度等相关概念进行清晰界定。形成的研究要点如下：林权是指以森林资源为客体所建立的所有权、使用权、收益权和处置权的一组权利束；林权制度是以林权为依托,在清晰界定林权权利束中各具体权利边界的基础上,将林权所包括的所有权、使用权、收益权和处置权在林权主体之间进行配置,并对各林权主体责、权、利的边界进行清晰界定,以制度形式对形成的林权配置结构予以认可和保护的一系列行为规范的总称。第二,在对工业化进程进行阶段划分的基础上,着重分析河北省处于不同工业化阶段林权制度变迁的动因、特征、林权配置结构及政策效果,总结林权制度变迁的规律性。形成的结论如下：以经济发展阶段理论为理论依据,选取人均GDP、产业结构、就业结构、霍夫曼指数、恩格尔系数和人口城市化率六项指标,运用阶段性阈值法对河北省及福建、浙江、江苏等对比省份的工业化进程进行阶段划分；特定时期的林权制度安排是由当时的经济发展水平、森林资源禀赋、国家意志、历史习惯习俗以及利益相关主体之间的博弈等诸多因素共同决定的,随着工业化进程的推进,林权制度发生变迁,工业化进程对林权制度变迁产生了非常重要的影响,但由于各个国家或地区在自然资源禀赋、国家意志、历史习惯习俗、意识形态以及民主程度等诸多方面存在差异,导致林权制度变迁呈现出不同的路径依赖；通过对林业投资、造林面积、森林覆盖率、林地面积、木材产量、林业产值等指标的量化比较,以及对农户与集体组织之间、农户与农户之间的博弈分析,评判各阶段林权制度安排的政策效果；工业化进程由低级向高级的发展过程决定了林权制度变迁的规律性,逐渐由保障对森林资源单一需求的林权制度安排转变为保障对森林资源多种功能需求的林权制度安排。第三,以委托代理理论等为理论依据,分析了影响林权制度安排政策效果的主要因素,在此基础上运用比较分析法对不同林权类型在不同工业化阶段的政策效果进行比较分析。形成的结论如下：林权制度安排政策效果除了受林权制度安排本身的合理性影响之外,还会受到林权制度变迁方式、林权制度安排的完善性、林权制度安排执行的有效性以及林权制度安排受保护的程度和稳定性等多种因素的影响,各因素相互作用,共同决定了林权制度安排的政策效果；私有林权制度安排通常适用于以发挥经济功能为主的森林资源,同时需满足林产品市场化程度较高等条件,集体林权制度安排界定给以发挥经济功能为主和以发挥生态功能为主的森林资源皆可,通常情况下,国有林权适宜界定给以发挥生态功能为主的森林资源,或是大面积成片的、其他林权主体难以经营的森林资源。林权类型与工业化阶段之间并不存在着严格的对应关系。第四,以公共物品理论为理论依据,利用Binary logistic回归分析方法和交叉列联分析法等计量经济学方法以及博弈论方法对河北省林权制度变迁的未来政策取向进行实证分析。形成的研究要点如下：以经营林地的规模和林业收入占家庭收入的比重为标准,运用快速聚类分析法将样本农户进行大户和小户的分类,分别对其进行Binary logistic回归分析,得出结论认为,各因素对大户与小户产生影响的方向和程度有所不同；运用交叉列联分析法对农户进行林种选择的影响因素进行分析,并对政府与农户选择公益林和商品林的博弈过程分别构建博弈模型,得出结论认为,增强农户对获得收益的预期、提高非农收入的比重、降低采伐限额标准以及增加对速生林生态效益补偿有助于激励农户选择经营速生林,在更大程度上推动林业经济效益和生态效益的协调。更多还原

【Abstract】 The purpose of the study is to analyze the change process of forest property rights institution after 1949, and to find out the important factor which influencing the policy effect of forest property rights institution arrange, as well as to summarize the discipline of the change of forest property rights institution on the bases of defending the notions of forest property rights and forest property rights institution clearly and from the perspective of the industrialization process, and then give the advice about the future of the change of forest property rights institution. In order to achieve this purpose, the study revolved around the contents as follow and came to corresponding conclusions:Firstly, it is to define the notion of forest property rights and forest property rights institution clearly on the bases of pro perty rights theory and institutional change theory. The conclusions as following:Defined the notion of forest property rights as a band of rights including the rights of ownership, use, usufruct and disposition for forest resource; the forest property rights institution is a ge neral form of a series of conduct code that configuring the ownership, use, usufruct and disposition which forest property rights including, and defining the responsibilities, rights and interests among different forest property body, and then recognizing and protecting the configuration structure of forest property rights by the form of institution, bases of defining the boundary of the every septic rights which forest property rights including clearly.Secondly, on the bases of dividing the stage of industrialization process in Hebei Province, the paper analyzed the motive, characteristics, configuration structure of the forest property rights and the policy effects of the change of forest property rights institution at different stage of industrialization process in Hebei Province, and summarized the discipline of the change of forest property rights institution. The conclusions are as follows:On the bases of the stages of economic development theory, the paper selected six indicators including per GDP, industrial structure, employment structure, Hoffman’s index, the Engel coefficient and population urbanization rate, and divided the stages of industrialization process using the method of periodic threshold; at different stages of industrialization, the motivations which promoting the change of forest property rights institution were various, but it is fundamental decided by the industrialization process. The ultimate purpose of the change of forest property rights institution is to meet the different needs for forest resources at different stage of industrialization; the forest property rights institution arrangements at different stages of industrialization are determinate by economic development level, forest resource endowment, historical customs and habits, as well as the game among the relevant stakeholders, and so on. evaluate the policy effects of the forest property rights institution arrangements at different stages of industrialization through comparing the quantitative of forestry investment, afforestation area, forest cover, forest area, timber production, forestry production and other indicators, as well as analyzing the game process between farmers and collective organizations, and among farmers; the development process of industrialization which from low-level to high-level decided the discipline of the change of forest property rights institution, the forest property rights institution arrangement transform gradually from on the purpose of ensuring meeting the single need for forest resource to on the purpose of ensuring meeting the multiple needs for forest resource.Thirdly, the paper analyzed the main factors which affect the police effect of forest property rights institution arrangement on the bases of agent theory and institutional change theory, and then compared the police effect of different type of forest property rights at different stage of industrialization using the method of comparison. The conclusions are as follows:The police effect of forest property rights institution arrangement are not only affected by the reasonable of forest property rights institution arrangement, but also affected by the suitability between forest property rights institution arrangement and supporting measures, the effectiveness of forest property rights institution arrangement and supporting measures, and the protection level of forest property rights institution arrangements as well as the stability, each factor interacted, and determined the police effect of forest property rights institution arrangement; generally specking, the private forest property rights institution arrangement is suitable for the forest resource with economic function mainly, at the same time, it should satisfy the condition of higher marketable extent of forest product and blameless supporting measures; the collective forest property rights institution arrangement should be endowed to forest resource with economic function or ecological function, in order to remedy the drawback of scatter management and lack of stretch; the state-owned forest property rights institution arrangement is suitable for the forest resource with ecological function mainly, or a large area forest resource, or the forest resource which is difficult for other bodies to management. But, it is not correspondence strictly between the type of forest property rights and the stage of industrialization.Fourthly, on the bases of public goods theory, the paper analyzed the police of the change of forest property rights institution in the future using the methods of econometrics such as Binary logistic regression analysis and cross-column joint analysis methods. The main study points are as follows:Selecting the scale of forest land and the proportion of forestry income in total income as the standard, the paper divided the farm holders to with rapid cluster analysis method, and analyzed by Binary logistic regression method. It is concluded that the direction and extent are different for bigger farmer and smaller farmer; the paper analyzed the influence factors for farm holders to the select the type of forest with the cross-listed method, and built the game model reflecting the game process between government and farm holders for operating the public forest and commercial forest. It is concluded that it is important for motivating the coordination to larger extent to enhance the farmers’expectance of abstaining benefits, reduce the standards of cutting quotas and increase the speed of forest ecological benefits compensation.更多还原